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Abstract 
Involving stakeholders in water governance is becoming an increasingly important 
topic in England. In this thesis I consider this ambition from the farming perspective, by 
investigating the potential for farmers to cooperate and participate in water 
governance. This dynamic is viewed through the conceptual lens of adaptive 
comanagement, an approach which its proponents claim can achieve the dual focus of 
ecosystem protection and livelihood sustainability under conditions of change and 
uncertainty. The relevance of adaptive comanagement is highlighted by the increasing 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding water governance in England, amongst other 
things because of the effects of climate change and a growing population. 
The research adopts an integrated methodological approach that revolves around a 
“politicised” version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework. 
Initially, three separate analyses investigate the context surrounding farming and 
water governance. The results of the contextual phase are incorporated into a more 
focused analysis, involving five farmer irrigator groups in the lowlands of eastern 
England. Here the intention is to explore the broader issues the research raises by 
investigating the potential for these groups to comanage water resources. Nine factors 
of success are identified, from which deeper, more abstract causal mechanisms are 
inferred. The relevance of the findings are discussed in relation to farming and water 
governance in England going forwards.  
Several key outcomes emerge from this research, including: 1) a theoretical and 
practical demonstration of the applicability of the politicised IAD Framework to studies 
of adaptive comanagement, 2) an understanding of the ways in which power, policy, 
and levels of trust influence the ability of lowland farmers to cooperate and participate 
in water governance, 3) specific strategies that can be used to develop comanagement 
arrangements between farmer groups and water managers. 
Key words: Water governance, adaptive comanagement, farming, power, lowland 
England 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Keith Weatherhead, not only for 
your guidance, wise words, and support, but also for allowing me the freedom to 
follow my own path. For this I cannot thank you enough.  
My gratitude goes out to the people who participated in this study. In particular, I 
would like to thank Stephen Richardson, Andrew Alston, Peter Youngs, and Paul 
Hammett for the time you have given me.   
Thank you to Dr Christine McCulloch. I have very much valued the time I have spent 
with you and Jim, and the discussions we have shared during car journeys, and in your 
lovely house and garden. It was great to get out on the river!  
Thank you also to the members of the TWSTT team. Alongside Keith and Christine, 
these are Dr Catarina Henriques, Dr Julian Harou, Dr Luuk Fleskens, Dr Lindsay Beavers, 
Dr Tohid Erfani, and my two fellow PhD students, Thom Swinscoe and Jennifer Garbe. I 
have always enjoyed our meetings together.  
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends. A special thank you to my sister, 
Savannah, for casting a keen literary eye over many of the chapters in this thesis. 
Thank you also to my brother, Jethro, for introducing me to the worlds of climbing and 
cycling! These pursuits have proven to be a vital tonic to the otherwise sedentary 
academic lifestyle that has consumed me over the last three years. 
A thank you to Darcey, our love has buoyed me; often without me even knowing. 
Most of all I would like to thank my parents. As always, your unquestioning love and 
support has given me the strength and belief to pursue what really makes me happy. 
All my achievements stem from you.   
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Thesis Publications 
Whaley, L. and Weatherhead, E.K. 2014. An Integrated Approach to Analyzing 
(Adaptive) Comanagement Using the “Politicized” IAD Framework. Ecology and 
Society 19(1): 10. 
Whaley, L. 2014. Agriculture and Water: Emerging Perspectives on Farmer Cooperation 
and Adaptive Co-management. Outlook on Agriculture 43(4), in press. 
Whaley, L. and Weatherhead, E.K. 2015a. Competition, Conflict, and Compromise: 
Three Discourses used by Irrigators in England and their Implications for the 
Comanagement of Water Resources. Water Alternatives 8(1), in press. 
Whaley, L. and Weatherhead, E.K. 2015b. Power-Sharing in the English Lowlands? The 
Political Economy of Farmer Participation and Cooperation in Water Governance. 
Water Alternatives 8(1), in press. 
Whaley, L. and Weatherhead, E.K. (under review). Managing Water through Change 
and Uncertainty: Comparing Lessons from the Adaptive Comanagement Literature 
to Recent Policy Developments in England. Submitted to Ecology and Society. 
Whaley, L. and Weatherhead, E.K. (under review). Using the Politicised IAD Framework 
to Analyse Comanagement: Farming and Water Resources in England. Submitted 
to Ecology and Society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ......................................................................................... xi 
List of Tables ............................................................................. xi 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................. xv 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................ 1 
1.1 Research background and rationale .................................................. 1 
1.1.1 Adaptive comanagement: The rise of a new paradigm ................ 2 
1.1.2 Water governance in England ...................................................... 6 
1.1.3 Farming and water governance in England .................................. 7 
1.2 Research aim ..................................................................................... 9 
1.3 Research framework ....................................................................... 10 
1.4 Research objectives ......................................................................... 11 
1.5 Definitions of key terms .................................................................. 14 
1.6 Outline of thesis .............................................................................. 16 
Chapter 2: Applying the Politicised IAD Framework to (Adaptive) 
Comanagement ........................................................................ 21 
Prologue: ............................................................................................... 21 
Paper 1 .................................................................................................. 23 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 24 
2.2 The development of comanagement theory ................................ 25 
2.3 Methodological considerations .................................................... 27 
2.4 The politicised IAD Framework ..................................................... 28 
2.5 Applying the Framework to (adaptive) comanagement ................ 36 
2.6 Conclusion .................................................................................... 47 
Epilogue ................................................................................................ 48 
Chapter 3: Research Design ......................................................... 51 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 51 
3.2 Research paradigm: Critical realism ................................................. 53 
3.3 Research strategy ............................................................................ 59 
3.4 Methods .......................................................................................... 64 
3.5 Researcher’s stance ......................................................................... 71 
3.6 Ensuring the quality of the research design ..................................... 74 
viii 
 
3.7 Limitations ....................................................................................... 76 
Chapter 4: Policy Analysis ........................................................... 79 
Prologue ................................................................................................ 79 
Paper 2 .................................................................................................. 81 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 82 
4.2 Adaptive comanagement: Origins and developments .................. 83 
4.3 Key policy considerations for adaptive comanagement ................ 86 
4.4 Water policy in England ................................................................ 89 
4.5 Discussion ..................................................................................... 95 
4.6 Conclusion .................................................................................... 97 
Chapter 5: Political Economy Analysis ............................................ 99 
Prologue ................................................................................................ 99 
Paper 3 ................................................................................................ 101 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 102 
5.2 Analysing power using the Power Cube ...................................... 103 
5.3 Lowland farming and the water environment: An historical 
perspective ....................................................................................... 106 
5.4 Discussion ................................................................................... 125 
5.5 Conclusion .................................................................................. 130 
Chapter 6: Discourse Analysis .................................................... 133 
Prologue .............................................................................................. 133 
Paper 4 ................................................................................................ 135 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 136 
6.2 Theory and method .................................................................... 137 
6.3 Results ........................................................................................ 144 
6.4 Discussion ................................................................................... 155 
6.5 Conclusion .................................................................................. 160 
Chapter 7: Case Study Analysis ................................................... 163 
Prologue .............................................................................................. 163 
Paper 5 ................................................................................................ 165 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 166 
7.2 Water abstractor groups in England ........................................... 168 
7.3 Methodology .............................................................................. 169 
7.4 Results ........................................................................................ 173 
ix 
 
7.5 The findings in their wider context ............................................. 186 
7.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................... 190 
Chapter 8: Conclusions ............................................................. 193 
8.1 Review ........................................................................................... 193 
8.2 Conclusions ................................................................................... 195 
8.3 Recommendations ........................................................................ 200 
8.3.1 For policy makers..................................................................... 200 
8.3.2 For researchers and further research ...................................... 203 
Literature Cited ....................................................................... 205 
Appendix 1: Extended Interview Schedule .................................... 229 
Appendix 2: Information Sheet and Interview Consent Form............ 233 
Appendix 3: Analysing Action Situations……….…………………………..……..237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 The narrowing scope of the analysis. ....................................... 12 
Figure 2.1 The IAD Framework ................................................................. 28 
Figure 2.2 The action situation of the IAD Framework ............................. 29 
Figure 2.3 The linkages among rules and levels of analysis.. .................... 29 
Figure 2.4 The politicised IAD Framework ................................................ 31 
Figure 3.1 The process of employing the politicised IAD Framework ....... 51 
Figure 3.2 The cross-disciplinary nature of the research. ......................... 53 
Figure 3.3 Basic elements of a realist explanation .................................... 60 
Figure 3.4 Wallace’s inductive-deductive cycle. ....................................... 66 
Figure 3.5 The different approaches to case study design………………….…..69 
Figure 5.1 The Power Cube..................................................................... 103 
Figure 5.2 Power dynamic governing farming and water management. 127 
Figure 6.1 Dominance of the three interpretive repertoires .................. 145 
Figure 7.1 Location of abstractor groups in England and Wales ............. 170 
Figure 7.2 The politicised IAD Framework. ............................................. 172 
Figure 7.3 Contribution of four abstractor groups to comanagement. ... 178 
Figure 7.4 Contribution of the LWT scheme to comanagement ............. 182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 Relationship between the politicised IAD Framework and 
(adaptive) comanagement ....................................................................... 37 
Table 3.1 The three ontological domains for scientific investigation. ....... 57 
Table 3.2 The six positions a researcher may adopt ................................. 71 
Table 4.1 Five key policy categories for the adaptive comanagement of 
water ........................................................................................................ 85 
Table 4.2 Seven key English water policy documents ............................... 89 
Table 5.1 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power 
Cube’s three dimensions for the period 1939-1959 ............................... 106 
Table 5.2 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power 
Cube’s three dimensions for the period 1960 - 1983 ............................. 108 
Table 5.3 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power 
Cube’s three dimensions for the period 1984-1999 ............................... 113 
Table 5.4 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power 
Cube’s three dimensions for the period 2000 until the present ............. 120 
Table 6.1 Seven comanagement activities.. ............................................ 139 
Table 6.2 Checklist of elements for analysing interpretive repertoires.. . 143 
Table 6.3 The elements of the competition repertoire. .......................... 146 
Table 6.4 The elements of the conflict repertoire. ................................. 150 
Table 6.5 The elements of the compromise repertoire. ......................... 154 
Table 7.1 The seven comanagement activities. ...................................... 172 
Table 7.2 Factors of success and generative mechanisms. ..................... 183 
Table A3-1 Water allocation between LWT members at the operational 
level………………………………………………………………………………………………………237 
Table A3-2 The rules devised by the LWT group to allocate water.……….239 
Table A3-3 Examples of each of the seven types of rules-in-use……………242 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
List of Abbreviations 
CAMS  Catchment Abstraction Management Strategy 
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy 
CBA   Catchment Based Approach 
DEFRA   Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs 
EA   Environment Agency 
EC   European Commission 
EC   European Community 
EEC   European Economic Community 
EU   European Union 
ESS   Environmental Stewardship Scheme 
GAEC   Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions 
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
IDB   Internal Drainage Board 
MAF   Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
MAFF   Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food 
NE   Natural England 
NFU   National Farmers Union 
RA   River Authority 
RB   River Board 
RBMP   River Basin Management Plan 
RT   The Rivers Trust  
RSPB   Royal Society for the Protection of Birds  
UN   United Nations 
UNCED  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
UNECE  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
UNEP   United Nations Environment Programme  
xvi 
 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
WAG  Water Abstractor Group 
WCED   World Commission on Environment and Development 
WFD   Water Framework Directive 
WTO   World Trade Organisation 
WWF   World Wildlife Foundation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research background and rationale 
“Water is life” appears to be an almost ubiquitous turn of phrase these days, kick-
starting the introduction or opening chapter to what feels like nearly every publication 
on the subject of water. Yet, from a slightly different perspective, we might say that 
“water is opportunity”. To the extent that it is an opportunity for life is clear when 
considering humankind’s great quest to find life in outer space. Despite mindboggling 
advances in the sophistication and performance of the technologies at our disposal, 
and an ever-deepening understanding of biology and biological processes, the first sign 
of life we look for is not DNA but a much simpler chemical compound: we look for 
water (Rayner, 2011). On earth, the intrinsic relationship between water and life can 
be seen everywhere. Thus even in the most arid hills and mountain ranges one may 
find green-tinted valley bottoms, hinting at the presence of water. Indeed, wherever 
water flows and gathers, life is bound to follow; from the moss-clad gaps between 
inner-city paving stones, to palm and shrub-lined desert oases; from the alluvial 
floodplains along the river Nile, to the vast, verdant growth of our planet’s tropical 
rainforests.   
The human body, like all terrestrial life-forms, behaves essentially as a container for 
water. With a protective, selectively permeable skin, our constant requirement to 
replenish the water we’ve lost through evaporation and other bodily processes is a 
reminder of our aquatic beginnings in prehistoric seas and oceans (Suzuki, 1999). 
Within human societies, the centrality of water to our existence and way of life cannot 
be overstated. It is no coincidence that many of the world’s towns and cities have been 
built adjacent to rivers, lakes, and seas. After all, beyond its basic life-giving function, 
water provides the opportunity for communication, travel, transport, defence, attack, 
ablution, farming, recreation, and many other things besides. It is also no coincidence, 
therefore, that water is fundamental to the spiritual beliefs and values of so many 
human cultures. This is reflected in our religious ceremonies, our creation myths, our 
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literature, our imagery, and our language (Strang, 2004). Yet the array of opportunities 
water provides also means that controlling it offers one further opportunity; the 
opportunity to hold and exercise power.      
1.1.1 Adaptive comanagement: The rise of a new paradigm 
For much of the twentieth century, this power tended to be held centrally by 
technically-minded governments (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008). Within this 
framework, water management, as with other forms of environmental and natural 
resource management, became the preserve of “experts” who were viewed as the 
only ones with the requisite knowledge to participate in decision-making processes 
(Bocking, 2004). However, prompted in part by a recognition that “top-down” forms of 
natural resource management were often proving ineffective, and even resulting in 
resource degradation (Dietz et al. 2003; Holling and Meffet, 1996), the 1990s 
witnessed widespread decentralisation and devolution of management 
responsibilities, particularly among the developing countries of the global south (Ribot, 
2002).1 More recently, this trend has been followed in many developed countries 
(Berkes, 2010; Brunner et al., 2005).2 The changing picture of natural resource 
management has been termed a move “from government to governance” (de Loe et 
al., 2009). Among other things, this phrase emphasises cross-scale interplay and a 
more substantive role for non-governmental actors in decision-making and action, in 
turn making space for stakeholder participation at the local level (Kooiman, 2003). 
Even before this time, scholars were turning their attention to participatory and 
collaborative approaches. Of particular note are the studies undertaken by those 
                                                          
1 There are now many examples where decentralisation appears to have failed to achieve its 
objectives. Whilst this has caused some to reject decentralisation outright, others argue that 
one must look at these failings on a case by case basis, where often a range of different factors 
explain the outcome (Ribot et al., 2006). For example, Larson and Soto (2008: 213) write that 
“policies implemented in the name of decentralization…are often not applied in ways 
compatible with the democratic potential with which decentralization is conceived, and only 
rarely have they resulted in pro-poor outcomes or challenged underlying structures of inequity”. 
2 It seems unlikely that this challenge to the role and responsibilities of “big government” in 
the field of natural resource management is wholly separate from the rise in market 
fundamentalism and the widespread adoption and imposition of neoliberal doctrines during the 
latter decades of the twentieth century (see Harvey 2005). 
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working in the commons tradition, an academic movement which rose to prominence 
in the 1980s, spearheaded by the late Nobel Prizewinning political scientist Elinor 
Ostrom (Dietz et al., 2002; Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Commons theory has 
tended to focus on how communities and groups of resource users, acting without 
assistance or intervention by a larger government, have been able to collectively 
devise rules that enable them to sustainably manage natural resources such as water, 
and the conditions that facilitate this outcome (Wade 1988, Ostrom 1990, Baland and 
Platteau 1996, Agrawal 2002). Out of this endeavour arose an interest in situations 
where community and user groups do not manage in isolation, but instead form 
power-sharing arrangements with governments in order to “comanage” a given 
resource (Berkes et al., 1991; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004; McCay and Acheson, 
1987; Pinkerton, 1989a). Comanagement has been promoted as a way of improving 
the appropriateness, efficiency, and equity of natural resource management 
(Pinkerton, 1989b; Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004). It has also served as a distinct 
challenge to the modus operandi of government managers and experts operating 
within centralised power structures (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Castro and Nielsen 
2001; Ribot et al., 2006). 
Running parallel to the emergence of commons theory, a new mindset has slowly 
pervaded environmental and natural resource management, with significant 
repercussions for approaches to governing water. This understanding questions the 
logic that held sway for much of the twentieth century; a logic that assumed a “stable 
and certain operating environment in which discreet policy problems could be 
addressed rationally and objectively by neutral officials acting alone” (Watson and 
Treffney, 2009: 450). Instead, there is now an emphasis on conceiving of humans in 
nature, rather than humans and nature, as well as a propensity to treat social and 
ecological system as intrinsically coupled (Folke 2006). The dynamics characterising 
these “social-ecological systems” are understood to be inherently complex and 
uncertain, leading to shocks, surprises, and even transformations (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002; Olsson et al., 2006). As with comanagement, these developments have 
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posed serious questions to the underlying assumptions, organisational structure, and 
goals of traditional management approaches. 
The origins of this new perspective can be traced back to non-equilibrium thinking in 
ecology during the 1970s (Holling, 1973), and the emergence of the concept of 
adaptive management (Holling, 1978; Lee, 1993). Adaptive management, which aims 
to treat policies as experiments or testable hypotheses, was promoted as a necessary 
tonic to the prevailing “command and control” management style which its critics 
claimed took the wrong approach to dealing with uncertainty, by attempting only to 
reduce or eliminate it. Such an approach tends to restrict natural variation in order to 
benefit from “a stable flow of goods and services or to reduce destructive or 
undesirable behaviour of those systems” (Holling and Meffet, 1996: 329). One clear 
danger of command and control management is that it is prone to result in 
pathological outcomes, as a loss of natural variability leads to rigid ecosystem 
dynamics with a low adaptive capacity, in turn greatly increasing the chances of system 
collapse (Holling and Meffet, 1996). Furthermore, from a social perspective, this style 
of management tends to be reactionary and inflexible, lacking the innovation to 
manage effectively in an unstable operating environment (Glasbergen, 1998; Pahl-
Wostl, 2006; Pahl-wostl et al., 2007b). In contrast, adaptive management is viewed as 
a way of increasing system resilience in the face of change and uncertainty, where 
much of the theoretical basis for this approach derives from work on complex adaptive 
systems (Levin, 1999). 
In more recent times, the unsettling effects of globalisation and climate change have 
done much to magnify the complexity and uncertainty of the challenges human 
societies face. As Gallopin (2002: 361) writes: 
On the one hand, the world is now moving through a period of extraordinary 
turbulence, reflecting the genesis and intensification of deep economic, social, 
political, and cultural changes associated with the current technologic-
economic revolution. In addition, the speed and magnitude of global change, 
the increasing connectedness of the social and natural systems at the planetary 
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level, and the growing complexity of societies and their impacts upon the 
biosphere result in a high level of uncertainty and unpredictability. These 
changes pose new threats but also new opportunities for humankind…On the 
other hand, the current trends are seen to be unsustainable for both ecological 
and social systems.  
More than ever before, these so-called “super wicked problems” (Lazarus, 2009; Levin 
et al., 2012) have drawn attention to the need to enhance the resilience and adaptive 
capacity of social-ecological systems. With respect to natural resource management, 
one promising response has been to combine the comanagement concept, with its 
emphasis on stakeholder participation and cross-scale interaction, with adaptive 
management, which promotes a learning-by-doing approach. The merger of these two 
narratives, each with their own distinct disciplinary history, has paved the way for a 
new area of enquiry centring on the concept of “adaptive comanagement” (Armitage 
et al., 2009; Armitage et al., 2007a; Olsson et al., 2004a).  
With one foot in commons theory and the other in resilience thinking and complex 
adaptive systems theory, adaptive comanagement is viewed by its proponents as a 
way of securing ecosystem protection and livelihood sustainability under conditions of 
change and uncertainty (Armitage, 2007). However, the cross-disciplinary nature of 
adaptive comanagement demands a wide methodological breadth that is able to 
encompass concepts and approaches deriving from both the natural and the social 
sciences (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014). Thus a challenge for scholars of adaptive 
comanagement relates to the need to develop a common framework that is capable of 
addressing its many dimensions across differing physical and social settings, where at 
present “our tools for conceptualizing and analyzing [the concept] are strikingly blunt” 
(Carlsson and Berkes, 2005: 72). Alongside this, a number of scholars are calling for an 
approach that is also able to ground the normative concepts associated with the 
subject in a critical awareness of how power and context fundamentally influences the 
process and its outcomes (Armitage, 2008; Wilson, 2010).    
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1.1.2 Water governance in England 
On the surface of it, water governance in England shares a number of similarities with 
the global trend from government to governance discussed above. Over the course of 
the last century, controlling the flow and use of water became an increasingly 
technical affair, undertaken by government officials in a system of governance where 
real decision-making power was located at the centre (Parker and Sewell, 1988; 
Watson, 2005; Watson and Treffny, 2009). The twentieth century also witnessed for 
the first time water issues stemming from a shortage of the resource (CAWC, 1960). 
This is in stark contrast to periodic bouts of coastal and riparian flooding, which have 
always challenged the existence and livelihoods of the inhabitants of the British Isles 
(Cook and Williamson, 1999; Purseglove, 1988). A burgeoning population and an 
increasingly consumption-based, materialistic society also brought with it new 
difficulties relating to water pollution, which as time has progressed has moved from 
the singular focus of providing potable water for human use, to the additional goal of 
securing clean water for a healthy aquatic environment (Barker and Turner, 2011). 
Now, alongside a recognition of the new challenges that a growing population and 
changing lifestyle preferences will throw up for water governance in England going 
forwards, there is also a realisation that climate change is fundamentally altering the 
ground upon which much of the thinking concerning the environment and its 
management has traditionally been based. 
As a result, a key concern for decision makers in England is enhancing the country’s 
resilience in the face of these challenges (BIS 2013; DEFRA 2013a). In this respect, 
water governance is no different. For example, the Government’s department for the 
environment, Defra, states that its “vision shows a sector that is resilient to climate 
change, with its likelihood of more frequent droughts as well as floods, and to 
population growth, with forward planning fully in tune with these adaptation 
challenges” (DEFRA, 2008: 8). Furthermore, in recent years, and particularly since 2000 
when the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) was introduced, there has been a 
move towards greater stakeholder participation in water governance (Cook et al., 
2012). This includes the nationwide rollout of a catchment-based approach in 2013 
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(DEFRA, 2013b). Both of these developments - the desire to enhance resilience and the 
adoption of participatory and cooperative management approaches - do not sit 
comfortably with the organisational structure and raison d’etre of the system of water 
governance that emerged in England over the last century. Nonetheless, driven on by a 
changing climate, a shrinking national budget, rhetoric that revolves around the notion 
of the “big society”, and developments in water and environmental policy emanating 
from the EU, it is clear that they will remain prevalent features of the way in which 
water is governed going forwards (Newson, 2011; Norton and Lane, 2011; Pahl-wostl 
et al., 2007a). 
These are not the only salient aspects of the direction water governance is taking. For 
example, it is also clear that another prominent strand of thinking favours the use of 
economic instruments. Much energy has gone towards concepts such as Paying for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) and the development of a more fluid system of water licence 
trading (UK NEA, 2011; DEFRA, 2013c). Nonetheless, the stated desire to focus on 
enhancing system resilience, as well as the development of approaches that encourage 
stakeholder participation in water governance, highlights parallels between the 
objectives of policy makers in England and basic tenets of adaptive comanagement, as 
outlined above. In this thesis I propose, therefore, that it is useful to adopt adaptive 
comanagement as a conceptual lens through which to view water governance in 
England. This is particularly relevant given such issues as climate change and 
population growth, which only promise to increase the complexity, uncertainty, and 
severity of the challenges that lie ahead (DEFRA, 2013a; Environment Agency, 2010; 
IPCC, 2007).  
1.1.3 Farming and water governance in England 
One sector whose participation appears crucial to the success of inclusive forms of 
water governance in England is farming. In large part this is because farming is the 
dominant land use, with responsibility for managing roughly 70% of the country’s 
landmass. As a result, it is one of the primary sources of water pollution due to farm 
run-off and other agricultural practices (Strosser et al., 1999). Since the 1950s, farmers 
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have also started abstracting water for irrigation. Although irrigation only accounts for 
a small fraction of the total water taken from rivers and aquifers in England, locally the 
impact can be significant because this water is typically abstracted during the hottest 
times of the year, often in the more water-sensitive catchments, when flow is at its 
lowest. As will be explored in this thesis, farmers have had to make significant 
adjustments in response to the very different demands that have been placed upon 
the agricultural sector over time. However, it is perhaps not since the medieval period 
that there has been a clear emphasis on farmers needing to work together in order to 
succeed (Pretty, 1990). Despite the sector’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances, 
the extent to which many farmers in England are able to embrace new forms of water 
governance that centre on cooperative and participatory approaches, as is now 
increasingly called for, is questionable. 
Yet with respect to water resources, there are already a number of examples in 
England where farmers are working together as members of farmer irrigator groups; 
or, as they are known in England, “water abstractor groups”. Situated largely in the 
low-lying east of the country where irrigated agriculture is most prevalent, the 
majority of these groups have emerged in the first instance to defend farmers’ water 
rights in the face of changing political, regulatory, and climatic conditions.3 Over time, 
however, it has become clear that acting collectively brings a number of additional 
benefits, both to the members of the group and to the government. Leathes et al. 
(2008) have discussed the institutional capacity of four of these groups to work 
together to defend their rights to abstract water for irrigation. However, beyond this 
reactive function the authors also ask if there isn't a role for abstractor groups in water 
governance more generally. In a separate report, Leathes (2007: 16) poses the 
question as follows (quoted at length): 
But can water abstractor groups play a greater role in addressing the emerging 
challenges in water management? In future there will certainly need to be 
                                                          
3  Bringing to mind Schattschneider's (1960: 71) observation that “organization is the 
mobilization of bias”. 
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more emphasis on managing change and uncertainty due to climate change, 
increasing demand and competition for water and reallocation between uses. 
Increasingly, change will have to be managed and scarcity shared, but within 
constrained funding limits. Recent policy changes such as the introduction of 
time-limited licences and water trading, and the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive will increasingly rely on collaboration for success. 
Abstractors, regulators and other organisations (particularly those promoting 
environmental issues) will need to be open to new and innovative approaches, 
adapt to new, more flexible ways of working and foster a spirit of collaboration. 
In part, this may result in a more flexible system of regulation where users have 
a much greater role in making allocation decisions based on their local needs, 
within defined limits. 
Abstractor groups are well placed to play an influential role in this emerging 
agenda as they provide an opportunity for improving information sharing, 
cooperation and collaboration, delegating responsibility to the lowest level and 
encouraging self-monitoring and restraint. Only time will tell if abstractor 
groups in the UK evolve to take on a more central role in water management 
and water policy formulation. However, experience would suggest that it is 
certainly possible, as many institutions that now manage natural resources 
have their origins in response to conflicting claims to the resource or to 
reassert identity or influence. 
1.2 Research aim 
The previous section has located the various problem areas this research concerns 
itself with. It brings attention to theoretical, methodological, and practical 
considerations. From a theoretical perspective, it discusses the development of 
adaptive comanagement and its usefulness as a conceptual lens through which to view 
the direction of water governance in England, whilst highlighting methodological 
difficulties associated with studying the subject. From a practical perspective, it draws 
attention to both the importance and the challenge of securing the cooperation and 
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participation of farmers in more pluralistic approaches to governing water. Specific 
attention was given to water abstractor groups because they serve as an example of 
instances where farmers are already cooperating to influence decision-making 
concerning water resources management. I have asserted that this makes abstractor 
groups a useful focal point for research concerned with exploring issues of farmer 
cooperation and participation in the changing system of water governance outlined 
above.  With these issues in mind, I can state that the aim of this research is: To 
explore farmer cooperation and participation in English water governance, through 
the conceptual lens of (adaptive) comanagement.4 
1.3 Research framework 
As noted, several methodological issues pose a problem for scholars attempting to 
study adaptive comanagement.  During the early stages of the research, a broad, 
exploratory review of commons theory, resilience thinking, and adaptive 
comanagement literature led me to discover a framework that appeared to address 
these concerns. This is the “politicised” Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
Framework (see Figure 2.4  in Chapter 2), which is a modified version of the much-used 
IAD Framework originally developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. In the next 
chapter the politicised IAD Framework is discussed in detail. However, given that all 
four research objectives revolve around this framework, in this section I will provide a 
brief overview.  
The original IAD Framework has been described as a tool for analysing how diverse 
governance systems affect the ability of people to solve problems (McGinnis, 2011). It 
works by drawing the analyst’s attention to the participants in an “action situation” 
(see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2) and the actions they are capable of, the positions they 
take up, the information they have access to, the ways in which their actions are linked 
to certain outcomes, the control they exercise over outcomes, and the benefits and 
                                                          
4 Below, in Section 1.5, I shall provide working definitions for the key terms contained within 
this statement. This will include the reasoning behind the use of the terms “comanagement”, 
“adaptive comanagement”, and “(adaptive) comanagement”. 
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costs assigned to them. The IAD Framework also considers how three exogenous 
variables - the “biophysical and material” world, the “rules-in-use”, and the 
“community” - influence the behaviour of participants by acting upon the various 
components that comprise the action situation (Ostrom, 2011). The Framework is 
compatible with a range of evaluative criteria, including resilience, efficiency, equity, 
and accountability (Ostrom, 2005).  
Later, the “politicised” element of the Framework was introduced by Clement (2010), 
who modified the original schema in such a way that it now draws explicit attention to 
the wider context and power relations between participants in an action situation. This 
was achieved by the addition of two further exogenous variables to the Framework, 
namely the “political-economic” and “discourse” variables. As I will discuss in Chapter 
2, it is this modification that makes the politicised IAD Framework especially well-
suited to analysing adaptive comanagement. 
1.4 Research Objectives 
All four research objectives revolve around the politicised IAD Framework. In Chapter 2 
the process I have adopted when employing the Framework is outlined, and then, in 
Chapter 3, I link the Framework to the other elements of the research design.   
The four research objectives this thesis sets out to address are: 
Objective 1: Demonstrate whether and how the politicised IAD Framework can be 
applied to studies of (adaptive) comanagement, and discuss the benefits of doing this. 
Objective 2: Analyse the extent to which English water policy provides an enabling 
environment for adaptive comanagement. 
Objective 3: Analyse the ways in which power and levels of trust influence the ability 
of lowland farmers to comanage water.  
Objective 4: Analyse the relationship between water abstractor groups and water 
resources management and identify the mechanisms that generate comanagement 
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outcomes. Discuss the relevance of the findings for water governance in England going 
forwards. 
The four objectives reveal three different phases of the research. Objective 1 spans all 
three phases, and is concerned with the theoretical, methodological, and practical 
aspects of applying the politicised IAD Framework to (adaptive) comanagement. 
However, Phase 1 relates only to the theoretical and methodological aspects of 
Objective 1. Phase 2 is comprised of Objectives 2 and 3. This phase entails an 
exploration of the context in which farming and water governance takes place, 
considering how policy, power, and trust influences the ability of farmers in lowland 
England to comanage water. The scope of the analyses in Phase 2 increasingly narrow 
until Phase 3, which relates to Objective 4 and is a more focussed, “content-oriented” 
analysis (Figure 1.1 overleaf). 
By investigating three of the politicised IAD Framework’s exogenous variables - the 
rules-in-use, political-economic, and discourse variables - Objectives 2 and 3 consider 
the broader context in which farming and water governance takes place. As will 
become clear in Chapter 3, this contextual phase is an important part of the research 
strategy I have adopted. Objective 2 does this by investigating the direction of water 
policy in England, asking in what ways this policy context serves as an enabling 
environment for adaptive comanagement. As the thesis title and the discussion in 
Section 1.1 allude to, a central concern of the research agenda is power. This is most 
explicitly addressed by Objective 3, which looks at the broad political economy of 
farming and water governance in lowland England from World War II until the present 
day, and the discourse of farmers as they talk about their relationship with water 
resources management as members of an abstractor group. The intention is to 
understand how the present-day power dynamic as well as levels of trust between 
farmers, and between farmers and water managers, conditions their ability to 
comanage water. 
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Figure 1.1 The narrowing scope of the analysis through Phase 2, a contextual phase, 
and Phase 3, a more focused, “content-oriented” phase.  
 
 
 
Finally, by employing the politicised IAD Framework in a way that incorporates the 
findings from Objective 3, Objective 4 concerns itself with a more focused examination 
of comanagement. Here the Framework is employed to analyse the relationship 
between farmer abstractor groups and water resources management, and to identify 
the “factors of success” that lead to comanagement under the conditions revealed by 
the contextual phase of the research. Using these factors as a point of reference, I then 
propose more abstract causal mechanisms that appear to generate comanagement. In 
Chapter 3 I discuss why this search for generative mechanisms is an important part of 
the research strategy. I finish by discussing the relevance of the findings for water 
governance in England going forwards.  
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1.5 Definitions of key terms 
In this section I consider the key terms used in the thesis, including how they relate to 
one another. This terminological discussion is intended to clarify why, according to the 
research aim, I claim to be exploring “farmer cooperation and participation in water 
governance, through the conceptual lens of (adaptive) comanagement”. I shall discuss 
three pairs of terms, namely “farmer cooperation” and “farmer participation”; “water 
management” and “water governance”; and “comanagement” and “adaptive 
comanagement”.  
By “farmer cooperation”, I mean situations where farmers are working together 
towards some end as a group or cooperative. However, this collective effort need not 
imply any involvement in water governance. By “farmer participation” I mean 
situations where farmers are actively involved in water governance. Therefore, 
according to these definitions, a comanagement arrangement would be one where 
farmers are cooperating as a group, where this group is seen to be participating in one 
or more comanagement activities.5 
The terms water management and water governance, although in some ways similar, 
are also quite different. Generally speaking, “water governance” is a broader, more 
inclusive term than water management, and can be thought of as “the whole range of 
institutions and relationships involved in the process of governing” (Pierre and Peters 
2000: 1). The distinction between the two terms is aided by the discussion in Section 
1.1.1 above, where I noted that the phrase “from government to governance” has 
come to imply the participation of both state and non-state actors in decision-making 
processes that span levels of organisation. In contrast, “water management” is 
narrower and more action oriented. It is about “achieving goals, preferably in a 
functionally and socially responsive and efficient manner, with given means, and 
largely within given conditions and constraints” (Toonen, 2011: 13). Therefore “[water] 
management is about action; [water] governance is about politics, sharing of rights 
                                                          
5 These activities will be discussed in later chapters. 
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and responsibilities, and setting objectives and the policy agenda” (Berkes, 2010: 491). 
By speaking of farmer cooperation and participation in water governance in this thesis, 
I am therefore including the involvement of farmer groups in more narrowly defined 
management activities, but am not restricting them to this. 
I have already discussed both comanagement and adaptive comanagement in Section 
1.1.1, yet their relationship to this thesis requires clarifying. Although the theoretical 
foundation of my research centres on adaptive comanagement as a guiding concept, 
when analysing the more concrete possibility of farmer cooperation and participation 
in the later chapters, it will become clear that the focus is instead centred more on the 
concept of comanagement. This is intentional, and relates to the fact that adaptive 
comanagement is considered an evolutionary development of comanagement (Berkes, 
2009). Given the challenge of securing farmer cooperation and participation in water 
governance (see above), it was necessary to frame this phase of the research in 
relation to developing comanagement, whilst accounting for the potential for such an 
arrangement to evolve into adaptive comanagement. For this reason, in the thesis I 
often speak about “(adaptive) comanagement” as a way of accounting for 
comanagement’s evolutionary dimension, whilst recognising that this dimension may 
be underdeveloped, or that it is not the focus of the present discussion.  
Finally, from one angle the use of “management” in “comanagement” is misleading. 
This is because “the basic idea of comanagement fits with the evolving notions of 
people-centred governance approaches in which the management responsibility is 
shared among…a diversity of players, including public and private actors” (Berkes, 
2009: 1694). Thus, according to Berkes (2009), both comanagement and adaptive 
comanagement can be viewed as governance.6 This observation provides further 
justification for my decision to consider the involvement of farmer abstractor groups in 
water governance from an (adaptive) comanagement perspective.  
                                                          
6 Although a slightly different position is taken by Folke et al. (2005), who put forward the 
notion that adaptive comanagement instead operationalises adaptive governance. 
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1.6 Outline of Thesis 
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. Five of these (Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7) are 
written in the format of a journal article. As a result, they represent relatively stand-
alone pieces of research that pertain to the various analyses undertaken during the 
course of this research programme. Each paper has been reformatted and sections 
renumbered so as to be consistent with the style of the thesis, and the references 
combined in the final reference list. All of the chapters that have been written in paper 
format also contain either a prologue, epilogue, or both, that detail additional 
information deemed necessary for the thesis but which could not be included, or not 
included in as much detail, in the papers themselves. A full list of publication details is 
provided on page V, and details of individual papers are stated in the relevant chapter 
prologues.  
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This chapter introduces the rationale and various strands of the research, highlighting 
an approach which is concerned with making contributions to theory, method, and 
practice. It outlines a three-phased process, and alongside discussing the research aim 
and objectives, it introduces the politicised IAD Framework to the reader. 
Chapter 2: Applying the politicised IAD Framework to (adaptive) comanagement 
This chapter discusses how the politicised IAD Framework is well suited to studying 
(adaptive) comanagement. It begins with a review of the comanagement concept from 
its origins in commons theory through to the development of adaptive 
comanagement. It then highlights the issues associated with studying adaptive 
comanagement, before going on to review the IAD Framework and the modifications 
made to it by Clement (2010) in order to bring explicit attention to the role of power in 
natural resource governance. This is followed by a discussion of how and why the 
Framework is suited to analyses of (adaptive) comanagement and the process one may 
wish to follow when employing the Framework, whilst also outlining the benefits of 
doing this.   
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Chapter 3: Research design 
Chapter 3 links in to Chapter 2. That is, whilst Chapter 2 is concerned with the 
framework I have employed to guide my analysis of (adaptive) comanagement, 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the overall research design and its relationship to the 
politicised IAD Framework.  The chapter moves from a discussion of the research 
paradigm I am working within, through a consideration of the research strategy, the 
methods I have employed, my position as the researcher, the measures I have taken to 
ensure the quality of the research design, and finally to an outline of the study’s 
limitations. 
Chapter 4: Policy analysis 
Chapter 4 is the first of three analyses that sets out to investigate the broader context 
in which farming and water governance takes place in England. This chapter relates to 
the “rules-in-use” variable of the politicised IAD Framework. As with Chapter 2, but in 
greater detail, it starts by reviewing the development of comanagement from its 
inception through to the emergence of adaptive comanagement. From the literature 
review five policy categories are identified which appear to provide an enabling 
environment for the emergence of adaptive comanagement. These categories are then 
used to perform a directed content analysis of key water policy documents in England 
dating from 2008 onwards. The intention is to reveal the extent to which water policy 
objectives in England appear to facilitate the emergence of adaptive comanagement, 
and the barriers that stand in the way. In the conclusion I offer suggestions that would 
favour the emergence of adaptive comanagement from a policy perspective. 
Chapter 5: Political economy analysis 
Chapter 5 sets out to investigate the “political-economic” variable of the politicised 
IAD Framework. It is concerned with power structures and how these structures 
condition the relationships between lowland farmers, and between lowland farmers 
and water managers. The intention is to understand how this power dynamic affects 
the ability of these farmers to cooperate and participate in the governance of their 
water environment.  
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To do this I undertake a political economy analysis of the major developments 
affecting farming and water governance in lowland England from World War II until 
the present day. The analysis is guided by a heuristic known as the Power Cube, which 
is an analytical tool for thinking about the interplay between different forms of power 
operating in different types of spaces and at different levels of governance. I then 
discuss the consequences of the findings for farmer cooperation and participation in 
water governance, and reflect upon measures to encourage this outcome. 
Chapter 6: Discourse analysis 
In Chapter 6 I investigate the “discourse” variable of the Framework, focusing on 
medium and large-scale farmers who are members of water abstractor groups in 
lowland England. The intention is to explore the current dynamic that exists among 
farmer irrigators in England, and between irrigators and water managers in order to 
understand the potential for comanagement to develop. By borrowing concepts from 
the field of critical discursive psychology, I analyse the ways in which these farmers talk 
about their relationship with each other, with water managers, and with the water 
environment. In light of the findings, I discuss measures that could help to facilitate the 
emergence of comanagement arrangements between farmer groups and water 
managers.  
 
Chapter 7: Case study analysis 
The various analyses described so far culminate in Chapter 7 (Phase 3), where the 
contextual phase of the research is incorporated into a more focused study that 
considers the relationship between water abstractor groups and water resources 
management in lowland England. Again, the analysis is guided by the politicised IAD 
Framework, but where attention shifts to local dynamics and the way in which these 
dynamics are structured both by the broader context already identified in Phase 2, as 
well as case-specific factors. The analysis leads to the identification of various “factors 
of success” that link farmer cooperation with comanagement, and from which I make 
inferences about more abstract structures and mechanisms that appear to generate 
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(adaptive) comanagement. I finish by discussing what the findings imply for the future 
of water governance in England from a farming perspective.  
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
In this final chapter I initially review the research aim, and the way in which this study 
has set out to address it. I then proceed to discuss the conclusions of the research as 
they relate to the four research objectives, before outlining a series of 
recommendations, firstly for policy makers, and then for researchers and further 
research. 
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Chapter 2: Applying the Politicised IAD Framework 
to (Adaptive) Comanagement 
Prologue: 
The paper below (Paper 1) sets out to address Objective 1 of the research agenda from 
a theoretical and methodological perspective. It has been published in the journal 
Ecology and Society (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014). The discussion of how the 
politicised IAD Framework can be applied to (adaptive) comanagement in Section 2.5 
below reflects the process I have adopted in this thesis. This, and the relationship of 
the Framework to the rest of the research design, will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Paper 1 - An Integrated Approach to Analysing 
(Adaptive) Comanagement using the Politicised IAD 
Framework 
Luke Whaley and Edward K. Weatherhead 
 
Abstract 
Scholars of comanagement are faced with a difficult methodological challenge. As 
comanagement has evolved and diversified it has increasingly merged with the field of 
adaptive management and related concepts that derive from resilience thinking and 
complex adaptive systems theory. In addition to earlier considerations of power sharing, 
institution building, and trust, the adaptive turn in comanagement has brought attention 
to the process of social learning and a focus on concepts such as scale, self-organization, 
and system trajectory. At the same time, a number of scholars are calling for a more 
integrated approach to studying (adaptive) comanagement that is able to situate these 
normative concepts within a critical understanding of how context and power 
fundamentally influences the behaviour of a system. We propose that the “politicised” 
version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework, originally 
developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues, is well suited to addressing this 
challenge. The framework provides breadth, clarity, and structure by drawing the 
analyst’s attention to the range of variables and questions to be considered when 
attempting a study of comanagement, the various components of the situation, and the 
ways in which they interact, and the criteria the analyst may wish to adopt in evaluating 
the outcomes of the process. Alongside its ability to address contextual factors and 
power dynamics, the socioeconomic and institutional dimension of the politicised IAD 
Framework means that it can be used to conduct analyses that result in sound policy 
recommendations. 
Key words: comanagement; adaptive comanagement; IAD Framework; politicised IAD 
Framework; methodology; institutions; power; discourse; resilience 
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2.1 Introduction 
Many of the world’s habitats and ecosystems are failing because of human activity and 
many more are under threat and face an uncertain future; yet at the same time a growing 
global population and changing lifestyle preferences is only set to exacerbate these 
issues in the coming years (UNEP, 2012). A tremendous amount of work has concerned 
itself with potential solutions to the difficult problems associated with ecosystem loss 
and natural resource management, attracting the attention of scholars working within 
and across different disciplines. Amongst academics and practitioners there is a growing 
appreciation of the shortfalls associated with a one-size-fits-all approach to 
environmental governance (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ostrom, 2007) and an awareness that 
centralised and bureaucratic attempts to manage the environment tend to be 
exclusionary, reactive, insensitive to changing circumstances, and prone to result in 
pathological outcomes (Holling and Meffet, 1996; Glasbergen, 1998; Pahl-wostl, 2006; 
Pahl-wostl et al., 2007b). In the place of top-down governance a suite of institutional 
arrangements have emerged as viable alternatives in particular circumstances, ranging 
from markets in natural resources to community-based systems of management (de Loe 
et al., 2009). One approach which links centralised and decentralised forms of 
governance across scales of organisation and which is gaining increasing attention as a 
means of addressing these challenges is comanagement.  
Comanagement has its roots in the work of commons scholars (Kearney, 1984; McCay 
and Acheson, 1987; Pinkerton, 1989a), although in the last decade it has increasingly 
merged with the field of adaptive management and related concepts found in resilience 
thinking and complex adaptive systems theory (Folke, 2006; Holling, 1978; Lee, 1993; 
Levin, 1999). This merger has tended to combine the linkages typical of comanagement 
with the learning dimension associated with adaptive management, resulting in what has 
been termed ‘adaptive comanagement’ (Armitage et al., 2009, 2007b; Olsson et al., 
2004a). The cross-disciplinary nature of (adaptive) comanagement demands a wide 
methodological breadth that is able to encompass concepts and approaches deriving 
from both the natural and the social sciences. Thus a challenge for comanagement 
scholars relates to the need to develop a common framework that is capable of 
addressing the many dimensions of comanagement across differing physical and social 
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settings, and to ground the normative concepts associated with the subject in a critical 
awareness of how context fundamentally influences process and outcomes.     
In this paper we discuss how a version of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) Framework originally developed by Ostrom and her colleagues (Kiser and 
Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2010) but that has been adapted by Clement (2010) 
to explicitly consider important contextual variables, can be used to analyse 
comanagement. To do this we first briefly review comanagement and the developments 
it has undergone since its establishment as a concept in the 1980s, as well as the 
methodological challenges associated with the study of the subject. We then provide an 
overview of the ‘politicised’ IAD Framework as proposed by Clement, before 
discussing how this framework is well suited to analyses of comanagement. We 
conclude with a synopsis of the main points of the discussion. 
2.2 The development of comanagement theory 
Emerging as a branch of commons theory, comanagement has come to be seen by some 
as a fourth ideal form of property-rights regime alongside the government, market, and 
community (Imperial and Yandle, 2005). At the same time, “comanagement is not 
envisioned as a replacement for central government, nor is it incompatible with existing 
market-based systems; it is a supplement to these decision-making processes” (Plummer 
and Fitzgibbon, 2004: 63). Despite its common point of origin in the academic 
literature, the concept of comanagement has since been influenced by a diverse group of 
scholars, managers, and commentators, resulting in variegated explanations of the term 
as one moves from place to place, resource to resource, or between different junctures in 
time. Nonetheless, rather than contradicting themselves, these conceptions of 
comanagement instead serve to highlight the multi-faceted nature of the subject, as well 
as the conceptual developments that have occurred as new insights have emerged, 
different analytical approaches have been adopted, and previously separate fields of 
enquiry have come together.  
One way of interpreting these various conceptions of comanagement has been provided 
by Berkes (2009), who charts the development of the term from its initial focus on 
structural dimensions through to an appreciation of complexity and the need to give 
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precedence to function and process. From this perspective, early attempts at analysing 
comanagement tended to focus on formal power-sharing arrangements between a 
community of resource users and a central government (Berkes et al., 1991), the 
development of adequate levels of trust between participants (Daniels and Walker, 
1996; Leach and Pelkey, 2001; Ostrom, 1999a; Pinkerton, 1989b), and institution 
building both at the local level and between levels of organisation (Jentoft, 1989; 
Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). Increasingly, however, consideration was given to the 
temporal dimension of comanagement and “how different management tasks are 
organised and distributed, concentrating on the function, rather than the structure, of the 
system” (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005: 73).  
This change in focus has turned attention towards the mechanisms via which the process 
of comanagement proceeds. Here scholars have found fertile ground in merging the 
narratives of comanagement and adaptive management, where the former’s attention to 
system linkages complements the latter’s concern with problem solving and learning-
by-doing. The merger of these two fields, each with their own distinct disciplinary 
histories, has resulted in what has come to be called adaptive comanagement (Armitage 
et al., 2009, 2007b; Olsson et al., 2004a). This development has propelled 
comanagement into the realm of complex adaptive systems theory and resilience 
thinking, where concepts such as scale, self-organisation, and emergence have 
established themselves in the discourse (Folke, 2006; Levin, 1999; Olsson et al., 
2004b). It has also placed a strong focus on the concept of social learning as a means by 
which the multiple perspectives represented in a system of comanagement are to jointly 
learn about and adapt to change and uncertainty (Armitag et al., 2008). 
The adaptive turn has also brought attention to earlier depictions that portrayed 
comanagement as a binary relationship between a homogenous community of resource 
users and a monolithic government. It is recognised that neither the government, nor a 
community of resource users are simple entities acting in unison but instead can 
themselves be thought of as complex systems comprising networks of individuals and 
groups. In an attempt to elucidate this perspective, Carlsson and Berkes (2005) have put 
forward the idea of ‘comanagement as governance’, where the system of management 
can be described in terms of the networks and institutions that emerge as a result of the 
process of collaboration. This version of comanagement “encompasses the idea that in 
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many real-life cases, we can expect to find rich webs of relations and agreements 
linking different parts of the public sector to a similarly heterogeneous set of private 
actors, all within the same area or within the same resource system” (Carlsson and 
Berkes, 2005: 69). 
2.3 Methodological considerations 
The above short synopsis shows how comanagement can be thought of in terms of 
power sharing, trust building, institution building, process, problem solving, social 
learning, and as governance (Berkes, 2007, 2009; Plummer and Armitage, 2007b). All 
aspects of comanagement are valid and convey important messages. Furthermore, for 
analytical purposes it is helpful to distinguish between the various ways in which 
comanagement can be understood, but in reality the boundaries of these categories are 
permeable, allowing each to flow into the other. However, the ‘many faces’ of 
comanagement (Berkes, 2007) provides a methodological challenge to those attempting 
to study it. The cross-disciplinary nature of the subject permits scope for investigating 
comanagement according to the tenets of a range of distinct and sometimes seemingly 
incompatible scholarly lineages. The adaptive turn in comanagement has brought in 
concepts and perspectives that stem from the natural sciences, whilst the large social 
and institutional component of the subject, where issues of power, collaboration and 
conflict abound, plants comanagement firmly in the social sciences, with their diverse 
philosophical and methodological underpinnings.  
Broadly speaking, a great deal of research aimed at understanding comanagement has 
tended to focus on and contribute towards the normative concepts that have come to 
characterise the field. These studies have been invaluable in developing a general 
relational picture of comanagement and for theory building. On the other hand, far 
fewer studies have adopted a more critical stance. Those that have demonstrate the 
importance of taking into account case-specific histories and the role of power when 
attempting to understand situations which are significantly less technical then many 
analyses of commons governance might lead one to believe (Li, 2006). And yet despite 
the large and growing body of literature on the subject, Carlsson and Berkes (2005: 72) 
observe that “our tools for conceptualising and analysing comanagement are strikingly 
blunt”.  
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Armitage (2008) has argued for a more inclusive approach that is capable of 
incorporating the normative concepts associated with governance arrangements such as 
(adaptive) comanagement within a framework that grounds them in the contextual 
details of a specific case. To this end, he suggests a fruitful synthesis could see 
commons and resilience discourses merge with concepts, methods and approaches 
found in political ecology, including analyses of history, discourse, and the political 
economy. Wilson (2010) points out that when it comes to discussions of social 
resilience a tension often exists between systematic approaches that proceed upon 
normative lines, and more critical attempts that fail to achieve the same systematic 
rigor: “when [resilience] discussions are systematic they tend not to be critical, and 
when they are critical they fail to be systematic” (Wilson, 2010: 52). Similarly then, 
Wilson posits that it would be beneficial to combine resilience thinking with approaches 
developed in critical social theory and which are employed by those working within 
political ecology.  
The challenge then is the development or adoption of a framework that is general and 
flexible enough to encompass the methodological diversity required to investigate the 
various dimensions of comanagement from both a normative and critical perspective, 
and detailed enough to ensure a systematic and structured analysis. Articulating this 
goal, Plummer and Armitage (2007a: 841) state that “to further build and consolidate 
the theoretical foundations of comanagement, it will be necessary to pursue 
methodologically consistent avenues of research across geographical locations and 
resource contexts. Systematic evaluation of experience grounded in commonly framed 
approaches will play a key role in this regard.” In the following sections we demonstrate 
how the politicised IAD Framework can be used to address this challenge.   
2.4 The politicised IAD Framework 
In this section we provide an overview of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) Framework, a key tool for scholars interested in how diverse governance systems 
affect people’s ability to solve problems, as well as the modifications Clement (2010) 
has made to the Framework in bringing explicit attention to the role of the political 
economy, discourse and power in studies of natural resource management. We keep our 
discussion of the original IAD Framework to a minimum, and instead refer the reader to 
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the many good summaries and expositions to be found in the literature (see for example 
Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2011; Ostrom et al., 1994; Kiser and Ostrom, 2000; Blomquist and 
DeLeon, 2011; McGinnis, 2011). 
2.4.1 The IAD Framework        
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework provides a means for 
inquiring into a subject by bringing explicit attention to the relevant variables and the 
questions one may want to ask (Blomquist and DeLeon, 2011). At the heart of the 
Framework is an ‘action arena’, consisting of an ‘action situation’, which is the social 
space where individuals or groups of individuals interact and outcomes are produced, 
and the ‘actor’, which contains the theory of the individual that the analyst wishes to 
draw upon. Behaviour of participants in the action situation is influenced by three sets 
of exogenous variables: the biophysical and material world, the community, and the 
rules-in-use (Figure 2.1). According to McGinnis (2011: 172), these variables 
“encompass all aspects of the social, cultural, institutional, and physical environment 
that set the context within which an action arena is situated.” 
Figure 2.1 The IAD Framework. Adapted from Ostrom (2005). 
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The action situation can be further broken down into seven working components 
(Figure 2.2) consisting of participants who take up various positions, where any given 
position allows the participant to undertake certain actions that are dependent on how 
much information they possess about each available action, how actions are linked to 
potential outcomes, the degree of control individuals exercise over these outcomes, and 
the costs and benefits they assign to them (Ostrom, 1990). McGinnis (2011: 173) 
observes that these working components of an action situation serve to “specify the 
nature of the relevant actors as well as the resources and options they face.” The three 
exogenous variables are able to affect different parts of the action situation (Ostrom, 
2005). Furthermore, a key feature of the IAD Framework relates to its ability to analyse 
behaviour at multiple theoretical levels by shifting from one action situation to deeper 
rule-changing situations (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982). Three nested levels are commonly 
recognised: the operational, collective-choice, and constitutional choice (Figure 2.3). 
One of the main strengths of the IAD Framework lies in its ability to provide a 
structured and consistent approach to analysing complex phenomena. It also recognises 
the interdependency of the three exogenous variables. For example, the relevance of any 
set of rules-in-use depends strongly on the prevailing biophysical conditions and the 
shared norms and values of those for whom the rules are intended.  
Figure 2.2 The action situation of the IAD Framework. Adapted from Ostrom (2005). 
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Figure 2.3 The linkages among rules and levels of analysis. Adapted from Ostrom 
(1990). 
 
The IAD Framework is compatible with a range of criteria which can be used to 
evaluate the process and outcomes related to the institutional arrangement under 
consideration. For example, Ostrom (2005) lists as examples of criteria which are 
suitable for examining the overall performance of an institutional arrangement, 1) 
economic efficiency, 2) equity, 3) adaptability, resilience and robustness, 4) 
accountability, and 5) conformance to general morality. Furthermore, Imperial (1999) 
discusses how the IAD Framework brings attention to three interrelated transaction 
costs which are associated with inter-organisational policy implementation and which 
provide a suitable means for assessing an institutional arrangement at different points in 
time: information costs, coordination costs, and strategic costs. Ostrom (2005) observes 
that changing to a different institutional arrangement generally entails trade-offs 
between different sets of evaluative criteria, where the relative success of an 
arrangement will depend upon stated policy or other objectives.  
2.4.2 Enriching the Framework 
Despite its many strengths the IAD Framework, and commons theory more generally, 
has been criticised for being both ahistorical and apolitical (Agrawal and Yadama, 
1997; Agrawal, 2002; Mosse, 1997), giving too much precedence to rules and the way 
in which rules operate to mould and constrain human behaviour, whilst failing to 
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adequately account for power dynamics and context (Jentoft, McCay, and Wilson, 
1998; Ribot et al., 2006). McCay (2002) points out that although commons theory does 
consider contextual variables such as group size or resource complexity, a real 
appreciation of context must extend beyond such variables to an awareness of what she 
calls ‘situation’. According to McCay, accounting for the situations in which people 
make decisions and undertake actions requires an understanding of how rules and 
property rights emerge from within particular historical, ecological and cultural 
traditions. As such, explaining how people relate to each other and to their environment 
“requires specification of those situations and their broader context” (McCay, 2002: 
393), something the IAD Framework only partially addresses. Furthermore, scholars 
employing the IAD Framework generally posit that institutions emerge and develop as 
the result of rational or boundedly-rational decision makers whose behaviour relates to a 
set of incentives, and in so doing it they fail to adequately consider the power dynamics 
at work in a system of governance (Johnson, 2004).  
Responding to these criticisms, Clement (2010) has proposed an adapted version of the 
IAD Framework that considers the role of power and the wider historical processes that 
come to bear on an action situation. To do this, the new ‘politicised’ IAD Framework 
explicitly recognises the need to consider discourse and the action of political and 
economic forces (Figure 2.4). In so doing, Clement has answered calls for more 
normative approaches to understanding the commons to take advantage of critical 
methods employed by those working in the field of political ecology (Armitage, 2008; 
McCay, 2002; Wilson, 2010). Whilst Clement has elaborated the rationale behind the 
revisions to the IAD Framework elsewhere (Clement and Amezaga, 2009; Clement, 
2010), in this paper we shall focus on how power and the wider context have been 
incorporated into the IAD Framework by discussing the two additional variables 
proposed by Clement: ‘discourse’ and the ‘political-economic’ context. These variables 
affect both the ‘action situation’ - in particular the ways in which participants are 
positioned – as well as the ‘actors’ component of the action arena, where they shape 
values, norms and preferences (Clement, 2010).   
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Figure 2.4 The politicised IAD Framework, with the additional variables shaded in 
grey. Adapted from Clement (2010). 
 
Discourse 
Discourse is a term which can be construed in many ways. In everyday parlance the 
terms discourse and discussion are often considered to be synonymous (Taylor, 2001). 
When analysing discourse, however, the two terms must be distinguished from each 
other so that the ‘discussion’ (or debate) becomes the focus of analysis, whilst 
‘discourse’ is understood to be a shared way of apprehending the world that is 
embedded in language and which “enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of 
information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek, 2005: 9). 
Hajer and Versteeg (2005: 175) define discourse as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and 
categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and 
which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices.” Thus whilst 
an independent reality exists, we make sense of that reality and attribute meaning to it 
through the use of particular discourses. To this extent, discourse plays a fundamental 
role in the social construction of the world we inhabit. Ontologically, this perspective is 
associated with critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975; Harre, 1972) and provides a 
philosophical bridge between the natural sciences and more interpretive strands of the 
social sciences. 
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The inclusion of discourse into the IAD Framework brings with it a number of 
important developments. Of significance from an institutional perspective is the 
consideration of power. Whilst in the original IAD Framework Ostrom recognized 
power as a relevant factor, she nonetheless does so in a highly instrumental manner by 
taking the power of a participant in an action situation to be the range of outcomes they 
are able to affect multiplied by the control they exercise over these outcomes (Ostrom, 
2005). A far more dynamic conception of power can be found in the work of the social 
philosopher Michel Foucault, who considered power, knowledge and discourse to be 
bound together. For Foucault, power “is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is 
it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is a name one attributes to the complex 
strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1978: 92). The power of social 
actors in this situation is relational, where the various positions and functions are 
defined and negotiated through particular discourses (Hall, 2001). Hajer (1995: 49) 
notes therefore that “in this view the power of the institution is permanent in so far as it 
is a constant feature of the discourses through which the role of that institution is being 
reproduced.” Thus discourses and institutions are intrinsically bound up in one another. 
Dryzek (2005: 20) observes that certain discourses become embodied in institutions, 
where they “constitute the informal understandings that provide the context for social 
interaction, on a par with formal institutional rules.”    
Also of interest to our discussion of discourse and the IAD Framework is the notion of a 
‘position’. In the Framework’s action situation all participants are assigned positions 
(Figure 2.2), where the standing of a person in any given position relates to the 
authorised actions available to them in this position or the way in which the position 
they assume limits their actions. Positions are conceived of as “anonymous slots” into 
which participants can move, and may include judges, defendants, buyers, sellers, 
resource users, regulators, and so on (Ostrom, 2005: 41). This definition of a position is 
akin to what social psychologists have traditionally termed a ‘role’. In critiquing the 
static and largely formal concept of role as a way of understanding the self in social 
interactions, Davies and Harre (1990) have instead proposed that people actively 
position themselves and those they are interacting with in a situation by employing 
ideas, concepts and categories that derive from particular discourses or that relate to 
particular storylines that actors draw upon in making sense of the world. Thus 
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positioning theory invokes a far more dynamic understanding of social encounters 
where people are involved in an argumentative exchange, and where identity is 
continually negotiated as actors attempt to position themselves and others, often 
subconsciously, in relation to a particular issue or set of issues.  
Political-economic context 
The political-economic variable in the politicised IAD Framework draws the analyst’s 
attention to contextual factors that not only require one’s analysis to expand outwards to 
take account of the wider political and economic factors that directly or indirectly 
influence the behaviour of participants in the action situation, but also to expand 
backwards in time so as to understand the events and processes that have given rise to 
present-day conditions. As with discourse analysis, this approach resonates strongly 
with the field of political ecology where political-economic analyses hold a central 
position. For these scholars, “a focus on the respective roles and interactions of the state 
and the market and the influence on environmental outcomes is critical” (Neumann, 
2005: 6). Without an understanding of both the local and wider political and economic 
situation it is not possible to appreciate the distribution of power among social actors, 
and how such a power dynamic affects the behaviour of individuals. The consideration 
of political and economic factors also draws attention to the issue of scale by 
acknowledging that “the design and sound implementation of adequate rules at the local 
level is significantly constrained by decisions made at higher governance levels and by 
the structure of the economy” (Clement, 2010: 137). According to Agrawal and Yadama 
(1997), explicit inclusion of the political-economic context is a necessary addition to 
mainstream commons research which has tended to focus on local communities without 
regard for political and economic forces and the ways in which they structure 
interactions within and between groups and organisations.  
What’s more, despite the fact that institutional design is historically contingent or ‘path 
dependent’, work on the commons has tended to be remarkably ahistorical (Stern et al., 
2002). And yet, appreciation of how the political-economic context structures power 
dynamics in a system requires one to consider not only present-day conditions but also 
the activity leading up to them. Mosse (1997: 470) has therefore argued that historical 
analyses must be incorporated into standard models of community resource 
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management on the grounds that “historically-specific structures of power, rather than 
simply calculated pay-offs (or traditional wisdom) underlie the norms and conventions 
of collective resource use, and account for the occurrence and persistence of local 
institutions of resource use. These do not only manage resources, they also serve to 
reproduce relations of dominance and dependence, and provide the context for political 
strategy and status competition.” 
In concluding then, although the original IAD Framework has many strengths, not least 
of all its analytical clarity, applicability, and capacity to account for nested levels of 
decision-making, its insights have failed to include critical approaches that recognise 
that “the interplay of power, the positioning of various actors within nested hierarchies 
and the role of context all exert a powerful influence” (Armitage, 2008: 24). The two 
variables Clement (2010) has included in the IAD Framework develop this critical 
dimension by drawing attention to the significance of the discursive and political-
economic context in which individuals, groups, and systems of resource governance are 
embedded and in so doing bring an added awareness of ‘situation’ to the analysis, as 
argued for by McCay (2002). Before proceeding, it must be noted that the IAD 
Framework has subsequently been modified by Ostrom and her colleagues so as to 
develop a more complex framework for analysing social-ecological systems (SES), 
where the emphasis has been on unpacking the ‘biophysical’ variable of the original 
IAD Framework (Ostrom, 2007, 2011). Whilst this emerging SES Framework promises 
much, here we are instead interested only in the politicised IAD Framework proposed 
by Clement (2010) because of its applicability to analyses of (adaptive) comanagement, 
as detailed below.    
2.5 Applying the Framework to (adaptive) comanagement 
In this section we discuss how the politicised IAD Framework is well suited to “a 
systematic evaluation of [the comanagement] experience grounded in commonly framed 
approaches” (Plummer and Armitage, 2007b: 841). One of the great strengths of the 
Framework derives from its ability to bring all the relevant factors of a situation to the 
attention of the analyst. Whilst not all of the five exogenous variables discussed above 
will necessarily carry the same weight from one study to the next, the politicised IAD 
Framework nonetheless ensures that each is considered and that those variables which 
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play an important role in the behaviour of the situation under consideration are not 
overlooked. Similarly, whilst the various components of the action situation (Figure 2.2) 
highlight the basic elements that must be incorporated into an analysis of the 
interactions between actors in any situation, it can also serve to guide an investigation 
into specific aspects of that situation, such as the ability for certain individuals or groups 
to participate in decision-making, the ways in which actors position themselves and 
others, the values they attribute to particular outcomes that can be achieved, and so 
forth.   
In keeping with those writers who have argued that understanding comanagement more 
fully will require the incorporation of both normative and critical methods of analysis, 
here we shall discuss how the politicised IAD Framework can be used to analyse the 
various dimensions of comanagement as outlined previously. Given the methodological 
breadth on offer to users of the politicised IAD Framework, the many interests of 
scholars working in the field of comanagement, and the many different elements and 
components that have come to be associated with the term itself (see Plummer and 
Fitzgibbon, 2004; Plummer, 2009), the intention here is not to provide an exhaustive 
account of the ways in which the Framework can be employed to investigate 
comanagement. Instead the discussion is intended to be suggestive; to point to the 
relationship between the Framework and comanagement whilst demonstrating a logical 
progression someone attempting to undertake a comprehensive comanagement study 
may wish to follow. In Table 2.1 we provide a generalised account of the relationship 
between comanagement and the politicised IAD Framework.  
Table 2.1 Relationship between the politicised IAD Framework and (adaptive) 
comanagement. 
Exogenous 
Variable 
Description of variable 
Relationship of Variable to (adaptive) Co-
management 
Biophysical 
and 
Material 
Ecosystem conditions, 
resource attributes, and 
forms of technology. In 
the action situation this 
variable affects what 
actions are possible, 
Environmental feedback caused by changes 
in ecosystem or resource dynamics can 
trigger collective action, where certain 
properties of the resource and the presence 
of technology are known to affect the 
ability of actors to self-organise. Particular 
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what outcomes can be 
produced, and what is 
contained in the actors' 
information sets. 
forms of infrastructure - e.g. large and 
centralised or decentralised on an 
appropriate scale - are also indicative of the 
type of governance arrangement – e.g. top-
down or polycentric - and thus the potential 
for comanagement to emerge. 
Political-
economic 
A contextual variable 
concerned with the 
overall political 
economy of the system 
in which the action 
situation is embedded. In 
particular this variable 
positions participants in 
the action situation, and 
shapes their values, 
norms, and preferences. 
It strongly influences the 
distribution of power 
between stakeholders. 
Comanagement networks are embedded in 
the wider political economy, which shapes 
power relations, structures cross-scale 
interplay and network characteristics, and 
influences the forms of power sharing, trust 
building, and rule crafting that emerge. 
These attributes in turn affect processes of 
problem solving and social learning. The 
structural influences of the political 
economy do not affect local environmental 
conditions directly but are mediated 
through the institutions and organisational 
characteristics of the co-management 
arrangement in question. The political 
economy is a 'slow variable' that strongly 
shapes overall system trajectory. 
Discourse Gives meaning to the 
physical and social 
world, and can be used 
to sustain or challenge 
existing power 
structures. In particular 
this variable positions 
participants in the action 
situation, and shapes 
their values, norms, and 
preferences. 
Environmental crises, which often serve as 
a trigger for comanagement, are not an 
objectively definable state of the world but 
instead are constructed and negotiated by 
stakeholders through the use of particular 
discourses. Discourses also operate to 
sustain or challenge power relations 
between participants as certain discourses 
become normalised or are undermined, and 
by positioning the actors in the action 
situation according to particular storylines. 
They are also vital for developing and 
maintaining the institutions that enhance 
collaborative and learning-based 
approaches. Discourses therefore provide a 
critical approach to understanding power-
sharing arrangements between participants 
in the co-management process. 
Rules-in-
use 
The set of rules "to 
which participants would 
make reference if asked 
to justify and explain 
their actions to fellow 
participants" (Ostrom 
Rules can operate to make a system of 
resource governance rigid and vulnerable to 
change, or flexible and dynamic by 
facilitating communication, negotiation, 
conflict resolution, problem solving, and 
joint learning within and between scales of 
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2005: 19). Rules-in-use 
both enable and 
constrain human 
behaviour by stating 
what actions are 
required, permitted, or 
forbidden. They affect 
all elements in the action 
situation. 
organisation.  Enabling legislation at higher 
levels can encourage self-organisation and 
the process of adaptive comanagement, 
whilst locally devised rules can enhance 
social learning, tighten environmental 
feedback loops, and increase the adaptive 
capacity of resource users. Rule changing 
allows participants to alter a system's 
trajectory and to institutionalise social 
memory. 
Attributes 
of 
Community 
Physical attributes of the 
community, such as the 
number of participants, 
and their gender, race 
and age. And cultural 
attributes, including the 
systems of norms, 
values, and beliefs that 
structure the participants' 
understanding of the 
world. 
Physical attributes of the community affect 
the ability of stakeholders to self-organise; 
for example, the size of a group alters 
stakeholders' incentives to act collectively, 
and differences in race and gender may 
affect power relations and levels of trust 
between participants. Particular functions 
of individuals, including acting as leaders, 
knowledge carriers, or networkers, are 
known to affect the process of adaptive 
comanagement. Furthermore, cultural 
differences or similarities can greatly 
influence the ability of a comanagement 
arrangement to emerge by undermining or 
enhancing trust and social capital, and the 
ability of participants to communicate, 
jointly learn about, and act in response to 
changes in social or environmental 
circumstances. This variable also allows 
the analyst to explore the relationship 
between co-management networks and the 
larger cultural systems they are embedded 
in. 
 
The first step an analyst takes when employing the politicised IAD Framework is to 
define the action situation (Figure 2.2). In considering comanagement, one may be 
interested in such instances as a government organisation and a community of resource 
users, a geographical area, or a particular resource. Given Carlsson and Berkes' (2005) 
argument that comanagement should be studied in terms of function and process, here 
we follow them in suggesting a good option for defining the action situation is to start 
with the management activities associated with the resource in question and the actors 
whose job it is to carry them out. In doing so it may be useful to consider the seven 
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broad management activities comanagement can enhance, as outlined by Pinkerton 
(1989b: 6). Thus whilst the resource - be it a region of forest or a river corridor – is 
geographically located, the action situation may include actors located outside of the 
resource boundary if their decisions affect the management of that resource (Imperial, 
1999).  
Defining the action situation according to management activities - or function - 
emphasises the importance of scale by bringing attention to the organisational levels 
across which management decisions are located. This is significant to analyses of 
comanagement where there is a focus on cross-scale interplay (Berkes, 2009; Carlsson 
and Berkes, 2005; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997), and where it has been recognised that 
“the connections between governmental and nongovernmental actors themselves are 
ripe for examination using IAD” (Blomquist and DeLeon, 2011: 5). Furthermore, by 
ascertaining who the relevant actors involved in a given management activity are, and 
the relationship of these actors to one another in the action situation, the Framework 
allows the researcher to develop a network approach to analysing process and function, 
a line of enquiry which is currently receiving much attention and which serves to 
promote an understanding of “comanagement as governance” (Bodin et al., 2006; 
Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Janssen et al., 2006; Newman and Dale, 2005). The 
politicised IAD Framework can then be used to critically analyse the connections and 
interactions within these networks and the outcomes that occur as a result, including 
processes of problem solving, social learning, power sharing, and the development of 
trust and newly devised rules-in-use. The Framework can also be used to investigate 
how a particular network “is embedded in a system of political economy, and embedded 
in greater cultural or normative systems” (Brown, 2001: 2 in Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 
2007). In the end, whichever way the action situation is defined what is important is to 
appreciate that in many respects comanagement is concerned with the participation of 
actors at the collective-choice level (Pinkerton, 2003) as this is where management 
decisions take place (Ostrom, 1990; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).  
Having decided upon the action situation, a general strategy is then to identify which 
aspects of the biophysical, political-economic, discursive, institutional, and community 
setting influence the various elements of the action situation as detailed in Figure 2.4. In 
effect, how do the exogenous variables affect who is allowed to participate in the 
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situation, what actions they can take and the costs associated with them, what outcomes 
they can affect, how actions are linked to outcomes, what information they have access 
to, and the extent to which they have control over outcomes they can affect (Ostrom, 
1990). To do this, one may first wish to enquire into the biophysical conditions by 
considering the characteristics of the resource. Here commons scholars have identified 
particular resource attributes, such as complexity, size, and productivity that affect the 
likelihood that resource users will self-organise (Ostrom, 1999b, 2009). Self-
organisation is also a concept that is considered important in both resilience thinking, 
where the focus is on how systems re-organise in the face of change, and political 
ecology, where the interest is in understanding how environmental systems can form or 
shape self-organising, self-sustaining power relationships (Armitage, 2008). 
Furthermore, self-organisation may connote institution building as rules are crafted to 
structure new forms of collective action between participants (Hodgson, 2006; 
Pinkerton, 1999). Another important aspect of the biophysical conditions relates to the 
presence of technology in the system of interest. For example, Pahl-wostl et al. (2007a) 
observe that large, centrally designed infrastructure is indicative of single sources of 
design, power and delivery; system attributes that characterise a command-and-control 
approach to resource governance. Alternatively, technology on an appropriate scale is 
typical of diverse sources of design, power, and delivery and may therefore represent a 
system that is better primed for more pluralistic forms of decision-making such as 
comanagement.     
Analysis of the political-economic context reveals ways in which power is distributed 
among the actors in a management arrangement and provides a critical appreciation of 
the potential for concepts such as trust or power sharing to emerge and develop. For 
example, in questioning the fact that “virtually every comanagement case study 
encountered in the literature [on the circumpolar North] is a success story,” Nadasdy 
(2003: 368) critically examines the case of a comanagement sheep-steering committee 
in southwest Yukon and shows that despite the fact that this particular case has been 
branded a model of success by many, the indigenous Kluane First Nation members and 
some of the biologists on the comanagement committee considered the process to be a 
“complete failure”. Nadasdy demonstrates that although there are a number of 
contributing factors that led to this outcome, the roots of the problem are in fact political 
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and in the end the comanagement process only served to reinforce existing power 
imbalances between the various parties. In a separate analysis on forest use in the 
Kumaon Himalaya in India, Agrawal and Yadama (1997) argue that socio-economic 
forces can significantly influence the condition of renewable resources and the ways in 
which these resources are managed. However, the authors discuss how such forces are 
always mediated by local institutions; findings which they conclude have significant 
implications for the role of comanagement between the market, state and the 
community. Adger et al. (2006) also highlight the importance of considering the 
political-economic variable in the politicised IAD Framework through a discussion of 
how the structure of the political economy, which reflects the distribution of power 
between stakeholders, strongly influences cross-scale interactions in comanagement 
networks. Here “cross-scale interactions by powerful stakeholders have the potential to 
undermine trust in resource management arrangements,” where “the structure of cross-
scale interplay, in terms of relative winners and losers, determines its contribution to the 
resilience of social-ecological systems” (Adger et al., 2006: 9). 
Understanding political and economic events and how they have come to structure the 
action situation draws attention to the evolutionary nature of the process. Graham and 
Ernstson (2012) show how an historical analysis of a comanagement agreement in 
Macassar Dunes, Cape Town, reveals that the political approach that characterised 
decision-making prior to the introduction of the comanagement arrangement tended to 
be top down and exclusionary. The authors conclude that “the formative stages of the 
comanagement process represent a fundamental comanagement barrier for some 
interviewees, and have implications in the contemporary setting for who should now 
‘take responsibility.’” Thus an historical account of political and economic drivers 
provides an insight into the factors that have come to determine the current system 
trajectory as well as those factors that may constrain or enable the pathway it takes in 
the future. Here again then, a critical perspective unearths contextual details pertaining 
to core concepts in resilience thinking and adaptive comanagement - in this case 
‘system trajectory’ and ‘pathways of change’ – therefore grounding abstract theoretical 
constructs within the specifics of a particular study.         
Discourse analysis offers up many fruitful avenues of enquiry for the study of 
comanagement. For example, Degnbol (2003) draws attention to the gap between 
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mainstream discourses in fisheries science and the discourses of local users. He argues 
that if comanagement arrangements are to become truly inclusive this gap must be 
bridged. It is therefore of interest to the researcher to understand the different ways in 
which users and government officials talk about the resource system in question, 
including its use and its management. Alternatively, examining the ways in which the 
various actors in the comanagement process talk about each other can also provide 
valuable insights into issues such as trust, power sharing, problem solving, and social 
learning. In discussing an agreement to comanage shellfish in the Dutch Wadden Sea, 
Steins (1999: 139) reveals how the imagery participants draw upon in describing the 
character and activity of the other actors in the agreement has tended to “cloud the 
discussions over resource use in the negotiating and decision-making process at the 
collective-choice and constitutional level”.  
Discourse analysis therefore provides a means of understanding how participants in a 
comanagement arrangement draw upon particular discourses and storylines to position 
themselves and others in relation to the challenge of resource management, and the 
developments that occur as these positions are negotiated and renegotiated over time. 
An inherent feature of such analyses are the power dynamics operating within and 
across nested scales of organisation, be it relating to the link between humans and their 
environment or between networks of actors in a collaborative setting. And so whilst 
power sharing is often portrayed as an outcome in the literature, the Framework also 
highlights how the balance of power between participants in the action situation 
intrinsically influences their behaviour and the sorts of outcomes that can be achieved, 
including the degree to which an equitable power-sharing arrangement may feasibly be 
reached. Furthermore, understanding how an environmental issue becomes a crisis 
through the meanings attributed to it by social actors is also important because a pre-
condition for comanagement is the recognition of a crisis of some sort (Pinkerton, 
1989b; Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004; Selin and Chavez, 1995). The point at which an 
environmental issue is deemed to be a crisis is not an objectively defined state of the 
world but instead emerges as a result of the ways in which the problem is discursively 
constructed and the particular storylines employed to make sense of the many 
competing discourses different actors bring to the issue, be they government officials, 
scientists, resource users, citizens, or whoever (Hajer, 1995).  
 44 
 
Analysis of the rules-in-use provides an understanding of the incentives an individual or 
group face in a given action situation. Actors make decisions within a system of rules 
and appreciating how such rules constrain or enable a comanagement arrangement is 
therefore of much importance to the analyst, where changes in the rules towards a more 
inclusive system of governance reflects a process of institution building for 
comanagement (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). Such changes may take the form of wider 
enabling legislation which recognises a community of resource users as legitimate 
participants in particular arenas of management decision-making and which is known to 
encourage self-organisation and the emergence of adaptive comanagement (Olsson et 
al., 2004a), or alternatively rules might be crafted that aim to facilitate collective action 
between resource users at the local level  or between local institutions and government 
bodies (Ostrom, 1990, 1999b). In their process-oriented model of comanagement, 
Borrini-feyerabend et al. (2000) discuss how before entering a learning-by-doing phase, 
rules must be devised that allow participants to enter into negotiation and discussion 
with one another. Identifying barriers or opportunities to rule changes such as these 
requires an understanding of the system’s trajectory and the power dynamics at play, 
which comes about through a critical analysis of the political-economic and discursive 
landscape.     
The final variable available to the analyst relates to the community within which the 
action situation is located. In many ways this variable represents the cultural dimension 
of the analysis, and can prove an especially significant feature of attempts to comanage 
a resource as in many cases comanagement arrangements have emerged from the 
coming together of disparate cultural perspectives. Sometimes the difference may lie 
between the organisational culture of a bureaucratic government administration whose 
guiding principles are predicated upon a rational scientific tradition and the indigenous 
value-system of a community of resource users (Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Nadasdy, 
2003a). At other times the differences may be less pronounced but perhaps still 
challenging if the political culture in the country reflects a tradition of non-participation 
from citizens, leans heavily towards a different form of governance such as market 
rationalism, or favours some kinds of comanagement arrangements over others (Sen and 
Nielsen, 1996). Ostrom (2005: 27) makes clear the importance of considering the 
cultural aspect of the comanagement process when she states that “if the participants in 
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a situation come from many different cultures, speak different languages, and are 
distrustful of one another, the costs of devising and sustaining effective rules are 
substantially increased.” However, the variable ‘community’ need not refer only to a 
consideration of culture but may relate to other attributes, such as the size and 
composition of a community of resource users, the race, gender, and age of participants, 
or the degree of inequality in the distribution of basic assets among the participants 
(Ostrom, 2005). From an adaptive comanagement perspective, the analyst may also 
benefit from thinking about the key functions that participants perform in the action 
situation – where these functions include leaders, followers, knowledge carriers, 
networkers, innovators, interpreters, and entrepreneurs – and how the prevalence, 
distribution, and relationship between the various individuals performing such functions 
affects the development of the comanagement process (Berkes, 2009; Folke et al., 2005; 
Plummer, 2009).  
Thus each variable associated with the politicised IAD Framework in turn relates to a 
suite of questions that are of relevance to the study of comanagement. What variables 
and which questions emerge as the focus of any given study will depend upon their 
relevance to the case under consideration and the interests of the researcher. However, 
by bringing attention to all the relevant exogenous variables that affect an action 
situation and the components that comprise it, the Framework ensures that an analyst 
identifies those aspects of the situation that are most relevant to the objectives of their 
study and ensures that no critical element is overlooked.  Furthermore, the Framework 
is also well placed to structure cross-disciplinary team studies, where the analytical 
clarity it provides can be used to guide and organise the work threads of the various 
members in the team. Having conducted the analysis, the researcher may be in a 
position to make predictions as to the outcomes of the comanagement process. 
However, given the large degree of uncertainty and procedural openness usually 
associated with comanagement, it is unlikely that any attempt at making predictions can 
move beyond informed estimations of what is more or less likely to occur in a particular 
situation, or a general appreciation of what the consequences of changing the rules 
would be (Ostrom, 2005). 
Alternatively, the analyst may wish to evaluate the outcomes that have transpired as a 
result of the comanagement process. As discussed previously, transaction-cost analysis 
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provides a means of evaluating the performance of an inter-organisational network at 
different junctures in time, by considering information costs, coordination costs, and 
strategic costs (Imperial, 1999). The advantage of this kind of assessment is that no bias 
exists concerning the appropriate form of governance for a given situation. Thus it may 
be that comanagement proves to be inappropriate or that another governance 
arrangement is better suited to the particulars of the case. Furthermore, when crafting a 
new institutional arrangement, it may be common for one set of transaction costs to 
decrease and another to rise. For example, in the early stages of the comanagement 
process one may observe an increase in coordination costs as a greater number of 
participants become involved in decision-making and new procedures to which they are 
not accustomed. However, over time, information costs may decrease as levels of 
communication improve, decision-making becomes routine, and information 
asymmetries between the various actors become less pronounced. Thus transaction costs 
can be divided up according to whether they are long-term or short-term by nature 
(Carlsson and Berkes, 2005).  
Beyond the analysis of transaction costs, one may also wish to evaluate the overall 
performance of the system after a sustained period of time. Although many evaluative 
criteria are compatible with the politicised IAD Framework, some are more relevant to 
comanagement than others. For example, improving equity has always been one of the 
central premises for implementing comanagement (Ingles et al., 1999; Pinkerton, 
1989a; Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004). Here a distinction must be made between 
equity relating to: 1) the proportionality between what an individual pays and the 
benefits they receive (fiscal equivalence), and 2) a system based on an individual’s 
ability to pay (redistributional equity) (Ostrom, 2005), where the relative weight placed 
on either of these two forms of equity will be case specific. With the adaptive turn in 
comanagement, attention must also be given to the adaptive capacity and resilience of 
the system. With respect to adaptability, Ostrom (2005: 67) raises such questions as “do 
individuals learn from experience within an action situation?” and “Do they adapt to 
new circumstances as they arise or do they become rigid in their response over time?” 
More recently, Plummer and Armitage (2007b) have proposed a comprehensive 
resilience-based framework for evaluating adaptive comanagement, where they have 
developed scale-specific parameters for three broad categories of assessment criteria: 
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ecosystem conditions, livelihood outcomes, and process and institutional conditions. 
The framework they provide emerges from a complex adaptive systems perspective and 
offers a systematic means for assessing adaptive comanagement in accordance with the 
various elements that have come to define it.                     
In summary, the discussion in this section has demonstrated that the politicised IAD 
Framework is a useful tool for guiding analyses and evaluations of (adaptive) 
comanagement according to an integrated methodological approach. By referring to 
particular examples from the literature, we have shown how the five exogenous 
variables of the Framework draw attention to the various faces of comanagement as 
outlined by Berkes (2007, 2009) and emerging concepts from resilience thinking and 
political ecology such as scale, self-organisation, path dependence, and system 
trajectory (Folke et al., 2005; Neumann, 2005; Olsson et al., 2004b). At the same time, 
the variables permit the analyst to ground these concepts in a critical awareness of 
“situation” (McCay, 2002). Furthermore, by considering rules-in-use, aspects of the 
political-economic context, and evaluative criteria such as transaction costs and 
efficiency, the politicised IAD Framework remains relevant to policy makers through 
the identification of the socio-economic the institutional components of an action 
situation. Thus the Framework overcomes perceived weaknesses of approaches in 
political ecology which have been criticised for failing to produce useful policy 
recommendations (Neumann, 2005), an issue which has also been recognised as a 
challenge for adaptive comanagement scholars (Armitage et al., 2007b).  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed that Clement's (2010) “politicised” version of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework is well suited to the study of 
(adaptive) comanagement. In doing so we have answered calls from scholars to develop 
or adopt a common framework that facilitates a systematic study of comanagement 
across different settings, and which is able to ground the normative concepts associated 
with the subject in critical approaches that recognise context and the power dynamics at 
play in a system of resource governance. Over the last three decades comanagement 
theory has come to be seen in a number of different ways. The general tendency has 
been to move from a perspective which views comanagement in terms of a formal 
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power-sharing arrangement between a homogenous government and a community of 
resource users, to a focus on function, process and the appreciation that social-
ecological systems are complex, adaptive, and characterised by an inherent degree of 
uncertainty. Thus comanagement has “many faces”, and can be thought of in terms of 
power sharing, institution building, trust building, process, problem solving, social 
learning, and governance (Berkes, 2007, 2009; Plummer and Armitage, 2007b). 
We have shown here how the politicised IAD Framework is an appropriate tool for 
guiding an analysis of the many faces of comanagement by drawing attention to the 
various dimensions of the process and the sorts of questions that arise when considering 
them. The Framework is also unbiased in that it does not favour one form of 
governance, such as comanagement, over another but instead evaluates each situation 
on its own merits (Imperial, 1999). Thus the Framework serves as a point of 
crosspollination between the field of comanagement and scholars working in other areas 
of environmental governance by providing a consistent means of analysing and 
evaluating the many institutional arrangements that exist across differing geographical 
and social contexts. At the same time, the politicised IAD Framework provides the 
specificity and structure needed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of comanagement, 
one that critically assesses the potential for normative concepts such as power sharing, 
trust, and social learning to emerge from within the biophysical, political-economic, 
discursive, institutional, and cultural milieu of a particular study. Such analyses provide 
a solid foundation upon which to make sound policy recommendations.    
Epilogue 
In the above paper I touched upon several evaluative criteria that are commensurate 
with the politicised IAD Framework. Although some explanation was given, this did not 
provided an adequate account of the criteria I employ in this thesis. Therefore, before 
proceeding to Chapter 3 where I discuss the overall research design, here I will first 
detail the evaluative criteria that I apply later in the thesis. As noted above, the 
politicised IAD Framework is consistent with a range of criteria, relating both to 
transaction costs and to broader concerns. The criteria I have utilised relate to both. 
Firstly, following (Imperial, 1999), I evaluate the interactions and outcomes observed 
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in each of the case studies in Chapter 7 using three forms of transaction costs: 
information costs, coordination costs, and strategic costs. These criteria are useful for 
examining the performance of a system of water governance at different points 
(snapshots) in time. 
Information costs are incurred when individuals and groups expend time and resources 
searching for and organising information. When considering water management, 
participants require both scientific and time-and-place information. Furthermore, 
water management problems are typically “trans-science” problems, and require the 
integration of different sorts of information. This is achieved through the development 
of low-cost mechanisms designed to “facilitate communication, make decisions, and 
resolve conflicts between scientists, agency officials, interest groups, and the public in 
order to minimise information asymmetries” (Imperial 1999: 456). Coordination costs 
“are the sum of the costs invested in negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing 
agreements” relating to the management of the resource in question (ibid). Finally, 
strategic costs are concerned with the ways in which “asymmetries in information, 
power, or other resources” allow for some actors to obtain benefits at the expense of 
others (ibid). 
Of the broader evaluative criteria mentioned in the above paper, the ones I have opted 
to use are adaptability, efficiency and equity. The criteria of adaptability is of particular 
significance because of my interest in understanding how comanagement between 
farmers and water managers may contribute to the resilience of the system under 
future conditions of change and uncertainty. To evaluate adaptability I follow Ostrom 
(2005: 67) in asking: 1) Do individuals learn from experience within an action situation? 
And, 2) Do they adapt to new circumstances as they arise or become more rigid in their 
responses over time?  
To evaluate efficiency, I considered both how the actions of the groups contributed to 
economic efficiency, and to efficiency of water use. In the context of water 
governance, economic efficiency is concerned largely with the allocation of water to its 
highest value use (Chong and Sunding, 2006). Clearly, other criteria, such as equity or 
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adaptability, may have to be traded off if such an outcome were to be achieved 
(Bakker, 2007). Efficiency of water use is more straightforward, and relates to the 
amount of water needed to perform a particular function compared with the amount 
of water used or provided (Vickers, 2001). 
Finally, Ostrom (2005: 66) observes that equity can be assessed in two ways: 1) on the 
basis of the equality between individuals’ contributions to an effort and the benefits 
they derive, and 2) on the basis of differential abilities to pay. The first option relates 
to what is known as fiscal equivalence, and assumes a relatively level playing field 
where “those who benefit from a service should bear the burden of financing that 
service” (ibid). On the other hand option two, which is sometimes called 
redistributional equity, is instead concerned with redistributing resources to poorer 
individuals (ibid). In this thesis I focus on the extent to which the case studies I analyse 
exhibit fiscal equivalence. This is a more appropriate criterion to apply in the context of 
this research, where, as I shall discuss, the participants involved tend to be medium to 
large-scale industrial farmers. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the politicised IAD Framework and demonstrated 
how, from a theoretical and methodological perspective, it is well suited to studies of 
(adaptive) comanagement. In doing this I have laid down some of the groundwork for 
the structure of the research design. In particular, I provided an extended discussion 
(Section 2.5) of the process I have followed by employing the Framework to conduct 
an analysis of potential (adaptive) comanagement situations (Figure 3.1, overleaf). The 
stages that make up this process include defining the action situation(s) of interest, 
investigating the five exogenous variables of the Framework and how they structure 
the action situation(s), identifying the shared strategies participants adopt within this 
structure, and evaluating the interactions and outcomes according to the criteria 
discussed in the epilogue of Chapter 2. Below I will discuss how the Framework fits in 
with the broader research design, including how it can be used to identify the 
structures and generative mechanisms that give rise to (adaptive) comanagement (also 
depicted in Figure 3.1). 
This chapter therefore builds upon the last one, by outlining the overall research 
design. Following Blaikie (2007), I start by situating the work within a broad meta-
theoretical tradition, or research paradigm, known as critical realism, before going on 
to discuss the research strategy I have employed, my position as the researcher in this 
study, and finally the methods used to collect and analyse the data. Given that the 
various analyses in this thesis are presented in paper format, a discussion of the 
methods is also provided in each of the relevant chapters. Therefore, whilst it is not 
necessary to go into great detail about each of the methods employed at this stage, it 
is nonetheless important to provide an overview and to demonstrate the general logic 
they conform to in the context of the research design.   
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Figure 3.1 The process of employing the politicised IAD Framework in this thesis. 
 
As Chapter 2 has alluded to, in this thesis I work at the interface of three bodies of 
knowledge: commons theory, resilience thinking, and political ecology (Figure 3.2). 
This approach allows me to critically analyse normative (adaptive) comanagement 
concepts associated with commons theory and resilience thinking, through a focus on 
power and the use of methods often linked with political ecology (Armitage, 2008), 
including analyses of discourse, history, and the political economy (Neumann, 2005).  
As I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, the challenge posed by this synthesis 
is well addressed by the politicised IAD Framework.  
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Figure 3.2 The cross-disciplinary nature of the research, which works at the interface 
of commons theory, resilience thinking, and political ecology. Adapted from Armitage 
(2008). 
 
3.2 Research paradigm: Critical realism 
This research is situated within a critical realist paradigm (Bhaskar, 1975, 1979), a 
philosophy that argues not only for ontology (and thus against the tendency of modern 
philosophy to reduce ontology to epistemology), but for a new ontology (Bhaskar, 
1975). Put simply, whilst critical realism maintains there is a reality (both natural and 
social) independent of the human mind7, knowledge of this reality “is filtered through 
language and concepts that are relative and changeable in time and space” 
(Danermark et al., 2002: 39). Of course, natural and social reality differ in fundamental 
ways, and this has significant implications for the methods we can use to understand 
them. One important distinction is made by Giddens (1976) between the one-way 
interpretation, or the “single hermeneutic”, of studies concerned with the natural 
world, and the two-way interpretation, or “double hermeneutic”, of attempts to 
                                                          
7 For me the significance of adopting a realist position is well summed up by Popper (1979: 
32), who writes: “In my opinion, the greatest scandal of philosophy is that, while all around 
us the world of nature perishes - and not the world of nature alone - philosophers continue 
to talk, sometimes cleverly and sometimes not, about the question of whether this world 
exists”. 
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understand the social world. In essence, whilst studies of natural objects are a one-
sided concern of the natural scientist, the job of the social scientist is to “‘interpret 
other people’s interpretations, since other people’s notions and understandings are an 
inseparable part of the object of study” (Danermark et al., 2002: 32). 
Critical realism therefore embraces both a realist ontology - a world beyond ideas - and 
an interpretive epistemology. Yet the significance critical realism attributes to 
language, concepts, and interpretation is precisely the foundation upon which many 
idealist positions have been built (see Blaikie 2007). There are at least two arguments 
which counter idealist positions concerning the ontological standing of the social 
world. The first, as Bhaskar (1979) suggests, is that although social structures only exist 
to the extent that they are produced, maintained, and changed through the continuing 
activity of social agents (sensu Giddens 1984), they nonetheless form a “social totality” 
that persists largely in spite of the action or inaction of the individual.8 Furthermore, 
these structures, or what Bhaskar calls the “intransitive objects” of science, are 
imbued with powers and tendencies that affect the behaviour and choices of 
individuals. Examples of intransitive objects include gravity or the process of 
photosynthesis in the natural sciences, or “class” and “peer group influence” in the 
social sciences. 
The second argument for a realist interpretation of the social world is provided by 
Sayer (1992), and relates to an understanding that social and material reality are 
enmeshed. Thus objects which in effect are meaningless, nonetheless gain meaning – 
are ascribed a concept-dependent or symbolic function – in society. Sayer uses as 
examples the material objects gold and diamonds. On the other hand, systems of 
language and concepts9 often have a bearing on the structure of material reality, and 
when dominant tend to solidify into particular institutional and organisational 
practices (Hajer, 1995).  For example, the concepts of “public” and “private” have for a 
                                                          
8 This is a point that has resulted in two somewhat different versions of critical realism. On the 
one hand, Bhaskar (1979) proposes a structuralist conception of social structures, whilst on 
the other, Harre (1972), Bhaskar’s former supervisor at Oxford, argues instead for a 
constructivist interpretation. 
9 What I will later refer to as “discourses”. 
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long time informed actions in our society, in turn becoming “objectified in its material 
organisation, most obviously and simply in the enclosed and locked spaces which are 
interpreted as confirming the conceptual distinctions on which the actions producing 
material arrangements depend” (Sayer 1992: 33). Therefore, according to Sayer (1992: 
33): 
The point to be made here is that although, in one sense, material objects are 
intrinsically meaningless, their use and functioning in society is concept-
dependent. Conversely, although systems of meaning and beliefs are not 
themselves material, they usually require some material mode of 
objectification if they are to communicate and function socially in a stable 
manner. In other words, practices, material constructions and systems of 
meanings are reciprocally confirming…Given this ‘reciprocal confirmation’, we 
usually find changes in meaning and practices go hand in hand. 
It is not correct to think that the intransitive objects of social science remain 
constant,10 but rather that change is typically a slow process: “The structures and 
relational character of social practices in connection with their being fundamentally 
linked to the material world gives stability and durability to particular formations of 
society” (Danermark et al., 2002: 34). In contrast to the intransitive objects of science, 
“transitive objects” of science refer to the concepts, theories, and models developed 
by scientists in attempts to understand and explain aspects of reality (Blaikie, 2007). 
Unlike extreme relativist/postmodern positions that claim all statements and theories 
are equally valid,11 and unlike a strong positivist outlook that confidently assumes that 
what we observe is all that can be known,12 critical realism instead endorses the notion 
that although all knowledge (the transitive objects of science) is fallible, it is not 
equally so (Neumann, 2005). Thus although facts are socially produced and inherently 
                                                          
10 In apparent contrast to the structures and mechanisms of the natural sciences. 
11 And by extension, that this claim is itself no more valid than any other. A paradox which has 
been called the “inward collapse” of relativism (Danermark et al., 2002). 
12 What Bhaskar (1979) has termed the “epistemic fallacy”, whereby reality is reduced to 
empirical observation: it is commensurate with empirically-grounded conceptions of it. 
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theory-dependent, they are not theory determined (Danermark et al., 2002). Within 
particular contexts, it is possible to produce strong arguments for preferring one set of 
beliefs or theories about the world to another. This is because humans are able to 
exercise what Bhaskar calls “judgemental rationality” (Bhaskar, 1979).  
The ontological and epistemological positions Bhaskar propounds in his exposition of 
critical realism led him to the key claim that reality is stratified into three levels or 
domains (Bhaskar, 1975). At the most “shallow” ontological level is the domain of the 
empirical, where events are experienced by humans; at the “middle” level is the 
domain of the actual, where events take place regardless of whether anyone is there 
or not to experience them; and at the “deepest” level, the domain of the real, exist the 
generative structures and mechanisms which give rise to events in the world (Table 
3.1). The fact that reality has “ontological depth” (Bhaskar, 1979: 15) moves the focus 
of science beyond an empiricist position which always reduces the world to the 
observable.13 Consequently, the central aim of science is to instead discover the 
relationships between the things we experience at the empirical level and the 
structures and mechanisms that generate them, but which we cannot observe 
(Bhaskar, 1975; Danermark et al., 2002).  
Table 3.1 The three ontological domains for scientific investigation. Adapted from 
Bhaskar (1975).  
 Domain of real Domain of actual Domain of empirical 
Mechanisms X 
  
Events X X  
Experiences X X X 
Another important development that follows from a critical realist stance concerns the 
nature of cause (Harre, 1972; Bhaskar, 1975; Bunge, 1979). Whilst empiricist social 
science has tended to ascribe cause to observed regularities or co-variance between 
                                                          
13 Which in Bhaskar’s schema limits the production of knowledge to a descriptive activity at 
the most shallow domain of reality. 
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objects or events,14 critical realism instead proposes that causes must be thought of as 
the tendencies of structures and generative mechanisms to produce concrete events 
(in the domains of the actual and empirical). An important point here is that the 
powers and tendencies of these intransitive objects are able to cancel each other out, 
or alternatively to reinforce one another, with the result that an event may or may not 
be produced despite the presence of mechanisms with the power to produce it. In 
reality, concrete phenomena are typically the result of a multitude of contending 
structures and mechanisms acting in consort. This explains the great variety of actions, 
events, processes, and objects we observe in the world (Danermark et al., 2002).   
Now I wish to briefly outline ways in which a critical realist paradigm links well both 
with my decision to adopt the politicised IAD Framework to guide the research, and 
the decision to use adaptive comanagement as a theoretical foundation. As I noted in 
the previous chapter, the politicised IAD Framework ties in well with a critical realist 
approach to social science (Clement, 2010). Of particular relevance is the way the five 
exogenous variables of the Framework (see Figure 2.4) allows the analyst to 
investigate the different structures and mechanisms that influence the behaviour of 
participants in an action situation. In effect, the Framework provides a means of 
structuring an analysis of the intransigent objects of science as they relate to the 
phenomenon in question, which in the case of this research programme is farmer 
cooperation and participation in water governance. By including “discourse” as one of 
the five exogenous variables, the Framework, like critical realism, gives special 
attention to the place of language, concepts, and categories, thus accommodating the 
“double hermeneutic” (Giddens, 1976) nature of social science research (see above).  
There is also good congruence between critical realism and resilience thinking, one of 
the core bodies of knowledge underpinning adaptive comanagement. In particular, 
critical realism appears well suited to addressing the challenges of complex adaptive 
systems theory, which has informed much of the thinking around resilience (see 
                                                          
14 Or to put it another way, to invoke a causal law through the constant conjunction of atomistic 
events. 
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Chapter 1). The first point to note is the way critical realism addresses the notion of 
emergence, which is a key concept from a resilience perspective (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002; Levin, 1999). For critical realism, emergence is also vital given the 
“laminated” ontology it propounds. Whilst I have discussed one form of ontological 
stratification above - that is the delineation of reality into the domains of the 
empirical, actual, and real (Table 3.1) – another is the assertion from a critical realist 
perspective that systems and powers operating at one level are in fact an emergent 
property of a more basic power or property and thus are unilaterally and existentially 
dependent upon them (Bhaskar, 1975; Bunge, 1979). A classic example is the existence 
of the mind as an emergent property of the body. As a result of this, it is clear that 
both critical realism and adaptive comanagement are concerned with the concept of 
emergence. 
The second point to note is the attention critical realism gives to open systems in the 
social sciences (Bhaskar, 1979). This involves the last of three ways in which 
ontological stratification is incorporated into a critical realist philosophy, with the 
other two having now been dealt with above. The natural sciences tend to deal with 
aspects of reality at lower strata, for example at the level of atoms in the case of 
physics, or molecules and chemical bonds in the case of chemistry. In these instances it 
is often possible to impose closure on the system of interest, and in doing so to study 
the effects of particular structures or mechanisms in isolation. However, as the 
subjects of the social sciences operate at higher strata, where there are typically a 
greater number of structures and mechanisms operating at different levels of 
emergence and in a multitude of combinations, these systems are always open 
systems (Bhaskar, 1979; Danermark et al., 2002). This makes the sort of control and 
prediction sometimes achievable in the natural sciences largely irrelevant in the social 
sciences (Sayer, 1992). This also implies that social systems are therefore complex 
systems.15 Again then, we can draw a parallel between the concerns of critical realism 
                                                          
15 As are natural systems - such as ecosystems - that exist at higher levels of emergence; and, 
by extension, “social-ecological systems”, which have become a core concept in the adaptive 
comanagement literature (Armitage et al., 2009). 
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and adaptive comanagement because of the way both accept complexity as an 
inherent feature of the systems of interest (Blaikie, 2007). 
3.3 Research Strategy 
Having fleshed out some of the central tenets of a critical realist philosophy and its 
relevance to this thesis, I will now discuss the research strategy, or logic of enquiry, I 
have employed to address the four objectives outlined in Chapter 1. As the previous 
section discussed, the core aim of science should be to discover the relationship 
between the actual events and processes we observe in the empirical domain, and the 
structures and mechanisms that generate them. The research strategy which is able to 
address this requirement is Retroduction,16 a mode of inference for discovering “the 
conditions fundamental to the existence of phenomena” (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013: 3). 
Although not often explicitly recognised as such, retroductive reasoning appears to be 
a vital aspect of the scientific process, underpinning such well-known discoveries as 
planetary motion, the structure of the atom, and viruses (Blaikie, 2007; Danermark et 
al., 2002). In accordance with a Retroductive research strategy, Pawson (2000: 298) 
outlines the logic of realist explanation as follows (and illustrated in Figure 3.3): 
Explanations focus on interesting, puzzling, socially significant outcome 
patterns (O). Explanation takes the form of positing some underlying 
mechanism (M) that generates the outcome, which will consist of positions 
about how structural resources and agent’s reasoning have constituted the 
regularity. The workings of such mechanisms are always contingent and 
conditional, and hypotheses will also be constructed in respect of which local, 
                                                          
16  It is necessary to make the distinction between a particular mode of reasoning (e.g. 
induction), and its related research strategy (e.g. the Inductive Strategy). The key distinction 
is that a research strategy is broader, and whilst its overall logic of enquiry conforms to the 
mode of reasoning it takes its name from, it may also be compatible with other modes of 
reasoning at points in the research process (Blaikie, 2007). For example, although the 
Retroductive Strategy is based on retroductive logic, it is able to incorporate inductive, 
deductive, or abductive modes of reasoning (ibid). In this thesis, I differentiate between the 
two by writing modes of reasoning in lower case, whilst capitalising their related research 
strategies. 
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institutional and historical contexts (C) are conducive to the action of the 
mechanism. 
Figure 3.3 Basic elements of a realist explanation. Adapted from Pawson and 
Tilley (1997, 2004) and Pawson (2000).  
 
The Retroductive Strategy can be broken down into various stages. Whilst this process 
is relatively flexible, cyclical, and open to interpretation, I have followed Blaikie (2010: 
87) by firstly describing the regularity to be explained, which in this case is farmer 
cooperation in lowland England. Following this, I then investigated the characteristics 
of the context (C) in which lowland farming and water governance takes place. Then I 
moved to a consideration of possible contending mechanisms (M) that appeared to 
encourage the development of (adaptive) comanagement (O) between farmer groups 
and water managers within the context identified, and an investigation of the 
relevance of these mechanisms and the ways in which the different features of the 
local and wider context facilitates or inhibits their operation. In doing this, I paid 
attention to the fact that it is “the combination of the context and the mechanism that 
is central to the explanation” (Blaikie, 2010: 88). This is an important point because “in 
the notion of ‘context’ lies the realist solution to the panacea problem. For realism it is 
axiomatic that certain contexts will be supportive to the [generative mechanism or 
mechanisms] and some will not. And this gives realist evaluation the crucial task of 
sorting one from then other” (Pawson and Tilley, 2004: 7). 
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A point of contention concerning the Retroductive Strategy relates to how the 
generative mechanisms postulated by a critical realist ontology are discovered. As 
Blaikie (2010: 87) puts it:  
The central problem for the Retroductive research strategy is how to discover 
the structures and mechanisms that are proposed to explain observed 
regularities. Is there an appropriate mode of reasoning that will assist the 
researcher to find these ideas? Is there a logic of discovery? This issue has been 
a matter of some dispute. However, there is general agreement that it requires 
disciplined scientific thinking aided by creative imagination, intuition, and 
guesswork. 
I propose that this “logic of discovery” can be significantly aided by the politicised IAD 
Framework. As I have already noted, this is because the Framework provides breadth, 
clarity, and structure, drawing the researcher’s attention to the range of variables and 
questions to be considered when attempting an investigation of both potential 
mechanisms (M) and context (C), and the way in which they act upon the various 
components of the action situation to condition (as distinct from determine) the 
behaviour of participants, resulting in particular outcome patterns (O).  
The Framework cannot be used to identify a mechanism directly, as mechanisms tend 
to be more abstract concepts (Danermark et al., 2002). Yet it can help pinpoint 
particular factors or measures from which mechanisms can be inferred. For example, 
Pawson and Tilley (2004) give the example of the introduction of breakfast clubs at 
schools as a means of boosting early education performance. Although the breakfast 
club itself is not a mechanism but rather a measure, the authors note how its 
introduction triggered a range of (postulated) mechanisms. The mechanisms for aiding 
classroom attentiveness that the authors propose are triggered by the introduction of 
the breakfast club include “offering kids a ‘nutritious kick-start’ (M1) to the day...or 
[the breakfast club] may act as a ‘summoning point’ (M2) to prevent kids loitering or 
absconding or misbehaving in the chaotic period before school…and/or it may act as 
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an ‘energy centre’ (M3) so soak up gossip and boisterousness before formalities 
commence”…etc. (Pawson and Tilley, 2004: 7).   
My approach follows the logic of discovery I have outlined above, where particular 
measures and contextual variables, or what I will later call “factors of success”, are 
identified using the politicised IAD Framework. From these factors of success I then 
postulate underlying causal mechanisms. As will become apparent, these factors of 
success are in themselves important findings of the research as they lie at the more 
concrete, empirical level. This level of analysis is a useful component of the thesis, 
which seeks to provide practical recommendations for water governance. 
Having identified possible contending structures and mechanisms that appear to 
explain the occurrence of a given regularity, there remains the difficulty of discerning 
which are necessary conditions (the constituent properties) and which are contingent. 
As I noted when discussing critical realism above, social phenomena exist as aspects of 
open systems, which makes the classic natural science experiment whereby causal 
mechanisms are investigated in a closed system virtually impossible. To overcome this 
issue, Danermark et al. (2002) have put forward five complementary strategies the 
researcher can employ as powerful alternatives to the traditional experiment, where 
these are: counterfactual thinking, social experiments, studies of pathological cases, 
studies of extreme cases, and comparative case studies. Of the five strategies, in this 
thesis I have employed three of them, namely counterfactual thinking, an analysis of 
an extreme case, and a comparative case study approach. I discuss these further in 
Section 3.4 below.  
As is typically the case, a research project seldom relies upon one kind of logic alone, 
and this thesis is no different. Whilst the overall research strategy I have adopted is 
one of Retroduction - specifically the model proposed by Pawson and Tilley (1997) and 
Pawson (2000) in Figure 3.3 - I complement this process with other analyses that utilise 
different forms of logic in order to analyse the context surrounding farming and water 
governance in lowland England. To do this, I have employed two commonly recognised 
forms of logic, namely induction and deduction, as well as a less well known form of 
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logic called abduction. Here I draw upon Blaikie (2007: 56-107) to provide a brief 
outline of each of these. However, it must be noted that the descriptions represent 
relatively idealised depictions, which have been defended, contended, and amended 
many times over. 
Induction entails an empirical approach whereby data is collected and, through a 
process of inductive reasoning, generalisations are derived that relate to patterns 
observed in the data. These patterns are then subjected to further testing in order to 
develop law-like statements about natural or social life. This form of logic therefore 
starts from the particular and moves to the general. On the other hand, deduction 
starts from the general and moves to the specific. According to deductive logic, a 
hypothesis or set of hypotheses which together form a theory are put forward, and 
one or more conclusions that result from the proposed theory are deduced. The 
conclusion(s) is then tested by gathering appropriate data. If the data is not consistent 
with the conclusion the theory is false. Alternatively, if the data is consistent with the 
conclusion(s) then the theory has been corroborated. Finally, abduction starts with 
everyday accounts from which expert accounts are then derived. Typically, these 
everyday accounts relate to the talk of social actors in which underlying meaning is 
often hidden. Through a hermeneutic process the researcher then attempts to “piece 
together the fragments of meaning that can be gleaned from these accounts” (Blaikie, 
2007: 107) as they move from lay language to technical language. 
Below I discuss at what points these different forms of logic have been employed when 
I consider the individual studies that make up the overall analytical component of the 
research programme. It is worth noting that this combining of different logics of 
enquiry is complementary, and can be used to strengthen the research process as long 
as none of the strategies conflict with its meta-theoretical position (Blaikie, 2007). In 
the case of this thesis there is no conflict, given the “maximally inclusive” 
epistemological approach critical realism allows for, whereby all forms of logic are seen 
to be relevant (Owens, 2011). 
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3.4 Methods 
As I have discussed so far in this chapter, the research paradigm and related research 
strategy I employ relies upon an investigation of how a particular regularity (farmer 
cooperation) lead to a particular outcome pattern (comanagement between farmer 
groups and water managers), and the structures and mechanisms that cause it. Given 
that the various separate analyses I have undertaken to achieve this are written in the 
form of journal articles, making up Chapters 4 through 7, each of these chapters are 
self-contained and therefore already include an outline of the methods employed. 
Nonetheless, it is still necessary here to provide an overview of the different methods 
as they relate to each of the studies, including the various forms and sources of data, 
and how the data was selected, collected, and analysed. I will also discuss which forms 
of logic were used at each stage. 
Using a predominantly qualitative approach, the research draws upon a mixture of 
primary, secondary, and tertiary data from a range of sources. The primary and 
secondary data consists of information provided by farmers and other key informants 
in semi-natural settings, participant observation through my attendance in several 
abstractor group meetings, as well as documentation relating to EU and national 
water, environment, and farming policy and legislation; international conventions and 
conference outputs; relevant reports, briefings, newsletters, and  position statements 
from a range of sources; and historical artefacts from the National and Lincolnshire 
archive offices. The tertiary data consists of published research in academic journals 
and books. It is necessary to point out that with respect to the use of this data, there is 
a degree of overlap between several of the studies. Most notably, the same set of 
interview data has been analysed in Chapters 6 and 7, and in places this information 
also supports the analysis in Chapter 5. In both of these studies, the content of the 
interviews are analysed in relation to a different set of research questions and 
objectives. 
Before considering the various methods I have employed to address each of the 
individual analyses in this thesis, it is worth providing an overview of how these 
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analyses relate to the research objectives, the politicised IAD Framework, and the 
Retroductive research strategy discussed above.17 The analysis in Chapter 4 has been 
used to address Objective 2 (an investigation of the broader policy context from the 
perspective of the “rules” variable of the Framework); the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 
are used to address Objective 3 (an investigation of the broader context from the 
perspective of the “political-economic” and “discourse” variables of the Framework); 
and the analysis in Chapter 7, in conjunction with the findings from the preceding two 
analyses, addresses Objective 4 (the relationship between farmer abstractor groups 
and the comanagement of water resources). Together these analyses account for the 
various components of the Retroductive Strategy I am employing (Figure 3.3), where 
the regularity is described, the context (C) is investigated, generative mechanisms (M) 
are identified that give rise to a particular outcome pattern (O), which is interpreted 
through the conceptual lens of (adaptive) comanagement. The methods pertaining to 
each of the analyses (Chapters 4-7) are now considered in turn. 
Chapter 4: Comparative analysis 
In Chapter 4 I analyse the water policy context in England, in order to assess the extent 
to which it serves as an enabling environment for the emergence of adaptive 
comanagement. This entails the use of both induction and deduction, in a process that 
can be located on Wallace's (1971) inductive-deductive cycle (Figure 3.4). The 
approach begins at the “data collection” phase of the diagram. Here inductive logic is 
employed, where from a review of the literature five policy categories (“empirical 
generalisations” on Wallace’s diagram) are derived that appear to be conducive to 
adaptive comanagement. Then deduction is employed as the five general categories 
are compared to recent water policy documents in England using a directed content 
analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005) and conclusions are drawn about the extent to 
which English water policy provides an enabling policy environment for adaptive 
comanagement. The data for this study consists of the academic literature on adaptive 
comanagement and seven key policy documents dating from 2008 onwards, which I 
                                                          
17 See Figure 1.1 for an illustration of the relationship between research objectives and the 
analyses in Chapters 4-7.   
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identified from a broader review of English water policy documents. The documents, 
and a short synopsis of each, are provided in Chapter 4 (Table 4.2).    
Figure 3.4 Wallace’s inductive-deductive cycle.                                                                                                              
Adapted from Blaikie (2007).          
                                         
Chapter 5: Political economy analysis 
Chapter 5 is concerned with power, and relies upon an historical analysis of water 
governance and farming in lowland England from World War II until the present day. 
The intention is to chart the evolution of the power dynamic governing farming and 
water management in order to understand how this dynamic affects the ability of 
lowland farmers to cooperate and participate in water governance. I employ a political 
economy analysis that relies upon a review of primary and secondary documents, 
which were listed in the introduction to this section. A form of abductive logic is 
employed, where the data was recontextualised in accordance with the conceptual 
schema of approach known as the Power Cube. The Power Cube itself can be 
described as an analytical tool for thinking about the interplay between different forms 
of power operating in different types of spaces and at different levels of governance 
(Gaventa, 2006a, 2006b). The analytical process in this chapter evolved as a dialectical 
relationship between the data and the concepts associated with the Power Cube. 
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Chapter 6: Discourse analysis 
In this chapter I employ two discourse analysis concepts from the field of critical 
discursive psychology – interpretive repertoires and subject positioning – in order to 
analyse how farmers talk about the relationship between farming and water resources 
management. All participants are farm owners, tenants, and managers of medium to 
large-scale farming businesses that rely upon irrigation to a greater or lesser degree. 
Furthermore, all participants are members of farmer water abstractor groups or are 
farmers thinking of farming a group. In total 25 interviews and two focus groups are 
conducted, and transcribed and analysed using the computer software package NVIVO 
(Bazely, 2007). The analysis employed an abductive research strategy, following a 
process outlined by Edley (2001). This process, along with the theoretical foundation of 
my approach, is described in more detail in Chapter 6.  
Both interviews and focus groups were semi-structured, and took the form of a guided 
conversation where the emphasis is on building a good rapport with the interviewee/s 
and on maintaining fluidity throughout the interview process (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
In the case of the two focus groups, I was part of a team of three researchers 
representing Cranfield University, where the other two members of the team were 
conducting research for a separate project looking at the formation and function of 
farmer water abstractor groups in England. Given the crossover in the context of our 
research programmes, I used this opportunity to gain access to the farmers in 
question.  
The interview questions were not consistent throughout the whole data collection 
phase. Rather, each interview evolved as a dialectical process between interviewer and 
interviewee(s), where on different occasions and at different stages in the interview 
certain issues became more relevant than others. Nonetheless, the majority of 
questions took their lead from the predefined list of interview topics (See Appendix 1 
for an extended example of an interview question sheet). These topics are: 1) the 
structure and function of the abstractor group in question, 2) the reasons for forming 
or wanting to form an abstractor group, 3) the relationship between the members of 
the group, as well as the relationship between farmers more generally, 4) the 
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relationship between the group (and farmers more generally) and statutory water 
managers and government advisors (in particular representatives from the 
Environment Agency, Natural England, and the Internal drainage boards), 5) the 
relationship between the group (and farmers more generally) and environmental 
NGO’s involved in or concerned with water management issues, and 6) the 
relationship between the group (and farmers more generally) and the water 
environment itself. A separate research information sheet and consent form were 
provided to each participant prior to the interview or focus group, and any questions 
the interviewee(s) has about the research were discussed. Then, if the interviewee was 
satisfied, the consent form was signed and dated by both parties before proceeding 
(see Appendix 2 for a copy of the research information sheet and interview consent 
form). 
Chapter 7: Multiple case study analysis 
The final analysis specifically considers the relationship between water abstractor 
groups and the comanagement of water resources in lowland England. It incorporates 
the findings of the previous wide-ranging analyses relating to the rules-in-use, political-
economic, and discourse variables of the politicised IAD Framework - which serves as 
the broader context in Figure 2.4 – and undertakes an embedded multiple case study 
analysis (Yin, 2009) of five water abstractor groups in the east of England by using the 
Framework. This involves complementing the broad contextual analysis with a more 
fine-grained analysis of the five exogenous variables of the framework and the way in 
which they structure the action situations of interest. When analysing the rules-in-use 
variable, Ostrom and Crawford’s (1995) grammar of institutions is used to define and 
differentiate between rules, norms, and shared strategies. Rules themselves are 
classified according to the element of the action situation they most directly affect 
(Ostrom, 2005).18 The reason why I opted for an embedded case study design is to 
account for the focus on action situations (Figure 2.2) at different theoretical and 
                                                          
18 Further discussion on how I analysed the rules-in-us and norms that structure action 
situations, and the strategies participants adopt within these situations, is provided in Appendix 
3. 
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organisational scales of analysis (Figure 2.3). For example, an action situation relating 
to an abstractor group, and then a second internal action situation relating to the 
group’s committee, which is embedded within the first situation. 
Figure 3.5 The different approaches to case study design.   
 Adapted from Yin (2009). 
   
 
Case studies attempt “to keep together, as a unit, those characteristics which are 
relevant to the scientific problem being investigated,” (Goode and Hatt, 1952: 4) and 
as such are appropriate in attempting to understand the abstractor groups under 
investigation in this study.  Furthermore, a case study approach is well suited to a 
single researcher with a limited budget and time-frame and is therefore appropriate 
for someone undertaking a PhD (Blaikie, 2000).  
In keeping with the research strategy I have adopted, in this chapter retroductive logic 
is employed to discover those generative mechanisms that appear to cause the 
development of comanagement arrangements between water abstractor groups and 
statutory water managers. This is achieved by firstly identifying the key factors of 
success – which may point both towards potential mechanisms as well as local 
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contextual conditions - that link the groups to different comanagement activities. Each 
case study is then assessed according to the evaluative criteria discussed in the 
epilogue of Chapter 2, namely three forms of transaction costs (information, 
organisational, and strategic) and three overall criteria (adaptability, efficiency, and 
equity). The relevance of the findings for the future of water governance in England is 
then discussed. 
To assist with identifying the most important mechanisms and contextual factors from 
the more contingent criteria the analysis employs three of Danermark et al.'s (2002) 
“strategies” noted above, namely counterfactual thinking, an analysis of an extreme 
case, and a comparative case study approach. Counterfactual thinking asks questions 
like “Is it possible to imagine X without…?”, and can be considered a process whereby 
“we use our stored experience and knowledge of social reality, as well as our ability to 
abstract and to think about what it is not, but what might be” (Danermark et al., 2002: 
101). This form of thinking is clearly of much use when attempting to understand 
which structures and causal mechanisms are of most importance for producing the 
outcome pattern of interest.  
Extreme cases are those instances where mechanisms appear to “manifest themselves 
in purer form than usual” (Danermark et al., 2002: 104); thus, where the preconditions 
for comanagement appear to be much clearer. In Chapter 7 I include one extreme case 
among the five case studies. This is an abstractor group that, unlike the other four 
groups, is involved in what can be considered a genuine comanagement arrangement 
with statutory water managers. Finally, by employing a multiple case study approach it 
was possible to compare different factors between the five cases in light of the 
outcomes produced. This strategy assisted with distinguishing “the necessary, 
constitutive conditions from more accidental circumstances”…because it provided “an 
empirical foundation for retroduction, a foundation to sort out contingent differences 
in order to arrive at the common or more universal” (Danermark et al., 2002: 105). 
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3.5 Researcher’s stance 
As the researcher, the stance I adopt is important because it reflects my relationship 
with both the research process and participants. This in turn has implications for the 
sort of knowledge I claim the work is producing (it is of epistemological significance). 
Blaikie (2010) proposes six different positions a researcher might adopt, where these 
are the “detached observer”, “empathetic observer”, “faithful reporter”, “mediator of 
languages”, “reflective partner”, and “dialogic facilitator”. A brief account of each 
position is provided in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 The six positions a researcher may adopt (Blaikie, 2010). 
Researcher stance Explanation 
Detached observer Researcher regarded as an uninvolved spectator. As values 
and preferences of researcher are seen to threaten 
objectivity of research, detachment is a requirement for 
producing reliable knowledge. 
Empathic observer Objectivity still the focus, but the ability for researcher to 
place themselves in social actors’ position seen as 
necessary. Actions can only be understood by grasping 
subjective meanings used by social actors. 
Faithful reporter Much less detached than empathic observer, where the aim 
is to report a way of life by allowing participants to “speak 
for themselves”. May require researcher to become 
immersed in way of life of participants in order to grasp 
meanings. 
Mediator of languages This position rejects the notion of detachment. Instead, 
studying social life is akin to studying a text, which 
involves interpretation on the part of the reader; the 
researcher actively constructs an account based on 
accounts of participants, where social, geographical, and 
historical locations, as well as the researcher interests and 
assumptions, have a bearing on the account produced. 
Reflective partner This position is committed to the emancipation of the 
participants from oppression and is associated with critical 
theory. It accepts the premises of Interpretivism, and that 
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the process of understanding socially constructed reality is 
dialogic.  
Dialogic facilitator A culmination of the previous two positions that reflects a 
post-modern stance. The researcher relies upon their 
understanding of a situation, but where they attempt to 
minimise the authority of their position by letting the 
participant speak for themselves. The researcher is 
regarded as just another actor in the social context being 
investigated. 
According to Blaikie’s schema, it is not clear that my position fits neatly into only one 
category. In part this may be due to the methodological breadth of the research. It is 
also because different commentators will provide different interpretations, of which 
Blaikie’s categories in Table 3.2 are only one. I argue that my position as the researcher 
in this thesis is best seen as a combination of “empathic observer” and “mediator of 
languages”. Blaikie (2010) equates the position of empathic observer with a quality 
called “verstehen”. This term highlights the hermeneutic nature of human 
understanding. As discussed in Section 3.2, when it comes to understanding the social 
world, the interpretive process is founded upon a double hermeneutic relationship 
between the researcher and the social object of study. Sayer (1992) argues that 
verstehen encapsulates the stance of a critical realist researcher, and uses the analogy 
of reading a book by way of illustration: 
We do not understand a book…by observing and analysing the shape of words 
or their frequency of appearance, but by interpreting their meaning. To this 
reading, we always bring interpretive skills and some kind of pre-understanding 
(although not necessarily a correct one) of what the text might be about. In 
other words there is an interpenetration and engagement of the ‘frames of 
meaning’ of the reader and the text. We cannot approach the text with an 
empty mind in the hope of understanding it in an unmediated fashion, for our 
own frame of meaning is an indispensable tool or resource for understanding. 
(Sayer, 1992: 35-36). 
 
 73 
 
Later, the analogy is qualified: 
The ‘text’ of actual social processes is usually highly disjointed and often highly 
contradictory, and whereas it is not generally necessary to know how a book 
was produced in order to understand it, little sense can be made of social 
interactions…without exploring the production of particular actions. (Sayer, 
1992: 36) 
Yet Sayer’s analogy of verstehen as being like reading a book confuses the categories in 
Table 3.2. This is because it appears to conform better to Blaikie’s (2010: 51) 
description of the mediator of languages position, where he writes that “studying 
social life is akin to studying a text, and this involves interpretation on the part of the 
reader”. Therefore, whilst my position shares common ground with that of the 
empathic observer, whereby I agree that “only by grasping the subjective meanings 
used by the social actors can their actions be understood” (Blaikie 2010: 51), I also 
have much in common with the mediator of languages position. This is clear from 
Sayer’s illustration of the concept of verstehen. The stage of the research where I most 
clearly adopt the mediator of languages position is Chapter 6. During this stage, the 
form of discourse analysis I employed was used to “actively construct an account 
based on the accounts provided by the participants,” where “this process of 
construction [was] not neutral” because “researchers have to invest something of 
themselves into this account” (Blaikie, 2010: 51).  
From this description, and in contrast to the position of empathic observer, it is clear 
that I am rejecting the claim that any form of neutrality or objectivity can be attained. 
This is because my concern is with “exploring the production of particular actions” 
(Sayer 1992: 36) through an analysis of both context and mechanisms, whilst 
recognising the double hermeneutic nature of the research process (see Sections 3.2 
and 3.3). Such a recognition draws attention to the need to be reflexive, to 
acknowledge my role in the research process and to be critical of it and the knowledge 
(the transitive object of science) that is produced. In effect, I am arguing that my 
research findings and conclusions constitute a “situated knowledge” (Harraway, 1988). 
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Given the stance I have adopted, I therefore view this thesis as a “situated 
contribution” to the theoretical and methodological challenges of studying (adaptive) 
comanagement, as well as the more practical issue of farmer cooperation and 
participation in English water governance. 
3.6 Ensuring the quality of the research design 
Yin (2009) describes four tests that can be applied in order to improve the quality of 
the research design when conducting case study research. In what follows I discuss 
these tests and the ways in which I have addressed them. I can also add that several of 
the chapters written in the format of a journal article have undergone the peer review 
process on their way to publication (Chapters 2, 5, and 6), and in these cases quality 
has been improved by having to respond to the comments of the reviewers. 
The first test is construct validity, which seeks to ensure that a sufficiently operational 
set of measures have been developed in order to guarantee that the “subjective” 
nature of the research remains robust. I attempted to address this by, 1) a 
triangulation of methods, 2) developing a chain of evidence, which involved storing 
and organisation all data on NVIVO, including observational notes of interviews, and by 
keeping a (sometimes sporadic) diary of the research process, 3) discussing my 
impressions and interpretations of events and processes with key individuals (typically 
representatives of water abstractor groups) in order to assess the extent to which they 
felt this information is representative of their situation, and 4) defining the key terms 
and criteria employed in the research, and operationalizing key concepts like 
comanagement, as well as the various evaluative criteria I have chosen to apply to the 
case studies in Chapter 7. 
The second test is internal validity, “which is mainly a concern for explanatory case 
studies, when an investigator is trying to explain how x led to event y” (Yin 2009: 42). It 
is clear by this description that internal validity is a test that is of much relevance to 
this thesis, given my intention to understand how particular generative mechanisms 
(“xn”) give rise to a comanagement outcome (“y”). Internal validity tests require that 
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the researcher performs various instances of “pattern matching” between the study 
results and the results of other related studies, or between the process under 
investigation and related logical models. I have addressed this validity check in two 
ways. Firstly, through the use of counterfactual thinking, an extreme case study, and a 
comparative case study approach, where the intention is to identify those mechanisms 
which are vital to the development of comanagement. In effect, these strategies are a 
way of establishing that “x”, and not “z”, causes “y”. And secondly, through pattern 
matching, where I can demonstrate that my findings are consistent with the findings in 
the literature more generally. This will become clear in Chapter 7.  
The third test is external validity and relates to how the results of a particular case 
study can be generalised. Here the important distinction is between “statistical 
generalisation”, which “makes a statement about the confidence we may have that 
the surface relationships observed in our sample will in fact occur in the parent 
population” (and which I have not employed), and “analytic generalisation”, where 
“the validity of the extrapolation depends not on the typicality or representativeness 
of the case but upon the cogency of the theoretical reasoning” (Mitchell 1983: 207). 
This requires that the case study results are analysed according to a well-developed 
theoretical framework (Bliaikie, 2000). I have attempted to demonstrate this in both 
this chapter and the last. In Chapter 2 I grounded the research in adaptive 
comanagement theory, and demonstrated how the politicised IAD Framework is well 
placed to analyse the concept by providing structure, clarity, and breadth to the study. 
Then, in this chapter, I have detailed the research design, which is consistent with the 
Retroductive research strategy utilised by others working in a critical realist tradition. 
The final test is reliability, and is concerned with the ability of later researchers to 
follow the same procedures described in the methodology, where by conducting the 
same study they would arrive at similar findings and conclusions. Yin (2009) states that 
the way to increase reliability is to make all steps in the research process as 
operational as possible. This study has attempted to document the different steps 
taken in enough detail that the reader is able to follow and understand the logic of the 
research process from its inception through to its conclusion. However, the extent to 
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which a different researcher following these steps could arrive at similar findings and 
conclusions, must of course be framed in terms of the arguments of the previous 
section concerning the stance of the researcher. 
3.7 Limitations 
Even with the above quality tests in place, there is of course a range of common 
limitations with any social science study, and this one is no exception. I will discuss 
these in terms of researcher bias, availability of data, access to data, constraints on 
time and resources, and thesis structure. Where limitations with method exist, these 
have been addressed in the relevant chapter. The first, researcher bias, has to some 
extent been addressed in Section 3.5 above where I discuss my position as the 
researcher. Here I make it clear that, unlike researchers working in a positivist tradition 
who strive towards the notion of objectivity, I instead recognise the situatedness of 
the researcher and the research by drawing attention to the concept of verstehen, as 
well as the need to remain reflexive throughout. Nonetheless, beyond this position, 
there is still the potential for bias which manifests itself through a lack of academic 
rigour. I have attempted to address this form of bias by conducting the validity and 
reliability tests outlined in the previous section.    
Limitations also relate to the availability of and access to data. In this research 
programme this applied in particular to the process of securing interviews with 
farmers (sample size). Here one issue related to the availability of farmers during 
several key periods throughout the year, either because it was an important and time 
consuming part of the farm calendar (such as planting or harvesting), or because it 
wasn’t and as a result many farmers were away on holiday. Secondly, even during 
periods when farmers where more available, accessing them proved very difficult in 
some instances. In large part, this is because farmers in the UK tend to be the object of 
a myriad government, academic, and other studies and as a result do not always feel 
inclined to participate in yet one more research project. The issue was overcome in 
part because Cranfield has strong links with members of the farming community, and 
this acted as a way in, as well as through my efforts to befriend key farmers by 
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attending meetings and discussions where they were present. Face-to-face contact 
proved far more successful than sending impersonal email requests.  
Another key limitation of the research concerns the constraints on time and resources. 
Most important of these variables was time, given the relatively wide-reaching and 
comprehensive nature of my research design. Although I feel the latter stages of the 
research programme have been addressed adequately, several of the analyses could 
have benefitted both from more data, and from a more exhaustive analysis of all the 
data. One notable observation is that, of the five water abstractor groups included in 
the study in Chapter 7, one of these – called LWT – received more attention than the 
other four. With limited time available, the decision to focus on this group in more 
detail concerns the fact it appeared to be significantly more involved in 
comanagement activities. In terms of the discussion above, this LWT proved to be the 
“extreme case” whereby a number of structures and mechanisms could be observed in 
their “purer form”. This is not to say a full analysis was not applied to the other groups, 
but rather that it lacked the more exhaustive approach that LWT received. Access to 
resources proved to be much less of a constraint, although at points this issue became 
problematic because for the last two years of the thesis I have been working off 
campus and on occasion would have benefitted from having easier access to Cranfield 
University’s library and related research resources.  
Finally, a minor point to note is the structure of the thesis, and in particular the 
decision to submit five of the chapters in journal article format. Whilst writing the 
various analyses as journal articles has a number of clear benefits, it has meant that 
additional information, in the form of prologues and epilogues, has had to be provided 
in order to bring the various papers together. Furthermore, because each paper 
conforms to the standard journal article structure there tends to be a degree of 
repetition in the thesis, especially with respect to the introduction of several of the 
papers. These issues have tended to disrupt some of the flow one may expect from a 
thesis submitted in the more traditional format. 
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Chapter 4: Policy Analysis 
Prologue 
This chapter forms the first of three analyses, written in the format of journal articles, 
which investigate the wider context surrounding farming and water governance in 
England. As noted in Chapter 1, the paper below (Paper 2) sets out to explore the 
“rules-in-use” variable of the politicised IAD Framework from a broad policy 
perspective. Later, in Chapter 7 I will also explore this variable, by instead conducting a 
fine-grained analysis of local rules-in-use and how they structure the various action 
situations pertaining to five water abstractor groups. However, in this paper I am 
concerned specifically with the extent to which water policy in England serves as an 
enabling environment for adaptive comanagement.19 Although the focus of the thesis 
is on farmer cooperation and participation, here my scope encompasses the system of 
water governance in England as a whole. In Chapter 1 I discussed how the scope of the 
analysis will increasingly narrow as the thesis progresses (Figure 1.1). The paper in this 
chapter addresses Objective 2 of the research agenda. It is currently under review by 
the journal Ecology and Society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 See also the discussion in Section 2.5. 
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Paper 2 - Managing Water through Change and 
Uncertainty: Comparing Lessons from the Adaptive 
Comanagement Literature to Recent Policy 
Developments in England 
Luke Whaley and Edward K. Weatherhead 
Abstract 
The challenges of managing water are set to become increasingly variable and 
unpredictable, in particular because of climate change. So as to better cope in the future, 
it is imperative that approaches that enhance the resilience of the system are 
encouraged. In this paper we investigate the extent to which water policy in England 
provides an enabling environment for the emergence of adaptive comanagement, a 
novel approach to natural resource management which its proponents claim can achieve 
the dual objective of ecosystem protection and livelihood sustainability under 
conditions of change and uncertainty. We do this by undertaking a review of the 
literature, from which we distil five policy categories, the presence of which appear 
important for facilitating the emergence of adaptive comanagement. We then use these 
criteria to conduct a directed content analysis of seven key water policy documents in 
England from 2008 onwards. Our findings reveal that in a number of ways decision 
makers are putting in place policy objectives that are amenable to the emergence of 
adaptive comanagement. Yet at the same time, we also observed a level of discrepancy 
between substantive aspects of the five policy categories and water policy in England. 
Addressing these discrepancies will be important if English water policy is to allow for 
the emergence of management processes, like adaptive comanagement, which are 
capable of coping with the challenges that lie ahead. 
Key words: adaptive comanagement; England; policy; water governance 
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4.1 Introduction 
Widespread water quality issues, regional and localised periods of water scarcity, a 
growing population, and a more variable and uncertain future climate means that in the 
coming years water governance in England faces a stern test (Barker and Turner, 2011; 
Collins and Ison, 2009; Weatherhead and Howden, 2009). Whilst we know that change 
will occur, it is not possible to accurately gauge the extent and precise nature of the 
challenges that lie ahead. As a result, enhancing the capacity of England’s system of 
water governance to cope with future uncertainties becomes a crucial objective. This 
contrasts starkly with the rigid and bureaucratic approach that came to characterise 
water management in England during the last century, “founded on the assumption of a 
stable and certain operating environment in which discrete policy problems could be 
addressed rationally and objectively by neutral officials acting alone” (Watson and 
Treffny 2009: 450).   
One approach that is receiving increasing attention as a way of achieving the dual 
objective of ecosystem protection and livelihood sustainability under conditions of 
change and uncertainty is adaptive comanagement, a field of enquiry that combines the 
linkages dimension of comanagement with the learning dimension of adaptive 
management (Armitage, 2007; Armitage et al., 2009, 2007a; Olsson et al., 2004a). 
Given the requirement to enhance the resilience of the system, here we propose that 
adaptive comanagement is a particularly appropriate lens through which to interpret the 
direction water management is taking in England. 
The establishment of adaptive comanagement is seen to depend in part on a government 
that fosters the conditions to both encourage and sustain the process, in particular 
through the creation of an enabling policy environment (Berkes et al., 2007; Olsson et 
al., 2004a; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). As a result, in this paper we attempt to assess 
the extent to which water policy in England provides a receptive context for the 
emergence of adaptive comanagement. While it is not explicitly stated in the documents 
examined that the UK Government is intentionally attempting to encourage adaptive 
comanagement, we are interested in the coincidental relationship between government 
policy and the factors that appear to facilitate this process. It is notable that the need to 
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adapt to such issues as climate change and a shrinking national budget has resulted in 
government objectives which could find fertile ground in a more direct consideration of 
adaptive comanagement. To this end, the findings of this paper are of use to policy 
makers in England. 
The analysis begins with a review of the literature, charting the development of adaptive 
comanagement from its academic origins and broadly outlining the major claims and 
contentions relating to the field. From the review we distil five important policy 
conditions that appear to provide a suitable enabling environment for the emergence of 
adaptive comanagement, and compare these findings to recent water policy 
developments in England. Our approach relies upon a directed content analysis (Hsieh 
and Shannon, 2005) of seven key government water policy documents, dating from 
2008 onwards. We conclude the article by summarising the findings of our analysis, and 
offer proposals that would favour the emergence of adaptive comanagement from a 
policy perspective. 
4.2 Adaptive comanagement: Origins and developments 
Broadly speaking, adaptive comanagement is viewed as the merging of the field of 
comanagement with adaptive management (Armitage et al., 2007c). Comanagement, as 
an academic concept, has its roots in commons theory, a body of scholarship that 
emerged in reaction to the famous “Tragedy of the Commons” dilemma (Hardin, 1968). 
According to that perspective, only intervention by the government or the market can 
stop users of a common resource from acting in their individual short-term self-interests 
and in so doing destroying the resource they collectively depend upon in the longer run. 
However, researchers working in the commons tradition have instead reported on a 
large number of case studies, both past and present, that reveal how communities of 
resource users, acting without assistance or intervention by a larger government, have 
been able to collectively devise rules that enable them to sustainably manage natural 
resources, and the conditions that facilitate this outcome (Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990; 
Baland and Platteau 1996; Agrawal 2002).  
Moving on from analyses based solely on community management, the earliest attempts 
at analysing comanagement tended to focus on formal power-sharing arrangements 
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between a community and the government (Berkes et al., 1991). Whilst the degree of 
power sharing and joint decision-making varies considerably from case to case, 
researchers have found that in nearly all successful cases comanagement depends upon 
the crafting of new institutions that confer more advanced property rights at the local 
level and that are able to link the actors involved in the management of the environment 
or a natural resource across scales of organisation (Jentoft, 1989; Pomeroy and Berkes, 
1997). They also depend upon adequate levels of trust between participants, and the 
development of social capital more generally (Daniels and Walker, 1996; Leach and 
Pelkey, 2001; Pinkerton, 1989b; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2006).    
For its proponents, comanagement has always been seen as a way of implementing a 
management process that more equitably includes the interests of the less powerful in 
decisions surrounding the use of natural resources (Pinkerton 1989b; Pomeroy and 
Berkes 1997; Borrini-feyerabend et al., 2000). It has also been shown to improve the 
legitimacy and transparency of the process in some cases, as well as develop greater 
capacity at the local level through community empowerment (Borrini-feyerabend et al., 
2000, 2004; Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004). Therefore, comanagement “is not merely 
about resources; it is about managing relationships” (Berkes 2009: 1692). Other authors 
have pointed out the risks associated with comanagement, and in particular the potential 
for local elites to dominate the situation in order to forward their own interests, or for 
the government to use the term as justification for their actions whilst continuing with a 
business-as-usual approach (Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Conley and Moote, 2003; Nayak 
and Berkes, 2008; Plummer and Armitage, 2007b).  
Whilst comanagement has traditionally been seen as a relationship between the 
government and a community or group of resource users, others have broadened this 
conception to include market-based management (Rose, 2002; Tietenbert, 2002; 
Yandle, 2003). From this perspective, “comanagement is not envisioned as a 
replacement for central government, nor is it incompatible with existing market-based 
systems; it is a supplement to these decision-making processes” (Plummer and 
Fitzgibbon 2004: 63). Another important development has come with the realisation 
that many of the attributes that characterise comanagement - such as power sharing, 
trust, and institution building - take time to develop and are ongoing (Borrini-
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Feyerabend et al., 2004; Gray, 1989; McCay, 2002). This understanding has turned 
attention towards the mechanisms via which the process of comanagement evolves. 
Here scholars have found fertile ground in merging the narratives of comanagement 
with adaptive management. Adaptive management is a concept which treats policy 
decisions as hypotheses to be tested (Lee, 1993) and which was originally derived from 
the work of the ecologist C. S. Holling (Holling, 1978) and a field of enquiry that 
recasts the relationship between humans and the environment in the light of complex 
adaptive systems theory and resilience thinking (Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Levin, 
1999).  
Amongst other things, this synthesis has highlighted the importance of social learning if 
the participants in a system of comanagement, who may have widely different 
perspectives and interests, are to jointly learn about and adapt to change (Armitage et 
al., 2008; Berkes, 2009; Allen et al., 2011). Thus comanagement's attention to power 
sharing and system linkages is complemented by adaptive management's concern with 
problem solving and learning-by-doing. The merger of these two fields, each with their 
own distinct disciplinary histories, has resulted in what has come to be called “adaptive 
comanagement” (Olsson et al., 2004a; Armitage et al., 2007a, 2009). 
The logic underlying adaptive comanagement brings with it a conceptual shift away 
from thinking about “humans and nature” to thinking about “humans in nature” (Folke, 
2006). From this perspective, social and ecological systems are understood to be 
coupled, not separate. Furthermore, these “social-ecological systems” are comprised of 
processes and interactions that are non-linear and characterised by an inherent degree of 
uncertainty, leading to shocks, surprises, and sometimes even to transformations in the 
basic structure and function of the system (Liu et al., 2007; Moberg and Galaz, 2005; 
Olsson et al., 2004b, 2006). As a result, it is argued that management practices must 
shift from traditional attempts to achieve optimal solutions to resource problems, to the 
need to account for change and uncertainly in a multi-level world (Dietz et al., 2003; 
Gunderson and Holling, 2002). In many circumstances this will require flexible 
institutions that operate within and across scales of organization, represent the multiple 
interests associated with the management and use of a resource, and facilitate adaptation 
through iterative cycles of problem solving and processes of dynamic learning 
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(Armitage et al., 2008; Folke et al., 2005; Pahl-wostl et al., 2007a). Thus, in addition to 
the evaluative criteria traditionally attributed to comanagement, the adaptive turn brings 
with it a strong focus on resilience (Folke, 2006). 
4.3 Key policy considerations for adaptive comanagement 
Here we identify five key policy categories that have been distilled from our review of 
the literature. Although the categories represent general claims about conditions which 
are conducive to adaptive comanagement, each of them is highly context dependent. 
This realisation underscores the fact that there is no prescriptive recipe or blueprint that 
can be followed to instigate adaptive comanagement. Instead, the policy categories are 
indicative of a process which is most likely dependent not solely on human design or on 
emergence, but on the interaction of the two (Berkes et al., 2007). It is also necessary to 
acknowledge that several of these categories are interlinked, as will be made clear. The 
five categories are listed in Table 4.1 and then discussed in more detail below. 
Table 4.1 Five key policy categories for the adaptive comanagement of water. 
Category Conditions conducive to adaptive 
comanagement 
Functions of water Conceive of water as performing a 
diversity of functions in a catchment, and 
not just as a resource for humans 
Change and uncertainty Recognise that change and uncertainty 
are inherent features of social-ecological 
systems, and adopt an attitude of learning 
to live with them 
Resilience and adaptive capacity  Focus on enhancing the resilience and 
adaptive capacity of the system, paying 
attention to the social dimension 
Participation and scale Promote cross-scale, participatory 
approaches to water management that 
operate in accordance with the subsidiary 
principle. Here support for local action is 
provided by higher-level institutions 
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Process and learning View water management as a long-term 
social process that proceeds through 
iterative cycles of joint learning 
Firstly, policy geared towards adaptive comanagement must account for both the 
economic and non-economic value of water and the diversity of functions it performs in 
a catchment - including its role as a source of social-ecological resilience - instead of 
viewing it purely as a resource for humans to draw upon (Folke, 2003). This shift in 
thinking brings attention to the dynamic and complex nature of social-ecological 
systems, in turn allowing for broader, more inclusive management approaches that 
better account for the highly interdependent nature of hydrological, ecological, and 
social issues (Folke, 2003; Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001). It also promotes a wider 
appreciation for the water environment, and is consistent with adaptive comanagement’s 
emphasis on thinking about humans in nature, rather than humans and nature.  
The second policy consideration involves a recognition that social-ecological systems 
are variable and prone to shocks and surprises (Fabricius et al., 2007; Olsson et al., 
2006). To this extent, policies that uncompromisingly attempt to maximise yield, 
control change, and reduce uncertainty appear misdirected (Holling and Meffet, 1996; 
Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Armitage et al., 2009). Instead, policy makers should 
embrace an attitude of learning to live with change and uncertainly (Folke et al., 2005; 
Plummer and Armitage, 2007a).  
Thirdly, by acknowledging the place of change and uncertainty, the narrow goal of 
achieving efficiency – be it economic or organisational efficiency – must be broadened 
to encompass an intention to “manage the capacity of social-ecological systems to cope 
with, adapt to, and shape change” (Folke, 2006: 254). Thus policy should promote 
measures that enhance the resilience and adaptive capacity of the system, even at the 
expense of short-term efficiency gains (Pahl-wostl et al., 2007a). In the case of adaptive 
comanagement, this must also entail a recognition of the importance of the social 
dimension for achieving this, rather than focusing solely on ecosystem resilience or on 
the ability of infrastructure to enhance capacity (Folke et al., 2005). As a result, the 
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“resilience and adaptive capacity” category is strongly linked to our remaining two 
categories discussed below, which relate to the social dimension of water management. 
Our fourth category, “participation and scale”, states that policy aligned with adaptive 
comanagement theory must move away from centralised and bureaucratic forms of 
environmental and natural resource management. Such approaches tend to be rigid and 
reactionary, typically only seeking to inform, or at best consult, non-governmental 
agents about management actions and decisions (Glasbergen, 1998; Holling and Meffet, 
1996). Instead, procedures should attempt to garner full participation of all key 
stakeholders in relevant decision-making processes and the co-production of 
knowledge, particularly resource users and those who directly affect the conditions of 
the water environment (Pinkerton, 2003; Pahl-wostl et al., 2007a; de Loe et al., 2009). 
This draws attention to the scale of activity. Here the focus is both on developing 
pluralistic procedures at the local catchment and sub-catchment level, and on facilitating 
linkages within and across levels of organisation from the local through to the national 
and international, but in accordance with the subsidiary principle (Carlsson and Berkes, 
2005; Jentoft et al., 1998; Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004; Plummer, 2006).  
By doing this, and in moving beyond narrow, efficiency-oriented strategies, policy 
makers should therefore conceive of water management as a long-term social process 
and not just a technical challenge (Allen et al., 2011). This fifth policy condition places 
much importance on the role of social learning as a key mechanism by which the 
process proceeds (Berkes, 2009; Dale, 1989; Pahl-wostl et al., 2007b; Plummer and 
Fitzgibbon, 2007). Social learning allows the different participants in the management 
process to reflect upon their changing understandings and new ways of conceiving of 
the issues at stake, in response to both social and environmental signals (Keen et al., 
2005; Reed et al., 2010). Thus the management system becomes better adapted to 
dealing with feedback. This feedback can be incorporated into policy by planning for 
iterative, multi-level management cycles designed to facilitate monitoring, learning, and 
adaptation (Pahl-wostl et al., 2007a).  
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4.4 Water policy in England 
4.4.1 Water governance 
Before discussing the findings of the analysis, it is useful here to provide a brief 
overview of the system that governs water management in England. Broadly speaking, 
at the national level the Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs 
(Defra) is responsible for devising water policy and legislation, and for translating and 
enacting the various water directives emanating from the European Union (EU). The 
key Defra body charged with managing the water environment is the Environment 
Agency (EA), although other bodies such as Natural England also play important roles 
with respect to environmental protection and enhancement. European legislation has 
increasingly exerted power over water management in England; since the introduction 
of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) in 2000 the approach to managing water has 
changed radically. By focusing at the level of regional river basins and by encouraging 
greater stakeholder participation, the WFD attempts to raise all water bodies in the EU 
up to “good status”, according to a new and more stringent set of ecological and 
chemical standards. The WFD requirement is to develop management strategies at the 
river basin scale, but in recent years England has also started to focus on the smaller 
catchment and sub-catchment scale, as a way of taking a more local and inclusive 
approach to water management.  
Despite recent proposals within the EU Blueprint for Safeguarding Europe’s Water 
Resources (EC, 2012) to better address water resources issues under the WFD, in 
England water quality and water quantity have historically been treated as two distinct 
policy domains. Whilst water quality management is now strongly governed by EU 
legislation, water resources has continued to be managed nationally by a licencing 
system that was introduced under the 1963 Water Act. Initially, water abstraction 
licences were granted in perpetuity and without due consideration of potential longer-
term environmental impacts. Since then, legislation has been brought in to time-limit all 
new licences, and powers have been introduced to amend or revoke licences which are 
causing significant environmental damage. The EA undertake management decisions 
concerning water resources based upon water availability statuses for the various 
“resource management units” in each of England’s roughly 100 designated catchments. 
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These statuses are derived from a process called the Catchment Abstraction 
Management Strategy (CAMS). Substantial reforms to the licencing system are now 
being consulted on, whereby the government is looking to time-limit all existing water 
licences, to better link licences to water availability, and to instigate a more 
sophisticated system of water licence trading. Therefore, whilst legislation and policy 
concerning water quality is leaning towards greater stakeholder participation and 
cooperation, some of the recent water resources management actions instead emphasises 
the importance of water as an economic good and the role of competition and profit 
making.   
4.4.2 Findings of the policy analysis 
Here we discuss the findings of the directed content analysis, detailing the ways in 
which the five categories that were identified from our review of adaptive 
comanagement compare to recent developments in English water policy. After an initial 
assessment, seven key documents were selected for detailed analysis; together these 
documents give a strong indication of government thinking and policy direction. A brief 
description of each of the seven policy documents is shown in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Seven key English water policy documents. 
Document name 
and publication 
date 
Reference 
in text 
Synopsis 
Future Water 
(2008) 
DOC1 A 96 page document outlining the government's 
overall strategy for water up to the year 2030. The 
focus is on the "sustainable delivery of secure water 
supplies and an improved and protected water 
environment" 
Water for People 
and the 
Environment 
(2009) 
DOC2 A 77 page Environment Agency document outlining 
the water resources strategy for England and Wales 
up to the year 2050. The central premise of the 
document is the need to manage water in such a way 
that there is "sustainable, reliable water supplies for 
people and businesses, whilst also protecting the 
environment" 
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Water for Life 
(2011) 
DOC3 A government water white paper laying out a vision 
for future water management through measures to 
tackle water pollution using the catchment-based 
approach; water abstraction reform; increased 
competition in the water sector; and details on how 
the government will encourage and incentivize 
water efficiency measures 
The Natural 
Choice (2011) 
DOC4 A 77 page environment white paper setting out the 
government’s intention to "mainstream the value of 
nature" across society. It proposes to achieve this by 
developing local action for nature protection and 
improvement; creating a green economy; 
strengthening the connections between people and 
nature; and demonstrating leadership at EU and 
international levels. As a critical component of the 
environment, water and its management are an 
important topic in the document 
The Catchment 
Based Approach 
(2013) 
DOC5 A 28 page document detailing a policy framework 
to encourage the wider adoption of an integrated 
catchment management approach for improving the 
quality of the water environment 
Water for Life and 
Livelihoods: 
Challenges and 
Choices (2013) 
DOC6 A 42 page document on the "challenges and 
choices" relating to England's waters. The document 
is a summary of the results of a consultation on 
significant water management issues which are 
outlined from the perspective of the government, 
along with potential measures to address these 
issues 
The National 
Adaptation 
Programme (2013) 
DOC7 A 181 page, wide-ranging document concerned with 
"making the country resilient to a changing 
climate". The two cross-cutting issues that dominate 
the list of priorities (as identified in the Climate 
Change Risk Assessment) are flooding and pressure 
on water resources 
Functions of water 
Current English water policy adopts the ecosystem services approach to understanding 
how water functions within a catchment. In Future Water (DOC1), a healthy water 
environment is explicitly linked to social, economic, and environmental resilience, 
where a “joined-up approach” is advocated due to the interrelated nature of the different 
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issues affecting the water environment. The range of ecosystems goods and services are 
outlined in the environment white paper, The Natural Choice (DOC4). Then, following 
the UK National Ecosystems Assessment (2011), the most recent policy documents 
detail a wide list of benefits that a healthy water environment provides for the different 
sections of society. These benefits relate to both economic outcomes and to human 
health and wellbeing, including resilience to droughts and short and long-term resilience 
to “market changes and global changes, and climate change” (DOC6: 12). Beyond the 
services the water environment provides for human society, in several of the documents 
mention is also given to the intrinsic value of a healthy water environment that 
conserves and enhances biodiversity, as well as the “strong moral responsibility to 
protect it” (DOC4: 7). 
Change and uncertainty 
The documents reveal that the Government recognises that a degree of change is 
unavoidable when managing water, and that this is set to increase in the future. Whilst 
the challenges associated with climate change are regularly mentioned throughout all 
but one of the documents, other sources of change that are addressed relate to 
demography, lifestyle choices, and water demand. Natural variability is also recognised, 
where the water environment is viewed as “a dynamic system, constantly changing as a 
result of natural forces and human activity” (DOC6: 8). This understanding appears to 
have resulted in an appreciation that new ways of thinking about dealing with these 
challenges is required, one which adopts the notion of “preparing for and 
accommodating inevitable change” (DOC7: 76). 
On the other hand, in most of the documents uncertainty is discussed far less often than 
change is, and in some of them is not mentioned at all. Yet in Water for People and the 
Environment (DOC2) and The National Adaptation Programme (DOC7) it is better 
addressed. Here there is a two-fold emphasis on both reducing uncertainty and also on 
managing for it, given that in the future there is likely to be “a far less stable operating 
environment with a higher degree of uncertainty and a greater potential for shocks” 
(DOC2: 62). Thus policy should “encourage options resilient to climate change to be 
chosen in the face of uncertainty” (DOC2: 3).  
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Resilience and adaptive capacity 
Throughout our analysis of the seven policy documents we observed a focus on 
developing resilience and adaptive capacity, where resilience is defined as “the ability 
of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic 
ways of functioning, and a capacity to adapt to stress and change” (DOC7: 111). 
However, despite the definition’s recognition that the social system is an important 
feature of resilience - which is the focus of adaptive comanagement - this dimension 
receives very little attention in the documents. Instead, they tend to focus on resilience 
and adaptive capacity as they relate to ecosystems and the natural environment or to 
infrastructure and technology. This is most telling when considering DOC5, which 
never makes this connection despite promoting measures that according to the adaptive 
comanagement literature are likely to enhance the resilience and adaptive capacity of 
the system. These measures include the devolution of management rights and the 
sharing of power with a wider range of stakeholders within the catchment. Only once, in 
DOC7, is the link between the structure of the social system and overall system 
resilience clearly made. Here the document states that the Catchment Based Approach 
“is the sort of innovative approach that the regulatory framework can enable to help 
deliver long-term resilience, including to climate change” (DOC7: 73).   
Participation and scale 
With respect to participation and scale, there is a change in emphasis from the earlier 
documents in 2008 and 2009 to the most recent documents. Although collaboration 
between different stakeholders is stated as being of importance in the earlier policy 
documents, this is typically framed more in terms of government consultation at the 
national or regional level, rather than joint decision-making and power sharing in 
accordance with the subsidiary principle. Thus although the catchment is discussed as a 
relevant scale in the earlier documents – for example in terms of the CAMS process and 
government programmes such as “catchment sensitive farming” – this typically does not 
then go on to discuss the merits of fuller stakeholder participation and cooperation at 
this level, and nor how the catchment level is linked to levels below and above it.  
In contrast, in the later documents the issue is reframed so that “local businesses, 
citizens, and interest groups will play a significant part in determining and 
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implementing the measures needed to achieve long-term improvements” at the scale of 
the catchment and local sub-catchment (DOC4: 30). Furthermore, these local scales are 
more coherently linked to the “strategic” regional and national levels, in particular 
through the process of river basin management planning.  Yet at the same time, the 
policy framework sets out to allow a degree of local autonomy for catchment-based 
groups as the government is “deliberately not trying to prescribe how and when local 
initiatives should work” but rather provide a “framework to support local action [where] 
much of what is described sets out the ‘bridge’ between local actions and the much 
larger scale actions described in the River Basin Management Plans” (DOC5: 2).  
Whilst these policy developments concerning participation and scale apply largely to 
water quality management, water resources policy is also placing more of a focus on the 
decision-making of resource users within catchments. This is being achieved through 
the development of a system that more closely links water abstraction licences to real-
time availability of water, as well as the trading of these licences. Both the farming and 
conservation sectors have observed that these reforms have the potential to encourage 
greater cooperation between resource users (NFU, 2013; ENDS, 2013).  
Process and learning 
Again, a progression can be seen between the earlier and the most recent documents, 
this time in how English water policy relates to process and learning. In particular, this 
can be observed by the way in which water management has come to be conceived of 
more as a long-term social process. Thus in The Catchment Based Approach (DOC5) 
the government state that their “level of ambition is not just for the short term. It is a 
long-term commitment” (DOC5: 14). Whilst this conception of water management as a 
long-term social process is not explicitly stated in many of the documents, the process 
of river basin management - including the participatory and cross-scale approach that is 
now being encouraged by the government, as discussed above - necessarily entails a 
social and process-oriented governance structure. This represents a substantial change 
from the centralised, bureaucratic, and expert-dominated management strategy that 
preceded these developments.  
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Several of the documents discuss the importance of learning but from a top-down 
perspective, where this usually refers to ways in which government bodies and different 
academic institutions can learn from “current research, pilot studies, and monitoring of 
existing and new mitigation and restoration activities” (DOC6: 39); or, as in the case of 
the Catchment Based Approach, the importance of “starting to test and assess different 
ways of working, learning initial lessons around engagement, collaboration, and 
catchment planning first hand” (DOC5: 1). There is also reference to the adoption of 
adaptive management plans by the EA for managing water resources, which again 
suggests a place for learning in the thinking of policy makers. 
Yet whilst there is clearly a recognition of the need to learn from experience, these 
policy documents do not explicitly frame learning as the mechanism by which processes 
like the Catchment Based Approach develop and evolve over time. Nonetheless, again 
the process of river basin management planning must be considered because of the way 
in which it requires participants at different scales to periodically develop management 
plans at six-year time intervals. As mentioned previously, this iterative and cyclical 
approach to water management encourages social learning when the different actors 
involved in the process are able to jointly learn from and devise actions in response to 
social and environmental feedback. Thus whilst in these policy documents the 
government does not fully recognise the central role of joint learning in developing 
adaptive and resilient management strategies, to some extent at least it is captured by 
the river basin management process, which is mandated for under the WFD.  
4.5 Discussion 
From our findings it is clear that in England national water policy is increasingly 
adopting a position which, according to the five policy categories we detail above, 
provides a reasonably conducive policy environment for fostering adaptive 
comanagement. Given the ways in which these more recent developments differ from 
water policy in the latter half of the twentieth century (see Section 4.1), this represents a 
notable shift. In particular, the key features of water policy in England that we identified 
as facilitating adaptive comanagement are: 1) a recognition of the many economic and 
non-economic functions that water and the water environment perform, using the 
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framework of the ecosystem services approach, 2) an acceptance that change is an 
inherent feature of water management that is only likely to become more prominent in 
the future, 3) a desire to enhance the resilience of the system, 4) the promotion of 
participatory and locally-based management approaches that are linked across scales of 
organisation, 5) a growing awareness of water management as a long-term social 
process.  
Despite these correlations between the policy categories and current water policy in 
England, it was also clear from our analysis that some aspects of these categories were 
less well addressed. In particular, learning received relatively little attention. This is 
significant given that learning, and in particular social learning, is one of the core 
principles of adaptive comanagement because of the way in which it supports the 
development of collaborative processes and contributes to the sustainability of social-
ecological systems (Armitage et al., 2008; Keen et al., 2005). As with learning, 
uncertainty is also a concept which does not always receive much attention - in four of 
the documents it is not mentioned at all - and although at times there is a recognition of 
the need to develop strategies to effectively manage uncertainty, there is also a tendency 
to promote the idea that uncertainty is something to be eliminated or reduced. Whilst 
this is not in itself problematic, it is nonetheless suggestive of a mindset that tended to 
characterise the “command-and-control” approach to managing water in the last 
century.       
As we noted above, to a certain extent the different policy categories are interlinked. 
From the findings of our analysis it is apparent that although a new policy framework 
has been adopted for encouraging participatory approaches at catchment and sub-
catchment levels, the ways in which this recent approach to “participation and scale” 
ties in with the “resilience and adaptive capacity” of the system, and its ability to deal 
with “change and uncertainty”, is not explicitly linked. This is a significant omission in 
the context of adaptive comanagement. Thus we find that whilst participation and scale 
as it relates to adaptive comanagement is best addressed in the document The 
Catchment Based Approach (DOC5), this same document makes no mention of 
uncertainty, resilience, or adaptive capacity. Furthermore, it only mentions change on 
three occasions, but where this relates to how the Catchment Based Approach is 
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expected to change over time, and not how it may be a valuable approach to managing 
water under changing circumstances. This omission suggests that government decision 
makers do not yet fully appreciate the importance of the social dimension for reducing 
vulnerability, and thus enhancing the resilience, of complex social-ecological systems. 
Finally, it is necessary to recognise a key limitation concerning the approach we have 
taken in this paper. That is, using a directed content analysis does not reveal the sorts of 
insights that a more critical understanding of water policy in England might provide, 
where there may be a significant difference between the discourses adopted in the 
policy documents and the reality of water management on the ground. For example, as 
Cook et al. (2013: 755) have discussed when exploring the concept of participation in 
integrated catchment management: “while statements about legislation promise 
symmetric engagements, the mechanics of legislation frame participation as asymmetric 
consultation”. In contrast, by critically examining the various proposals and statements 
we identified in the policy documents from a discourse analysis perspective, or by 
embedding these documents within the wider political economy of water governance in 
England, it would be possible to discover something about the ways in which power 
operates to constrain or facilitate the adoption and implementation of the stated policy 
objectives. Increasingly, these factors are being recognised by the adaptive 
comanagement literature, which now pays attention to the importance of understanding 
how power shapes issues such as trust building, conflict resolution, and social learning 
(Armitage et al., 2009; Doubleday, 2007; Nadasdy, 2003a, 2007; Whaley and 
Weatherhead, 2014) which are vital for fostering the success of the process. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined current water policy in England through the lens of 
adaptive comanagement, an emerging approach to environmental and natural resource 
management that is claimed to enhance the resilience of complex social-ecological 
systems under conditions of change and uncertainty. Given the sorts of challenges that 
issues such as climate change and a growing population pose to water governance in 
England, encouraging the development of approaches like adaptive comanagement 
becomes an important policy consideration. Our review of the literature revealed five 
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key policy categories which were identified as being necessary for providing a suitable 
enabling environment for the emergence of adaptive comanagement. We then used 
these criteria to conduct a directed content analysis of key English water policy 
documents from 2008 onwards. Our findings have revealed that in a number of ways 
decision makers have put in place policy objectives that are amenable to the emergence 
of adaptive comanagement. Yet at the same time, we also noted a level of discrepancy 
between key aspects of the five policy categories and water policy as laid out in the 
seven Government documents. In particular, we identified: 1) a failure on the part of 
policy makers to adequately prioritise the place of social learning as a central 
mechanism by which water management in England can progress and adapt to changing 
circumstances, 2) only a weak focus on uncertainty and the need to live with it, instead 
of simply attempting to reduce or eliminate it, 3) a failure to link resilience and adaptive 
capacity to the social dimension of water management. 
In order to facilitate the development of an enabling policy environment for the 
emergence of adaptive comanagement, here we put forward two proposals. Firstly, 
water policy should give special attention to the place of social learning within existing 
management processes such as river basin management planning and the Catchment 
Based Approach. It should also promote new objectives especially designed to facilitate 
joint learning as a way of developing a more adaptive system of water governance in 
England, and to recognise that this is necessary because of the inherent levels of 
uncertainty decision-makers face from a range of sources (Pahl-wostl et al., 2007a). 
Secondly, attempts to enhance the resilience and adaptive capacity of water 
management in England must explicitly link this objective to the social dimension. In 
the documents we analysed, although resilience and adaptive capacity were stated aims 
of the government, this typically related to the design of infrastructure and regulatory 
systems, or the healthy functioning of natural ecosystems. Whilst these are important 
considerations, from an adaptive comanagement perspective the participatory, multi-
level, learning, and process aspects of water governance are seen as key social attributes 
of a more resilient and adaptive system. Embracing these concepts so as to achieve this 
aim could prove vital in the coming years, if policy makers are to allow for a system of 
governance that is able to cope with the challenges that lie ahead.   
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Chapter 5: Political Economy Analysis 
Prologue 
This chapter sets out to investigate the broader context in which farming and water 
governance occurs in England, through an analysis of the “political-economic” variable 
of the politicised IAD Framework. The paper below (Paper 3) has been accepted for 
publication in the journal Water Alternatives (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2015b). 
Along with Chapter 6, it addresses Objective 3 of the research agenda. 
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Paper 3 - Power Sharing in the English Lowlands? The 
Political Economy of Farmer Cooperation and 
Participation in Water Governance 
Luke Whaley and Edward K. Weatherhead 
Abstract 
Participatory and cooperative forms of water governance have become regular features 
of government discourse and stated policy objectives in England. We consider this 
aspiration from the perspective of farmers in the English lowlands, by analysing the 
current power dynamic that exists among these farmers, and between them and the key 
stakeholders involved in water management. To do this we undertake a political 
economy analysis that places lowland farming and water governance within the 
evolution of historical processes that over time have influenced the ability of farmers to 
participate in the governance of their water environment. These historical developments 
are interpreted through the lens of the Power Cube, an analytical tool for thinking about 
the interplay between different forms of power operating in different types of spaces 
and at different levels of governance. Our findings reveal that despite there now being a 
number of structural changes that provide lowland farmers with the opportunity to 
cooperate and participate in water governance, three distinct barriers stand in the way. 
These relate to the power “within” these farmers, which continues to align with a 
productivist ideology founded on individualism and competition, often at the expense of 
the environment; the power that government water managers still exercise “over” 
farmers instead of “with” them; and the relationship between lowland farming and 
environmental interests, where historically the two sides’ power “to” act has been 
diametrically opposed. The findings point to the importance of developing suitable 
programmes designed to support and incentivise farmer cooperation and participation.   
Keywords: Power Cube; Cooperation and participation; Water governance; Farming; 
lowland England 
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5.1 Introduction 
In England, as elsewhere, the challenge of managing the water environment in the face 
of competing demands is often complex and uncertain (Wallace et al., 2003; Pahl-wostl 
et al., 2007b; Fish et al., 2010). Added to this is a growing list of future pressures – 
climate change, population growth, shifting lifestyle preferences – that threaten to 
exacerbate the situation (Collins and Ison, 2009; Weatherhead and Howden, 2009; 
Barker and Turner, 2011). As a result, the dominant management discourse of the 
twentieth century is being revised, with much greater emphasis now placed on 
enhancing resilience and adaptive capacity (DEFRA, 2008; DEFRA, 2011a). In 
particular, there is a growing awareness of the need to move beyond centralised, 
bureaucratic, and technocratic forms of governance (Hodge, 2007; DEFRA, 2013b), to 
recognise the politicised nature of water use (Watson, 2005), and to appreciate the 
intrinsic value of freshwater ecosystems (DEFRA, 2011b). Part of this change in 
emphasis has entailed a focus on developing more participatory and cooperative forms 
of water governance. This is reflected, for example, in the EU Water Framework 
Directive (2000/60/EC), which makes room for the “active involvement” of all 
“interested parties” and “the public, including water users”, and in newly instigated 
national water programmes, such as the Catchment Based Approach.  
The success of people-centred approaches to water governance requires the participation 
of farmers. Farming covers almost 70% of England, and has the potential to 
significantly damage or improve the water environment, for example through pollution, 
physical modification, and water abstraction (Strosser et al., 1999). The low-lying areas 
of England, situated predominantly in the south and east of the country, have witnessed 
the biggest changes to agriculture in modern times and it is here that the water 
environment is under most pressure from a combination of these threats. Yet normative 
claims to develop pluralistic forms of environmental governance often fail to take into 
account the difficulties: there are no panaceas when it comes to developing water 
institutions (Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Instead, attention must be given to the 
appropriateness of the intended approach in light of the particular institutional, cultural, 
and historical context (Wesselink et al., 2011), which tends to be more important than 
the “purity” of the approach itself (Ingram, 2008; McCay, 2002). This implies that 
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notions of farmer cooperation and participation in water governance are highly situation 
dependent, and points to a need to understand the wider systems of power in which they 
are embedded. 
With this in mind, our intention is to understand how, over time, the interplay of power 
has come to influence the ability of farmers in England to cooperate and participate in 
the governance of their water environment. We are therefore concerned with “the 
complex configuration of power relations in which planners and participants are 
enmeshed” (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998: 1988), and what this implies for 
the future role of farmers in England’s system of water governance. To do this, we 
undertake a political economy analysis that examines lowland agriculture and water 
governance from World War II until the present day. We interpret these historical 
developments through the lens of the Power Cube, an analytical tool for thinking about 
the interplay between different forms of power operating in different types of spaces 
and at different levels of governance. The research is based on an analysis of 
government documents and other primary texts, and an extensive review of secondary 
sources. The work is part of a broader programme examining farmer cooperation and 
participation in English water governance. 
5.2 Analysing power using the Power Cube 
In this paper we adopt an approach to thinking about and analysing power known as the 
“Power Cube” (Gaventa, 2006a; Gaventa, 2006b). Simply put, the Power Cube is a 
heuristic for analysing the levels and spaces in which different forms of power operate, 
as well as how these dimensions interact (Figure 5.1). The changing structure of these 
interactions and the system’s overall pathway or trajectory provides an insight into the 
power dynamics at play, as well as pointing to possible strategies for implementing 
change. Each dimension – levels, spaces, and forms - comprises three sub-components, 
though in reality all three dimensions operate along a continuous scale.  
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Figure 5.1 The Power Cube. Adapted from Gaventa (2006a). 
 
In its most basic arrangement, the “levels” dimension of the Power Cube is subdivided 
into the “local”, “national”, and “international”. The “spaces” dimension is broken 
down into “closed spaces”, where decision-making goes on behind closed doors, 
undertaken by politicians, experts, managers, and other elites; “invited spaces”, which 
are those fora that have come about, often through pressure from outside influences, in 
order to provide other interests with the opportunity to participate in governance 
processes; and “claimed spaces”, which are those spaces that groups of people create for 
themselves. These may be more formal structures such as NGOs or community 
associations, or they may be more informal. The last of the Cube’s three dimensions 
concerns the different forms that power takes. “Visible power” is understood by the 
adage “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would 
not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957). “Hidden power” relates to the ability of actors to 
control the agenda by influencing the sorts of issues that can be debated and who can 
participate in the debate in the first place. Finally, “invisible power” is understood by 
the adage “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to 
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping, or determining his 
very wants,” where this may be achieved by such activities as “the control of 
information, through the mass media, or through the process of socialization” (Lukes, 
2005: 27). 
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Proponents of the Power Cube often make one further distinction. Although power 
might typically be conceived of as a means by which one actor or group is able to 
exhibit control over another, this is a restricted definition which does not easily allow 
for the “productive aspect of power” (Foucault, 1980: 119). Alongside the common 
conception of power “over”, which typically relates to control and coercion, three 
alternative “expressions” of power have been proposed by Veneklasen and Miller 
(2002). These are power “with”, power “to”, and power “within”. Power “with” is the 
capacity for actors to work together; power “to” concerns an actor’s ability to influence 
their world through agency; and power “within” relates to an actor’s sense of identity 
and self-worth. Broadly speaking, for farmers to cooperate and participate more fully in 
water governance, certain relationships of power “over” must be transformed into 
relationships of power “with”. For this to happen, potential participants require a strong 
enough sense of identity and purpose (power “within”) to instigate change (power “to”) 
by coming together with likeminded individuals as well as with other interests, 
including the government (power “with”). Alternatively, the ability to act that 
accompanies power “within” and “to” may result in the pursuit of purely selfish ends by 
some actors, in turn disrupting the process. 
We posit that the Power Cube is a useful tool for guiding this analysis of farming and 
water governance because of the way it draws attention to the wider multi-level and 
cross-scale processes which make up governance arrangements in our modern, 
globalised world. At the same time, it allows the analyst to reflect on what this wider 
dynamic implies for farmer cooperation and participation in water governance at more 
local levels, which is the focus of this study. Following Huitema et al. (2009), when 
speaking of “governance” we adopt Pierre and Peters' (2000: 1) definition, namely that 
governance is “the whole range of institutions and relationships involved in the process 
of governing”. This includes both formal and informal institutions, and, importantly for 
this paper, “the power relations and practices that have developed” over time (Huitema 
et al., 2009: 27). It is also key to recognise that in speaking of a system of water 
governance, it is necessary to appreciate that this system “is part of broader social, 
political and economic developments and thus is also affected by decisions outside of 
the water sector” (UNDP, 2014). Again, the Power Cube approach appears well suited 
to addressing this broader conception of the issues relevant to water governance.  
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5.3 Lowland farming and the water environment: An historical 
perspective 
In this section we undertake an historical analysis of farming and water governance in 
England from World War II until the present day through a largely political economy 
approach. We do not intend to capture in detail all the developments we discuss, but 
instead attempt to reveal the broad processes and prominent events that have affected 
the present-day power dynamic. In accordance with the Power Cube, we pay attention 
to the different forms and expressions of power, and the levels and spaces they operate 
in. Due to the nature of the study, it is more difficult to analyse “invisible power” and 
the expression of power “within” when compared to the other forms and expressions of 
power because to do so typically requires a more fine grained and exhaustive approach, 
for example through the use of in-depth interviewing techniques and discourse analysis. 
Nonetheless, we do reflect upon invisible power and power “within” during the analysis 
and discussion, although this inherently involves a degree of conjecture. The central 
focus of the analysis is on the relationship between farmers and the key actors involved 
in water management in the English lowlands, with particular emphasis given to 
government and environmental interests.  
5.3.1 Post-war policy (1939 to 1959): The reconstruction of the English 
countryside 
The onset of World War II dramatically changed English farming. Since the 1870s 
agriculture had suffered chronic depression due to the government’s decision to support 
low-cost food imports. However, the blockade from German U-boats resulted in the 
urgent prioritisation of greater self-sufficiency. What most characterised the massive 
overhaul that agriculture underwent from this time onwards was the visible and hidden 
power the government wielded in closed spaces at the national level to intervene in 
almost every facet of food production, as farmers relinquished their independence in 
return for greater stability and support (Brassley et al., 2012) (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three 
dimensions for the period 1939-1959  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions of 
power 
MAF and NFU National Closed Visible 
and 
hidden 
Corporatist relationship 
exercising power “over” 
farmers in pursuit of efficient, 
intensive production 
Agribusinesses National 
and 
regional 
Closed Hidden Gain power “over” farmers 
through industrialisation of 
farming practices and processes 
River Boards Regional / 
catchment 
focused 
Closed Visible 32 Boards with power “over” 
land drainage, fisheries, and 
navigation 
Government 
extension 
workers 
Local Invited Hidden 
and 
invisible 
Extension workers form close 
relationships of power “with” 
farmers to induce behaviour 
change 
Farmers Local Closed Invisible A new power “within” farmers 
emerges based on productivist 
ideology 
The drive towards efficient production laid out in the 1947 Agricultural Act paved the 
way for a marked transition to modern commercial farming through a system of 
guaranteed prices, subsidies, grants, advice, education, coercion, and the widespread 
adoption of science and technology in the countryside, often characterised as a move 
“from agriculture to agribusiness”. In this new system, a highly rationalised farming 
sector geared towards profit maximization was integrated vertically into a system of 
food production that controlled “all processes from seedling to supermarket” (Newby, 
1987: 193). 
Of particular note was the intimate relationship, founded on the wartime dynamic, that 
developed between the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) and the National 
Farmers Union (NFU), who together were responsible for deciding the minimum annual 
prices of food commodities in a system of deficiency payments (Winter, 1996). 
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Furthermore, a close relationship developed between many farmers and government 
agricultural extension agents. The job of these agents was to ensure “changes in the 
attitude and behaviour of individuals and the efficient uptake of grant aid,” where “these 
relationships with farmers were often characterised by mutual trust and respect 
developed through face-to-face meetings and farmer groups over lengthy periods of 
time” (Hall and Pretty, 2008: 394).  
Other post-war Acts were also significant. In particular, the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1947 singled out industrial development and urban sprawl as the major threats to 
the countryside, whilst embracing the prevailing stewardship ethic whereby farmers and 
landowners, left to their own devices, would continue to manage the countryside in a 
favourable manner consistent with the interest of the wider public (Marsden et al., 
1993). This custodial interpretation of the role of farming in the countryside harked 
back to the ideological relationship between the landed classes and their estates in the 
19th Century (Newby et al., 1978). As will become evident, the agricultural stewardship 
discourse is an enduring feature of the post-war period, which has been deployed by 
different actors at different points in time. Today, the notion of “stewardship” still 
shapes how cooperation and participation in land and water management is understood 
by English farmers. 
These developments were most dramatic in the arable farmlands in the low-lying east of 
the country. The farmers here stood to gain most from increasing their farm’s size, 
adopting new practices and new technology, and intensifying inputs such as fertilizers 
and pesticides to boost production (Grigg, 1989). Referring to the Power Cube, we infer 
that the visible and hidden power exercised in a corporatist closed space at the national 
level by MAF and the NFU, and the rapport between agricultural extension agents and 
farmers on the ground in turn resulted in the emergence of an invisible form of power 
and a particular sense of power “within” lowland farmers that was in keeping with the 
productivist ideology (see Table 1).   
5.3.2 Conflicts in the countryside (1960 to 1983) 
In this section we look at key aspects of the power dynamic that developed between 
1960 and the early 1980s, as shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three 
dimensions for the period 1960 - 1983  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions 
of power 
EC 
 
European Closed Visible From 1973 the EC begins 
to exert considerable 
power “over” agricultural 
policy through the CAP 
MAFF, farming 
lobby, Land 
Drainage 
Committees, 
IDBs 
National, 
regional, 
and local 
Closed Visible, 
hidden, and 
invisible 
The “MAFFia” exercise 
power “over” land 
drainage to further 
modern, intensive farming 
Supermarkets and 
Agribusinesses 
National 
and 
regional 
Closed Visible and 
Hidden 
Alongside 
industrialisation of 
agriculture, power “over” 
food retail is located 
increasingly in hands of a 
select number of 
supermarkets 
Environmental 
NGOs 
National 
and 
regional 
Claimed Visible Strengthening of groups at 
national level and 
emergence of county-level 
wildlife trusts with power 
“to” act 
Urban 
newcomers 
Local Claimed Visible and 
Hidden 
New village inhabitants 
with power “to” oppose 
modern farming practices 
A crucial factor in the success of commercial agriculture from the post-war period 
onwards concerned water management, and in particular land drainage in low-lying 
parts of the country. By the start of the 1960s, power over water management policy 
was located firmly at the national level in closed spaces occupied by the reformed 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) on the one hand, and the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government (which from 1970 became the Department of the 
Environment) on the other. After the Water Resources Act 1963 this separation of 
decision-making power was consolidated, with the Ministry of Housing and Local 
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Government retaining responsibility for all aspects of water management apart from 
drainage and fisheries, which belonged to MAFF (Parker and Sewell, 1988). As we 
shall see, land drainage became one of the key issues underlying the countryside 
conflicts that followed. 
By the late 1950s the government had become concerned that growing demand for 
water by farmers, chiefly for irrigation, “might seriously deplete the natural flow of 
many rivers and streams” (CAWC, 1960: 4) and called for statutory powers to control 
the abstraction of surface water. These recommendations were also legislated for in the 
1963 Act, which replaced the longstanding common law system of riparian water rights 
(Getzler, 2004) with a permitting regime whereby most users of surface and 
groundwater required a water abstraction licence. From an organisational perspective, a 
move towards the integration of management functions had been taken in 1948 when 
the 47 existing Catchment Boards were replaced by 32 River Boards charged with 
overseeing land drainage, fisheries, and navigation. Another function of the 1963 Act 
was to replace the 32 River Boards with 29 multi-purpose River Authorities that 
incorporated agricultural land drainage, flood alleviation, pollution prevention, fisheries, 
and navigation under the jurisdiction of a single administrative structure.  
While advances in modern agriculture continued apace throughout the 1960s, this was 
also a decade that witnessed a considerable rise in environmental awareness at both 
international and national levels. In 1949, the National Parks and Access to the 
Countryside Act had been introduced, formally ushering in the “environmental 
movement” in England (Sheail, 1995). Locally, the power of this movement was being 
strengthened by the large numbers of middleclass city dwellers who were buying 
property in the countryside and who brought with them a set of values and expectations 
about how the countryside should be, based at least in part on a romantic conception of 
“rural idyll” (Howkins, 2003). The first half of the decade also saw a spate of county-
level Wildlife Trusts form “claimed spaces”, which were represented at the national 
level by the Society for the Protection of Nature Reserves.  
It was in the 1970s though that this environmental power base began most forcibly to 
come into conflict with farming interests through a series of local confrontations whose 
political significance often reached well beyond the geographical boundaries of the 
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disagreements themselves (Lowe et al., 1986). Not least were cases concerning water 
management where drainage activity threatened to destroy primary and secondary 
wetland sites through conversion to intensive agriculture (Purseglove, 1988). However, 
the first and perhaps most significant conflict from a political perspective was not 
related to land drainage but to the encroachment of modern farming methods on the 
heather moorlands of Exmoor National Park in southwest England (Brotherton, 1990; 
Lobley and Winter, 2009). The issue drew attention to important national questions 
concerning agricultural regulation versus environmental protection, including the 
appropriateness of the voluntary approach for achieving conservation measures, the 
relationship between agriculture and formal planning legislation, and the efficacy of 
National Parks for securing Britain’s landscapes (Newby, 1979; Lobley and Winter, 
2009).  
As we have seen, after World War II most decision-making power concerning 
agriculture was concentrated at the national level within a closed space occupied by 
MAF and the NFU. Together these parties were responsible for directing farming along 
its productivist trajectory by exercising visible and hidden forms of power over farmers 
(Table 6.1). However, in 1973 the UK entered into the European Community (EC), and 
much of the power held at the national level was itself to become subsumed by 
decision-making at the European level. During the 1970s, while the battle for Exmoor 
was rumbling on, other disputes between farming and conservation interests were 
emerging. In part the intensity of these disagreements was being fuelled by Britain’s 
succession into the EC and its adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
which by keeping the price of wheat and other grains artificially high provided a strong 
incentive for farmers to convert to intensive forms of arable production, especially 
where this involved a change from low-intensity livestock grazing (Grigg, 1989). Key 
to such changes in wetland sites like the Norfolk Broads, the Fens, and the Kent 
Marshes of the southeast, or the Somerset Levels of the southwest, was artificial 
drainage to lower water levels, often replacing wetland ecosystems which had evolved 
with farming over hundreds of years (Cook and Williamson, 1999).  
The power that farming interests held over land drainage at this time is evident when 
considering the changes that accompanied the Water Act 1973, which replaced the 29 
River Authorities with 10 truly multifunctional Regional Water Authorities responsible 
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for every facet of water management in England. Despite attempts during the run-up to 
the Act to concentrate all aspects of water policy within the Department of the 
Environment (DoE), the powerful network of public and private agricultural interests 
fronted by MAFF - and coined the “MAFFia” by its critics - successfully campaigned to 
retain control over the administration of land drainage, including the system of central 
government grant aid subsidies (Purseglove, 1988). This achievement by the farming 
lobby resulted in the formation of separate Regional Land Drainage Committees, made 
up of landowners and farmers, with the power to administer land drainage finance 
(Parker and Sewell, 1988). At a more local level, internal drainage boards (IDBs), 
created under the Land Drainage Act 1930, were still playing an important role in 
undertaking drainage schemes that supported the advance of commercial agriculture in 
the most low-lying and flood prone areas of the country. The origins of IDBs date back 
to at least the twelfth century (Reeves and Williamson, 2000), and for almost all of their 
history these authorities have had strong ties with landowners and farming, although 
this relationship and the hidden power structures it embodies has been the focus of 
criticism in more recent times (Purseglove, 1988; Bankoff, 2013). 
It is therefore clear that in the 1970s commercial farming interests were able to exercise 
both visible and hidden power in implementing land drainage schemes by deciding both 
how funds were allocated and who could participate in decisions concerning the nature 
and operation of such schemes. Land drainage designed to bring about intensive forms 
of farming was strongly supported at all levels by a well-resourced agricultural 
department in conjunction with the Regional Land Drainage Committees, the farming 
lobby (with the NFU also holding an office in Brussels), and the local IDBs. 
Furthermore, despite the financial rewards such undertakings might provide for 
agriculture as a whole, the gains were often disproportionately allocated in favour of the 
larger farmers who had the capital to undertake the necessary changes and who were 
able to benefit from economies of scale, oftentimes at the expense of small farmers 
(Lowe et al., 1986).  
In a similar fashion, these large commercial farmers were able to dictate matters through 
the hidden power they exerted over the decision-making of Regional Land Drainage 
Committees and IDBs, where representation and voting procedures tended to be 
weighted heavily in their favour (Purseglove, 1988). Thus the countryside disputes of 
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the 1970s not only pitted productive agriculture against environmental interests, but also 
large, often arable farmers against smaller farmers who had fewer options available and 
less of an incentive to adhere to the productivist ideology espoused by MAFF and the 
farming lobby, but where a failure to do so could result in continued economic 
marginalisation and even bankruptcy. 
5.3.3 A shift in power (1984 to 1989) 
In Table 5.3 we summarise the key aspects of the power dynamic that was to emerge 
after the countryside conflicts of the 1960s, 70s and early 80s. This period, discussed in 
the next two sub-sections, extends until the start of the new millennium. 
Table 5.3 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three 
dimensions for the period 1984-1999  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions of 
power 
UN International Closed 
and 
invited 
Visible 
and 
hidden 
International conferences 
and conventions 
championing more 
decentralised and 
participatory approaches to 
water management and 
contributing to a new sense 
of power “within” 
EU European Closed 
and 
invited 
Visible 
and 
hidden 
Power “over” CAP reforms 
and introduction of single-
issue water directives. 
Opening up of policy 
processes to develop a 
degree of power “with” other 
actors 
Central 
Government 
National Closed Visible Power “over” national water 
legislation and 
implementation of EU water 
legislation 
EA National and 
regional 
Closed Visible Charged with power “over” 
water management in 
England 
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Supermarkets, 
agribusinesses 
National Closed Visible 
and 
hidden 
Growing power of 
supermarkets “over” farmers 
and corporate power “over” 
large-scale, industrial 
farming 
Environmental 
NGOs 
National and 
regional 
Claimed Visible 
and 
hidden 
Formation of Wildlife Link 
Committee to coordinate 
environmental lobby’s power 
“to” act 
Rivers trusts Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Power “to” protect and 
enhance the water 
environment in certain 
catchments 
Farmer water 
abstractor 
groups 
Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Power “to” defend rights of 
irrigators against changes to 
water legislation 
The balance and operation of power at the beginning of the 1980s can be seen by 
considering the positions and contrasting influence of the various farming and 
environmental interests during the passage of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, 
covered in detail by Lowe et al. (1986). The process revealed the hidden power of the 
farming lobby at the national level, where they maintained a relatively close relationship 
with agricultural and environmental ministers. This was in contrast to the relative 
powerlessness of the government’s own conservation bodies (Winter, 1996). A key 
outcome of the Act was the ability of landed and farming interests to secure a system of 
“voluntary cooperation, encouraged where necessary by management agreements based 
on full financial compensation” (Marsden et al., 1993: 95). Again, the farming lobby 
had played to the enduring discourse of agricultural stewardship and farmer goodwill in 
securing these gains (Lowe et al., 1986).  
Overall, the Wildlife and Countryside Act only appeared to further polarise the debate. 
With its introduction in 1981 the disputes between farming and conservation that had 
arisen in the previous decades took on a new significance, with all parties realising that 
it was how the Act was to be interpreted in its first few years that would decide how it 
would be implemented going forwards. In this context the relatively remote set-piece 
conflicts in wetland sites like Romney Marsh, the Halvergate Marshes in the Norfolk 
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Broads, and West Sedgemoor in the Somerset Levels (where at the height of the conflict 
effigies of conservationists hanging by their necks from a makeshift gallows were burnt 
by local farmers) were to set precedents which would affect exactly how the Act was 
applied in National Parks and SSSIs all over the country (Purseglove, 1988).  
However, other factors were now beginning to derail the progress of intensive 
agriculture in England, as the positive public image of farmers that had emerged after 
the war (Griffiths, 2012) was being replaced by one far less flattering. In part this 
reflected the public’s growing awareness of the damage farming was causing to the 
country’s landscapes and wildlife, which was given added momentum by a string of 
scientific and popular publications (e.g. Shoard, 1980; Body, 1981; Cheshire and 
Bowers, 1983).  And, just as importantly, the economic logic underlying the direction 
agriculture was taking appeared outdated and even nonsensical. The most visible sign 
that something was awry was the stockpiling of “food mountains” and “milk lakes” 
throughout Europe, caused by massive overproduction brought on by the CAP’s 
productivist orientation, and the huge costs of storing and disposing of these surpluses 
(Marsden et al., 1993). These factors were shifting the balance of power. The shift was 
further aided by the neoliberal policies of the Thatcher government (Harvey, 2005), 
which tended to favour free-market principles in place of the traditional support shown 
by Conservatives towards the agricultural sector (Flynn et al., 1996).  
It was this political shift which was to once more change the structure of water 
management in England. As Parker and Sewell (1988: 767) observed, the Water Act 
1973 developed a new conception of water as “an economic good rather than a 
subsidized public health service…based upon a managerial philosophy, upon a 
philosophy that ‘bigger is better’ and upon increased administrative efficiency and 
greater economic efficiency - in short, upon ‘business’ imperatives.” This new attitude 
towards water combined with the wave of privatizations under the Thatcher government 
in the 1980s. By 1989 the functions of the Water Authorities were pared down to the 
delivery of public water supply and sewage treatment and they were floated on the stock 
market. The remaining water management functions were brought under the jurisdiction 
of a newly formed National Rivers Authority, which in 1996 became the Environment 
Agency (EA) when it was merged with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution and the 
country’s waste regulation authorities.  
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5.3.4 Implementing change in the 1990s 
If the 1980s was a decade when the tide of opinion began to turn away from the 
productivist regime and in favour of the environmental movement and wider social and 
economic objectives in England’s countryside, then it was in the 1990s that this change 
in emphasis resulted in more fundamental alterations to the rules governing agricultural 
production and environmental protection. Influenced by the Uruguay round of GATT 
(Lowe et al., 2002), at the European level this took place in part through a series of 
major revisions to the CAP (EC, 1991a, 1991b; Kay, 1998), starting in 1992 and ending 
with Agenda 2000, which created a second pillar for the CAP budget designed 
specifically to fund rural development initiatives, including agri-environment schemes 
(Swinbank, 1999; Dobbs and Pretty, 2008). These schemes – of which the 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas and Countryside Stewardship were the most 
prominent - where to further strengthen the relationship between the concept of 
agricultural stewardship and the expectation of financial compensation in the minds of 
English farmers.  
The power of international conventions to influence the policies and discourses within 
nations was also becoming apparent. Building upon themes first developed during the 
Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm during 1972, the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 in Rio brought international 
attention to issues of environmental degradation, environmental justice, and the need to 
adopt policies for achieving “sustainable development” as proposed by the Bruntland 
Commission (WCED, 1987). One key theme to emerge concerned the requirement for 
governments to pursue more decentralised and inclusive forms of decision-making for 
managing the environment. In Agenda 21, a key output, these ambitions are related 
directly to water governance where it states that “integrated water resources 
management, including the integration of land- and water-related aspects, should be 
carried out at the level of the catchment basin or sub-basin…based on an approach of 
full public participation”  (UNCED, 1992: para 18.9). Public participation in 
environmental decision-making was given further support by the Aarhus Convention 
(UNECE, 1998), which was adopted in 1998 and came into force in 2001. 
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Despite the growing international consensus to promote decentralised and participatory 
forms of environmental governance, it would be some time before these developments 
began to have any effect on national policy. In 1991 a raft of water-related EU and state 
legislation was introduced, including the EU Nitrates Directive, addressing the harmful 
effects of nitrogen runoff from agriculture, and the Water Resources Act 1991, where 
Section 57 gave the EA the power to reduce or halt water abstraction for spray irrigation 
during periods of “exceptional water shortage or other emergency”. This singling out of 
farming during times of shortage was to rile many irrigators and their representatives in 
the NFU who felt the system was unfairly prejudiced against them (Hamett, 2013). Yet 
it was indicative of the wider attitudinal shift outlined above, where after years of 
unquestioning support productive agriculture was now being legislated against in favour 
of other interests and objectives in the countryside.  
Although decision-making power concerning water management remained concentrated 
at the national and European levels, environmental and agricultural interests were 
nonetheless claiming their own spaces at the regional and local levels in the form of 
rivers trusts and farmer “water abstractor groups”. In the southwest of England the first 
rivers trust gained charity status in 1995 with the aims of protecting and enhancing the 
rivers of the Westcountry. With time more groups formed, and today there are over 40 
operating in different catchments across England under the overall coordination of a 
national body, The Rivers Trust. At the same time, in the southeast a different form of 
local organization oriented towards the defence of farmers’ water abstraction rights was 
emerging. The first of these water abstractor groups formed in 1992 in response to a 
Section 57 order. Since then other groups have formed, often as a result of changes to 
environmental legislation, or the onset of drought and the resulting threat of a Section 
57 (Leathes et al., 2008). Although the groups have tended to have a strong lobby focus, 
they have also offered wider benefits including the promotion of water efficiency 
measures and best practice among their members, and improved communication 
between the EA and farmers in a catchment (Barker and Turner, 2011).  
5.3.5 Lowland farming and water governance in the new millennium  
By the turn of the new millennium, the power dynamic that had emerged to govern 
lowland farming and water in England after World War II had been significantly 
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challenged. The changing political context was reflected at the national level by the 
merging of MAFF with the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
to create the Department of the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). As 
Lowe et al. (2002: 16) have noted, this reform meant that “for the first time since the 
establishment of the Board of Agriculture in 1889 there is now no UK central 
government department with the word ‘agriculture’ in its title”. Furthermore, under new 
EU legislation, in 2000 the first round of the England Rural Development Programme 
was introduced, providing amongst other things a range of agri-environment schemes 
which farmers could participate in. Yet at the same time, it is clear that despite these 
organisational and institutional changes modern commercial agriculture continues to be 
one of the dominant forces structuring the landscapes of lowland England. Here 
important macro factors - including changing global dietary patterns and the 
unpredictability of food supply resulting from climate change - have played their part by 
bringing to the fore new narratives and concepts like “sustainable intensification”, 
whilst reviving old ones, such as “food security” (Marsden, 2010). These narratives are 
perhaps paving the way for a “new productivism” that threatens to eclipse previous “old 
environmental” concerns centring on landscapes and biodiversity (Lobley and Winter, 
2009). 
One distinctive feature of the current dynamic governing farming in England relates to 
the power of the retail sector, where by 2013 the top four supermarkets enjoyed 75% of 
the market share (Kantar, 2013). This market power, located predominantly at the 
national level but often also spanning the international, allows the supermarkets to exert 
considerable downward pressure on prices at the farm gate (Marsden, 2010). Coupled 
with stringent food quality standards, this has encouraged the development of large, 
efficient farms at the expense of small producers who find it particularly challenging to 
comply with supermarket conditions and still make a profit. The trend has been 
exacerbated by the increasingly specialised nature of farming, which often requires 
sophisticated and expensive machinery suited to expansive, homogenised farm units 
(Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006).  Such developments have been reflected in changing 
farm sizes, where there has been a move towards fewer but larger production-oriented 
farms (Walford, 2003). For example, between 1995 and 2005 the average farm size in 
eastern England fell in all size categories apart from holdings of between 5 and 20 
 119 
 
hectares which rose by nearly 10% (indicating the growth of niche or “hobby” farms) 
and farms in the largest category of 100 hectares or more which rose by 13.4% 
(DEFRA, 2014a).  
Another symptom of the structure of the food supply chain in England is the strong 
competition which often exists between farmers attempting to capture a share of the 
market, potentially making cooperation harder to achieve. Those examples of where 
farmers do work together revolve largely around producer coops and machinery groups 
designed to increase bargaining power with processors and supermarkets, and to spread 
financial risk (Youngs, 2013). Furthermore, as Hall and Pretty (2008) have 
demonstrated with their study of farming in the eastern county of Norfolk, the close ties 
which developed between many farmers and the government in the post-war period 
have been significantly undermined in more recent times in response to political shifts 
and the changing demands placed on farmers. The authors conclude that there is now “a 
striking degree of physical and social distance, professional disrespect, divergent 
agendas and distrust between government delivery agencies and farmers, findings that 
are clearly revealed by many of the government’s own investigations” (Hall and Pretty, 
2008: 411).  
It is with these features of the agricultural sector in mind that we will consider the 
developments that have occurred in water governance in England since the year 2000, 
and in so doing move towards an understanding of the current power dynamic affecting 
farmer cooperation and participation. The way in which power has come to be 
structured since 2000 is shown in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4 The key actors and most prominent elements of the Power Cube’s three 
dimensions for the period 2000 until the present  
Actors Levels Spaces Forms of 
power 
Comments on expressions 
of power 
UN International Closed and 
invited 
Visible 
and 
invisible 
Continuing power “over” 
European and national 
policy and influencing 
power “within” 
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WTO International Closed Visible Power “over” key aspects 
of CAP reform 
EU European Closed and 
Invited 
Visible 
and 
hidden 
Increasingly power “with” 
a range of interests to 
develop water and 
environmental policy. 
Introduction of WFD and 
continuing CAP reforms 
DEFRA National Closed and 
invited 
Visible Subsumed MAFF, Power 
“over” government water 
policy and implementing 
EU legislation 
Supermarkets, 
agribusinesses 
National and 
international 
Closed Visible 
and 
hidden 
Power of supermarkets 
and corporations “over” 
farmers, with agriculture 
integrated into global 
supply chains 
EA National and 
regional 
Closed Visible 
and 
hidden 
Power “over” WFD 
process and water 
resources management.  
Environmental 
NGOs 
European, 
national and 
regional 
Claimed Visible 
and 
hidden 
Increasing influence of 
groups such as RSPB, 
WWF, and Wildlife Trusts 
with the power “to” act 
River basin 
liaison panels 
Regional Invited Hidden Group of invited “co-
deliverers” operating at 
scale of 10 large River 
Basin Districts 
purportedly to share power 
“with” EA 
Catchment-
based groups 
Local Invited Hidden Offspring of WFD 
process, providing 
opportunities for private 
interests and water users 
to share power “with” 
government water 
managers 
Rivers trusts Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Expansion of trusts to 
cover 40 catchments 
across the country, with 
power “to” act to protect 
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water environment. Under 
WFD now sharing some 
power “with” other water 
managers as “co-
deliverers”  
Farmer water 
abstractor 
groups 
Regional and 
local 
Claimed Visible Several nascent groups, 
with some starting to 
express a willingness to 
develop relationships of 
power “with” other actors 
In the following subsections we detail developments that run alongside one another, but 
which are separated out here for the sake of clarity. 
Water Framework Directive 
In 2000 the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) was introduced, becoming part of 
UK law in 2003. This new piece of legislation tied together various existing single-issue 
EU Directives concerning water management under a broad and inclusive approach, 
whilst setting the ambitious aim of improving all of Europe’s water bodies – to raise 
them up to “good status” – by the year 2015. By promoting the participation of non-
state actors in planning and implementation, the Directive also made room for a 
fundamentally different system of water governance to that which had developed in 
England over the course of the twentieth century (Page and Kaika, 2003; Collins et al., 
2012). This was to provide a new impetus for non-governmental organisations like the 
rivers trusts who now positioned themselves as “one of the primary co-deliverers” in 
efforts to improve England’s water environment (RT, n.d.). The change in emphasis 
brought about by the WFD also entailed a restructuring of power due to its requirement 
for the adoption of pluralistic procedures – “invited spaces” - operating at the scale of 
ten river basin districts. Each of these hydrological units requires the periodic 
development and implementation of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) by a 
“competent authority or authorities” in conjunction with the various interests 
represented in each river basin. In England sole responsibility for delivering the 
objectives of the WFD was given to the EA as the only competent authority. 
However, as Watson and Treffny (2009) have shown, the process of developing the 
RBMPs prior to the first six-year cycle of the WFD, which runs from 2009-2015, 
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largely served to maintain the status quo, as decision-making power and overall control 
continued to reside with the EA and central government. Despite a rhetoric of 
decentralisation and collaboration, by functioning at the broad scale of the river basin 
where a Regional Liaison Panel made up of an invited list of “co-deliverers” was largely 
consulted on decisions which had already been decided by the EA, local issues and 
interests represented by the likes of environmental groups, municipalities, or farmers 
failed to enter into the process. In this way the government was able to exercise hidden 
power to control the water management agenda in spite of an apparent change in 
structure and process as mandated for by the WFD. At the time Watson and Treffny 
(2009: 458) concluded that: 
Overall…a modestly reformed bureaucracy continues to be a fundamental 
element of the institutional approach for water management in England. 
Whilst...more non-state actors are now engaged in aspects of water management, 
they have tended to be assigned to the job of ‘rowing’ within the reformed 
governance arrangements, while the task of ‘steering’ remains firmly in the 
hands of powerful government departments and technically oriented public 
agencies.     
Responding to the threat of a legal challenge from WWF-UK and the Angling Trust 
concerning a perceived failure on the government’s part to implement the WFD in 
accordance with the terms defined in the Directive, in March of 2011 DEFRA released a 
position statement in which they outlined their commitment to implement a Catchment 
Based Approach (DEFRA, 2011c). Following on from an initial pilot project, in 2013 
the Catchment Based Approach was rolled out nationwide. Publications by DEFRA 
during and after the pilot phase would suggest the government has taken a substantial 
step towards facilitating a more pluralistic approach to managing England’s water 
environment, with repeated references to the value of collaborative and partnership 
working on the ground, the importance of retaining the autonomy of local catchment 
groups, and the need for the government to relinquish absolute control over water 
management and instead embrace change and uncertainty (DEFRA, 2012b; DEFRA, 
2013b; DEFRA, 2013d; DEFRA, 2013e).  
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Substantiating these claims will require time and critical analyses of the situation as it 
develops. Yet as the government’s own pilot-phase evaluation indicated, the 
participation of farmers in the scheme has been difficult to secure. Work by the 
government suggests that while around a quarter of the participants in the catchment 
groups were EA staff, farmers only made up 7% of the numbers, and here it is likely 
that at least one reason for becoming involved in the first place was to ensure their 
interests were being represented (DEFRA, 2013d). Although Catchment Based 
Management is clearly in its early stages, statistics like this hint at a situation whereby 
farming remains a sector largely acted upon, even if by a more diverse and localised 
group of interests, rather than one that constructively participates in collaborative 
decision-making processes intended to bring about positive environmental change. 
Water resources management 
Water resources management has become an issue of increasing significance in 
England, although as we have seen most of the historical conflicts concerning farming 
have tended to revolve around land drainage. Under the overall direction of DEFRA, the 
power to implement and control water resources management lies almost entirely with 
the EA through a system of abstraction licencing. Although a resource assessment 
programme called the Catchment Abstraction Management Strategy (CAMS), 
developed in 1999, was later to orient water quantity management towards the 
objectives of the WFD through its focus on supporting the ecology of water bodies, this 
has not been accompanied by a shift to a more pluralistic stance on planning and 
implementation at the local level. Despite the fact that the CAMS process involved the 
participation of stakeholder representatives in its early stages, water resources 
management remains a highly technical affair conducted by experts situated in a 
hierarchical organisational structure (Warwick, 2012).  
Yet the Government is currently pushing for an overhaul of the water licencing system, 
with two reform proposal being debated. Whilst they differ, both would better link 
water licences to the real-time flow in a waterbody and facilitate the development of 
water markets (DEFRA, 2013c). A potential upshot of reforming the system along these 
lines is that it could encourage water users to become more involved in a degree of 
cooperative management within catchments, a view suggested by the RSPB and 
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supported by the NFU (ENDS, 2013; NFU, 2013). Reforms of this sort also provide an 
opportunity for farmer water abstractor groups to involve themselves more in water 
resources management by acting as market intermediaries in a system of water trading, 
a function which similar groups already perform in other parts of the world (Kloezen, 
1998).  
The CAP 
Alongside reforms to water legislation, the CAP has also undergone deep structural 
changes. Following on from Agenda 2000, in June 2003 new reforms were put in place 
to, a) further decouple subsidies from food production, b) make compulsory a system of 
cross-compliance whereby farm subsidies are dependent in part on farmers adhering to a 
set of Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions (GAECs), including GAECs 18 
and 19 which relate to measures for protecting the water environment, and c) to enforce 
the process of “modulation” whereby Member States are required to incrementally 
reallocated funds to the pot that finances rural development programmes, such as agri-
environment schemes (Gay et al., 2005). Since then the CAP has been simplified and 
streamlined in attempts to remove some restrictions on farmers and further align 
agriculture with price signals on the world market. These reforms have been driven in 
no small part by the international pressure placed on European decision makers by the 
Doha round of WTO negotiations (Nedergaard, 2006; Swinbank and Daugberg, 2006). 
The extent to which the various environmental reforms that have been made to the CAP 
have changed farmers’ underlying attitudes, values, and beliefs, as opposed to simply 
influencing their behaviour through financial incentives or coercion, is something that 
that remains open to much debate.  Furthermore, despite the range of benefits that acting 
collectively is known to bring to environmental management (Ostrom, 1990; 
Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Lubell et al., 2002; Pretty, 2003), the CAP has largely 
failed to encourage cooperation among farmers for delivering environmental objectives. 
This is brought about at least in part because the areas targeted for cross-compliance 
measures or agri-environment schemes in England seek to promote individual farm or 
field-scale initiatives, as opposed to joint action (Franks et al., 2011). 
Yet modest developments are underway to support and encourage greater cooperation 
among farmers in instances where it appears benefit can be derived from doing so. In 
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particular, under two options in England’s Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS), 
the largest initiative of the CAP’s Rural Development Programme, farmers are provided 
with an incentive to collaborate under options UX1 (for upland farming) and HR8. HR8 
is a voluntary option which can be adopted by farmers looking to undertake collective 
measures to achieve environmental benefits that extend beyond the more basic entry 
levels of the ESS (DEFRA, 2012d). Although HR8 was initially intended for situations 
relating to areas of common grazing land, Franks and Emery (2013: 851) have observed 
that in a handful of instances HR8 agreements have been adopted “on non-common 
lowlands where, in general, they have been used with great innovation and 
inventiveness.” However, to date no HR8 agreement has been used to support the 
collective management of water-related issues, despite recognition by the government 
and academic community of the benefits a more joined-up, boundary-spanning 
approach could bring (Lubelle et al., 2002; Wallace et al., 2003; Fish et al., 2010).  
5.4 Discussion 
Throughout the historical analysis of the previous section we reflected on the evolving 
interplay of three forms of power in different types of spaces at local, national, and 
international levels with respect to lowland farming and water governance in England. 
The intention has been to understand how the resulting power structure we identify has 
come to influence the ability of lowland farmers to cooperate and participate in water 
governance. By drawing on the language of the Power Cube, in this section we will 
highlight the major trends that have been observed, and what they imply for our 
objective. We consider these developments in light of four distinct phases which are 
encapsulated by Tables 5.1 through 5.4 above, and comprise the periods 1939-1959 
(Phase 1), 1960-1983 (Phase 2), 1984-1999 (Phase 3), and 2000-the present day (Phase 
4). The changes are represented in Figure 5.2. 
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5.4.1 Charting key trends in farming and water governance 
During Phase 1 it is evident that the systems governing farming and water management 
were most distinctly characterised by relationships of power “over”. This power was 
held by the government and farming lobby at the national level, who together oriented 
the sector along productivist lines. The country also witnessed the emergence of a 
nascent agribusiness industry and supermarket sector, with a power “over” farmers that 
would continue to grow with time. The visible and hidden forms of power exercised by 
the Government, the farming lobby, agri-business corporations, and other key actors in 
closed spaces resulted in a particular sense of power “within” farmers that came to 
shape their thoughts and behaviour. This sense of power “within” is best encapsulated 
by the concept of “productivism”. 
Phase 2 witnessed the consolidation of water management responsibilities into fewer, 
larger administrative units as the 32 Rivers Boards were replaced by 29 River 
Authorities, and then later, in Phase 3, by 10 Regional Water Authorities and finally the 
EA. Phase 2 was also the period when the UK joined the European Community (EC). 
At this point, some of the power “over” farming and water policy that had been held at 
the national level was subsumed by decision makers operating in closed spaces at the 
European level. One notable feature of the UK’s succession to the EC was the adoption 
of the CAP, which helped incentivise farmers in England to convert to intensive forms 
of arable production. The productivist drive was also strengthened by the growth of the 
agribusiness industry, and the control that a powerful network of government and 
farming bodies held “over” land drainage in England, which was a key requirement for 
productive agriculture in many low-lying parts of the country. At the same time, the 
emerging environmental movement, with the power “to” act in favour of wildlife and 
landscape conservation, claimed spaces at the national, regional, and local levels. The 
result was a series of conflicts, as environmental and commercial farming interests were 
pitted against each other.  
Throughout Phases 1 and 2 we can see that visible and hidden power exercised by 
decision makers in closed spaces at the national, and increasingly at the European level, 
tended to dominate the course of events in agriculture and water management. However, 
as Phase 3 progressed a number of these closed spaces started to open up under pressure 
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from a range of interests, including the power of institutions such as the UN and WTO 
operating at the international level, and by widespread public concern at the national 
level. In effect, the closed corporatist relationship between the government and the 
farming lobby in England, and the power of farming interests in Brussels, was being 
undermined on a number of fronts. The result tended to be the development of more 
inclusive decision-making arenas that allowed environmental groups to insert “green 
ideas” into policy making (Wilson, 2007). The influence of the environmental 
movement at this time is evident by the emergence of farmer water abstractor groups at 
the local level, who were forming in response to new environmental legislation that 
impinged on lowland farmers’ ability to abstract water.  
By the start of Phase 4, the range of actors with the power “to” influence farming and 
water governance in England was spread across levels spanning the local to the 
international. As this last phase has progressed, one observable characteristic has been 
the apparent opportunities that the farming community now has to cooperate and 
participate (to develop relationships of power “with”) in the governance of their water 
environment. In large part, these developments have been a result of power exercised at 
the international and European level, in particular through the introduction of the WFD 
which in turn has facilitated the emergence of invited spaces at a more local level with 
the Catchment Based Approach. Another key characteristic of the current system is the 
power the corporate food supply chain exercises “over” farmers, having continued to 
expand and embed itself in global systems of production (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006; 
Weis, 2007).  
5.4.2 Developing relationships of power “with”?  
Having outlined the major trends, here we shall consider what they imply for the ability 
of lowland farmers in England to cooperate and participate in water governance; or, to 
use the language of the Power Cube, to develop power “with” each other and with 
governmental and non-governmental water managers. Despite the structural progression 
towards more pluralistic forms of water governance, our power analysis highlights three 
distinct barriers that stand in the way of garnering the cooperation and participation of 
farmers.  
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The first barrier concerns the power “within” lowland farmers, which in turn affects 
their power “to” act. As we have seen, after the war the power “within” many of these 
farmers became strongly associated with productivism. Although this identity has in 
turn been challenged by “post-productivist” policies emanating in large part from the 
EU, other aspects of the system governing farmers have continued to nurture and 
develop it. These include the ongoing support from organisations like the NFU for an 
efficient, expansive, and productive farming sector, the ideological basis of agri-food 
politics in the UK, and the structure of the corporate agri-food chain in which farmers 
operate. As a result, today productivism remains an integral component of farming 
activity and culture in lowland England (Wilson, 2001; Walford, 2003; Burton and 
Wilson, 2006; Marsden and Sonnino, 2008), which has been given added impetus since 
the price rises on fuel and food during 2008 (Marsden, 2010).  
The power “within” that the productivist identity bestows on many lowland farmers is 
likely to inhibit their power “to” participate in water governance because of its general 
failure to account for the environment and the often strong ideological strands of 
individualism and competition that accompanies this perspective (Marsden et al., 1993). 
This would help to explain the general lack of involvement of farmers in voluntary 
initiatives like the Catchment Based Approach. This same power dynamic would appear 
to inhibit the ability of farmers to cooperate with each other in order to contribute to 
water governance objectives as part of a collaboration. The analysis did draw attention 
to the emergence of farmer water abstractor groups, and indicated that despite their 
focus on lobbying, over time they have also benefitted water management. Yet 
according to our findings, the degree to which these groups could “comanage” (Berkes 
et al., 1991; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005) water resources appears limited at best. 
Instead, farmer cooperation is most obviously linked to the goal of increasing profit by 
removing obstacles to productive capacity.  
The second barrier concerns the ability of government agencies, and in particular the 
EA, to move from exercising relationships of power “over” farmers to developing 
relationships of power “with” them. During the course of the last century, the 
technically-minded administrations in charge of managing water in England became 
increasingly consolidated and centralised. In this light, the organisational and cultural 
challenge posed by more recent developments in water governance that champion 
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decentralisation and a partnership approach, is a very real one. It is therefore not clear 
how easily the bureaucracies charged with managing the water environment are willing 
or able to relinquish power, despite adopting a discourse which would suggest 
otherwise. Perhaps the major difference now is that where once government water 
managers exercised visible power “over” farmers in order to regulate their behaviour, 
today the same outcome may require the use of hidden power instead. For example, in 
the case of the WFD we saw a tendency for the EA to exercise hidden power so as to 
maintain control of the management process in spite of a more pluralistic and dispersed 
governance structure. Furthermore, developing power-sharing arrangements between 
the government and farmers is also undermined by the distance and mistrust that has 
come to characterise their relationship (Hall and Pretty, 2008). 
The third and final barrier concerns the possibility of farmers developing relationships 
of power “with” non-governmental stakeholders. In particular, this relates to groups 
such as the rivers trusts, wildlife trusts, and RSPB who under the WFD can now 
position themselves as “co-deliverers” in the management process. Yet the relationship 
between modern farming and the environmental movement is one founded on conflict 
and dispute. We have seen that both sides have tended to exercise their power “to” act 
in ways which are often diametrically opposed. Although the environmental movement 
has achieved a number of gains with respect to agri-environmental practices in lowland 
England, this has tended to be as a result of its ability to curtail (often peripheral) 
aspects of a production-oriented system. Now, with the possible rise of a “new 
productivism” (Lobley and Winter, 2009), the likelihood of lowland farmers and 
environmental groups finding the common ground needed to develop relationships of 
power “with” seems some way off. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The introduction to this paper brought attention to the importance of context for 
understanding both the relevance and feasibility of garnering the cooperation and 
participation of lowland farmers in English water governance. We have investigated this 
issue from a power perspective, by using an approach known as the Power Cube. 
Broadly speaking, this has revealed how since World War II the system governing 
farming and water management has witnessed a dispersal of power across different 
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levels of organisation from the local to the international, and in different types of spaces 
(Figure 5.2). One outcome is the establishment of “invited spaces” in which non-state 
actors, including farmers, have an opportunity to influence planning and decision-
making.  
Yet despite this opportunity, the power dynamic revealed by our analysis indicates that 
three distinct barriers stand in the way of involving lowland farmers in English water 
governance. These are, 1) the power “within” these farmers, which continues to be 
defined in large part by a productivist ideology that favours individualism, competition, 
and profit, often at the expense of the environment, 2) the ongoing power that 
government water managers exercise “over” farmers (and other non-state actors) instead 
of sharing power “with” them, and 3) the relationship between farming and 
environmental interests, which is characterised by a history of conflict and mistrust. As 
a caveat, we must also point to the broad political economy approach we have adopted. 
To this extent, despite the generality of these claims, the degree to which they apply in 
reality is of course far more nuanced and variable than our conclusions might suggest.  
Nonetheless, the power dynamic highlighted in this paper appears to undermine any 
expectation that lowland farmers in England would willingly cooperate and participate 
in water governance. This realisation provides justification for the use of regulations 
and financial incentives designed to instigate behaviour change. The claim is 
strengthened by what our analysis has revealed about the evolving notion of 
“agricultural stewardship”, which since World War II has become increasingly tied to 
an expectation of financial compensation. This points to the importance of the current 
system of agri-environment and water-related schemes and programmes. Encouraging 
farmer participation and developing a more cooperative approach to water governance 
will depend on the structure of such schemes. To this end, we suggest a greater 
integration of government programmes and a channelling of funding sources. Here CAP 
payments under ESS options such as HR8 (see above) could combine with initiatives 
like the Catchment Based Approach to provide an impetus for farmers and farmer 
groups to participate in collaborative catchment-wide objectives or joint action at the 
scale of the local waterbody. 
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Yet there is a limit to how far top-down incentives can induce substantive change in the 
identities underlying farmers’ behaviour, at least in the short to medium term (Burton 
and Wilson, 2006). There are enduring discourses, ideologies, and power relations born 
out of the massive upheaval of war which remain entrenched in the collective psyche of 
the farming community, and are associated with notions of feeding the nation and what 
it means to practice “good farming”. These have been strengthened and maintained by 
the structure and volatility of the global food system, and the economic pressures and 
incentives farmers face (Weis, 2007; Lobley and Winter, 2009b). Although many 
farmers have adjusted to the more recent “greening” of agricultural policy, timeworn 
divisions such as the distinction between productive agriculture and a picturesque and 
wildlife-friendly countryside (Pretty, 2002) will not be easily replaced. 
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Chapter 6: Discourse Analysis 
Prologue 
The paper in this chapter represents the last of the three analyses comprising the 
contextual phase of the research programme (Phase 2). Alongside the previous 
chapter, it sets out to address Objective 3 of the research agenda. It is also the most 
focused of the three analyses (see Figure 1.1) in that its subject matter specifically 
considers farmer irrigators who are members of water abstractor groups in lowland 
England. Yet, as will become clear, the findings of the research can be considered to be 
broader than this, in that they allude to ideological power structures that condition the 
thoughts and behaviour of medium and large-scale farmers in lowland England more 
generally. At the same time, this more focused analysis usefully accommodates the 
transition to the final phase of the research in Chapter 7 (Phase 3), where five water 
abstractor groups are considered. The paper below (Paper 4), has been accepted for 
publication in the journal Water Alternatives (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2015a). 
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Paper 4 - Competition, Conflict, and Compromise: 
Three Discourses used by Irrigators in England and 
their Implications for the Comanagement of Water 
Resources 
Luke Whaley and Edward K. Weatherhead 
Abstract 
In this paper we use discourse analysis to explore the current dynamic that exists among 
farmer irrigators in England, and between irrigators and water managers in order to 
understand the potential for comanagement to develop. To do this we employ two 
concepts from the field of critical discursive psychology – “interpretive repertoires” and 
“subject positions” - and apply them to a qualitative analysis of 20 interviews with 
farmers who are members of irrigator groups and two focus group discussions with 
farmers thinking about forming an irrigator group. The findings reveal that the 
participants drew upon three interpretive repertoires when talking about the relationship 
between farming and water resources management, namely the “competition”, 
“conflict”, and “compromise” repertoires, with the latter being the least dominant. We 
situate the repertoires in their wider historical context to reveal the ideological forces at 
play, and conclude that the relative dominance of the competition and conflict 
repertoires serve as a barrier to comanagement. In particular, this is because they 
engender low levels of trust and reinforce a power dynamic that favours individualism 
and opposition. At the same time, the less dominant compromise repertoire challenges 
the power of the other two, providing some hope of achieving more participatory forms 
of water resources management in the future. To this end, we discuss how the 
restructuring of current agri-environment schemes and government water programmes 
may be used to promote the adoption and institutionalisation of the compromise 
repertoire in order to facilitate the emergence of comanagement. 
Key words: Water resources, comanagement, farming, discourse, power, England 
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6.1 Introduction 
The broader context within which water resources management in England operates is 
changing, and with it the task of managing water resources is becoming increasingly 
complex and uncertain. Not least among the causes is population growth, changing 
lifestyle preferences, and the effects of climate change, including more extremes 
(Weatherhead and Howden, 2009; Barker and Turner, 2011). Already there are signs of 
the sorts of weather-related challenges that may lie ahead: since 2010 the country has 
experienced a period of prolonged drought, unseasonal cold snaps, record levels of 
rainfall, and severe flooding. These changes are putting further pressure on water 
resources. At the same time, a shrinking national budget has resulted in cuts to the 
Environment Agency (EA), the organisation charged with managing water resources. 
This strongly suggests that the system governing water resources will need to become 
more flexible and adaptive in order to cope. Given limited government resources and 
new discourses that champion more local and collaborative approaches, it would appear 
there is now an onus on water users in England to play some part in managing change 
and sharing scarcity.  
In contrast to many other countries, irrigated agriculture in England accounts for a small 
proportion – around 1.5% - of water use annually (Weatherhead, 2006). However, 
during the growing season water for irrigation can amount to 70% of the total used in 
some catchments (Holman and Trawick, 2011). This water is taken in the hotter summer 
months when it is scarcer and there is greater all-round demand, placing added strain on 
the environment. In more recent years there has also been increasing emphasis given to 
home-grown food production. This has been encouraged by volatile global food markets 
brought on by extreme weather events and changing dietary patterns in countries like 
the BRICS (Lobley and Winter, 2009). These trends and uncertainties suggest water for 
food is an issue in England that will only become more central in time. 
In many low-lying parts of England there is strong competition for water both within 
and between different sectors. This has been heightened by a growing awareness of the 
needs of the water environment, which has resulted in more stringent regulations 
designed to protect it (Barker and Turner, 2011). Responding to the threat that greater 
demand and a changing regulatory context has posed to commercial agriculture, since 
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the 1990s a small number of farmer irrigator groups – known as “water abstractor 
groups” in England – have formed, with the aim of protecting their members’ rights to 
abstract water. Despite a strong lobby focus, over time abstractor groups have 
contributed to water management by lowering transaction costs for the regulator, 
encouraging water efficiency measures, and voluntarily reducing water use during 
periods of scarcity (Leathes et al., 2008). Yet the extent to which farmer groups like this 
may become more involved in water resource management is not well understood. 
In this paper we investigate farmer cooperation and participation in water resources 
management in England, by focusing on water abstractor groups (including farmers 
considering forming an abstractor group). We adopt a discourse analysis approach, 
where the intention is to investigate the present-day power dynamic and levels of trust 
that exist among irrigators, and between irrigators and government water managers. Our 
approach is framed by the concept of “comanagement”, defined as a process where “the 
government shares power with resource users, with each given specific rights and 
responsibilities relating to information and decision-making” (OECD, 2001). In the 
sections that follow, we firstly discuss the theory and method that underpins the 
research before outlining the findings of our analysis. We then situate these findings in 
their wider historical context in order to gain an understanding of the ideological forces 
at play, and discuss how this dynamic may constrain or enable the process of 
comanagement between farmer groups and government water managers. We end by 
outlining the main conclusions of the research. 
6.2 Theory and method 
In this section we locate the research topic within a body of knowledge known as 
commons theory, paying particular attention to the concept of comanagement and its 
relevance with respect to farmer abstractor groups and water resources management in 
England. We then go on to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of our discourse 
analysis approach, before concluding the section with an outline of the methodology 
employed. 
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6.2.1 Comanagement and water resources in England 
From a theoretical perspective, the participation of farmer abstractor groups in water 
resources management is well framed by the field of commons theory. Scholars 
working in this tradition have documented a wide range of cases in which resource 
users have averted a “tragedy of the commons” scenario by devising self-governing 
arrangements in order to manage common pool resources such as water. A significant 
area of interest has been irrigator groups (Ostrom, 1990; Tang, 1992; Dietz et al., 2002), 
where in countries like Nepal research has consistently demonstrated that “on average, 
farmer-managed irrigation systems outperform agency-managed irrigation systems on 
multiple dimensions” (Ostrom and Basurto, 2010: 320).  
Several commons scholars extended the analysis beyond situations of local community 
governance, to a consideration of “comanagement” between a community or group of 
resource users and the government (Pinkerton, 1989a; Berkes et al., 1991; Pomeroy and 
Berkes, 1997). It is proposed that this form of power-sharing arrangement is able to 
improve the legitimacy, equity, and effectiveness of natural resource management 
(Pinkerton, 1989b; Reed, 2008; Berkes, 2009), although such (often normative) claims 
have not been without their critics (Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Conley and Moote, 2003; 
Nadasdy, 2007). Seven broad management activities are considered commensurate with 
comanagement (Pinkerton, 1989b), including water allocation, resource protection and 
enhancement, and longer-term decision-making (Table 6.1). Furthermore, over time 
there is the potential for comanagement to evolve into “adaptive comanagement”, 
through dynamic processes of networking, problem solving, and joint learning (Olsson 
et al., 2004; Armitage et al., 2009). Adaptive comanagement, which combines the 
linkages dimension of comanagement with the learning dimension of adaptive 
management, has been portrayed as a means of achieving the “dual outcomes of 
ecosystem protection and livelihood sustainability” under conditions of change and 
uncertainty (Armitage, 2007: 72). With respect to water resources management in 
England, the emergence of such a process would appear to be desirable, given the issues 
outlined in the introduction.  
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Table 6.1 Seven comanagement activities. Adapted from Pinkerton (1989b). 
Comanagement activities 
1         
Data 
gathering 
and 
analysis 
2  
Logistical 
decisions 
such as who 
can abstract 
water and 
when 
3  
Water 
allocation 
decisions 
4  
Protection of 
resource from 
environmental 
damage 
5 
Enforcement 
of 
regulations 
6 
Enhancement 
and long-term 
planning 
7  
Broad 
policy 
decision 
making 
However, England is a country characterised by a strong regulatory regime and a history 
of increasing centralisation and bureaucratic water management (Parker and Sewell, 
1988; Watson and Treffny, 2009). To this extent, comanagement represents a distinct 
challenge to water managers and users alike. Yet forthcoming institutional 
developments may provide a window of opportunity. In particular, the licencing system 
which was first introduced to regulate water abstraction in the 1960s is in the process of 
undergoing major reforms. The system has been modified previously; most recently 
with the Water Act 2003 which introduced several changes, including the time-limiting 
of new abstraction licences. Yet the current reform proposals are more radical. Although 
two alternative systems are being debated, key objectives of both are to link abstraction 
licences to the real-time availability of water and to allow abstractors to trade water 
more effectively (DEFRA, 2013c). 
As a result, the reform proposals potentially confer a degree of decision-making power 
to water users, most obviously with respect to the task of water allocation. Several 
stakeholder representatives have suggested this could allow for a more participatory and 
cooperative approach. For example, the National Farmers Union propose that the new 
system should “encourage user groups, such as abstractor and water resources groups, 
to become more involved in collectively managing water” (NFU, 2013: 3). In a similar 
vein, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds have stated that the reform has the 
potential to “encourage cooperative water management between shareholders in each 
catchment” (ENDS, 2013).  
The comanagement literature provides theoretical support for the notion that farmer 
collaborations, such as water abstractor groups, could comanage water resources in a 
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system of licence trading. Rose (2002) discusses the possibility that in the future we 
may witness more examples where communities or groups of resource users become 
liberalised and evolve to operate by way of a tradable permits approach. Tietenberg 
(2002) echoes these sentiments, claiming that the properties of a common pool resource 
like water mean it is actually suited to arrangements of this sort. Yet as the literature 
also makes clear, the emergence of comanagement is dependent on communication, 
trust, and the prevailing power dynamic for partnership building (Berkes, 2009; Graham 
and Ernstson, 2012; Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014). In the following section we 
discuss the theory underpinning the discourse analysis approach used to investigate 
these issues. 
6.2.2 Discourse analysis: interpretive repertoires and subject positions 
Proponents of discourse analysis share the view that far from being a passive medium 
for conveying meaning and information, language is instead understood to be 
constitutive - to construct the meaning humans attribute to the social and physical world 
- as well as action-oriented, in the sense that language is capable of “doing things” 
(Taylor, 2001). The endeavour to study language through discourse analysis has 
resulted in a broad field encompassing a range of theoretical and methodological 
approaches (Wetherell et al., 2001a, 2001b). In this paper we utilise two analytical 
concepts associated with critical discursive psychology, namely “interpretive 
repertoires” and “subject positions” (Wetherell, 1998; Davies and Harre, 1990; Edley, 
2001; Harre et al., 2009). A central premise of a critical discourse analysis approach is 
that people are both the products and producers of discourse (Billig, 1996). That is, 
discourses exert power over the speaking subject by delineating what can be said and 
thought, and at the same time the subject exhibits agency by drawing upon the 
discursive resources a culture makes available to them to negotiate and construct 
meaning, exercise power, and thus produce effects in the world: humans are both slaves 
to and masters of language (Barthes, 1982).    
It is this dual understanding of how language operates which leads us in this paper to 
speak not about “discourses” but “interpretive repertoires”. Although the two terms 
share much in common, in some analytical traditions a discourse is conceived of as 
having a broad, structuring effect which tends to marginalise the agency of the subject: 
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“the ‘subject’ is produced within discourse” (Hall, 2001: 79). In contrast, interpretive 
repertoires are conceptualised as smaller and less overbearing; they are ensembles of 
ideas, categories, and concepts “used for characterising and evaluating actions, events 
and other phenomena” where “often a repertoire will be organised around specific 
metaphors and figures of speech” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 149). Edley (2001) 
discusses how interpretive repertoires largely contribute to a community’s common-
sense understanding of the world. They can be thought of as being like books on a 
library shelf which are always ready to be borrowed during the course of social 
interaction. This metaphor also stresses the point that “when people talk (or think) about 
things, they invariably do so in terms already provided for them by history” (Edley 
2001: 198).  
The second concept we draw upon in this paper, subject positioning, was developed by 
social psychologists in an attempt to move beyond the restrictive notion of “roles” and 
to instead consider “positions”, and how they help to “focus attention on dynamic 
aspects of encounters in contrast to the way in which the use of ‘role’ serves to highlight 
static, formal, and ritualistic aspects” (Davies and Harre, 1990: 43). From this 
perspective, people are involved in an ongoing argumentative exchange (Billig, 1996), a 
process of negotiation in which they attempt to position both themselves and others 
during the course of social interaction. The different positions that can be attributed to a 
person or thing in the world are themselves located in the various interpretive 
repertoires the speaking subject has at their disposal. Therefore, in the way we use them 
here, interpretive repertoires can be thought of as embodying a particular story about the 
phenomena, activity, or event they construct - a version of events - and it is within these 
different storylines that agents are positioned. However, interpretive repertoires and 
their related subject positions do not just “float in space”. Instead, as noted above, these 
repertoires and subject positions are embedded in history. As they become dominant, 
they are not only adopted by many people as a way of conceptualising the world but 
they also “solidify” into particular institutional and organisational practices (Hajer, 
1995). In doing this, they come to represent distinct social, political, and economic 
privileges for different people.  
Thus in a number of ways discourse is intimately bound up with power. By considering 
interpretive repertoires and subject positions we can see that the issue of trust also 
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becomes relevant, where some repertoires and their positions serve to undermine trust 
between different actors, whilst others reinforce it.  With this in mind, we can state here 
that the central aim of this study is to understand what the interpretive repertoires and 
subject positions that farmers utilise in the course of speaking about farming and water 
resources management reveals about “the broader ideological context in which talk is 
done” (Edley 2001: 217). In so doing, we reflect upon what this implies for developing 
relationships of trust in a way that encourages farmers to comanage water resources. To 
this extent, although we recognise the ways in which discourse is employed by the 
speaking subject within the local context of the interpersonal exchange, the focus is 
instead on providing a general account of the various interpretive repertoires and their 
related subject positions as evidenced in the talk of the farmers in this study. 
Nonetheless, we will return to one implication of this dual conception of discourse in 
the discussion. 
6.2.3 Research approach 
The data for this study consists of 20 interviews and two focus groups. All interviewees 
were members of water abstractor groups, whilst the focus groups were made up of 
farmers from two separate catchments who were considering forming an abstractor 
group. All abstractor groups were located in the low-lying east of the country, where 
irrigated agriculture is most prevalent and competition for water tends to be greatest 
(Barker and Turner, 2011). The locations of the two focus groups were a catchment in 
the east of England and another in the west, near the border with Wales. As so few 
water abstractor groups exist in England – perhaps as few as six (EA, n.d. a) – we 
adopted a non-probability “snowball” sampling strategy  (Bryman, 2012), which 
involved interviewing the perceived “gatekeeper” of each group (typically the 
chairman), through whom contact was made with other group members. In almost all 
cases the interview and focus group participants were medium to large-scale industrial 
farm owners, tenants, or managers.  
Interviews lasted on average one hour, and focus groups two hours. The sessions were 
recorded, transcribed, and analysed using the qualitative data analysis programme 
NVIVO. We adopted an abductive research strategy (Blaikie, 2010), whereby the 
analysis started with the language of the participants, from which were derived the 
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categories and concepts that comprise each interpretive repertoire. Interpretive 
repertoires and their subject positions are delineated according to a modified schema 
developed by Dryzek (2005), where for each repertoire we sought to identify: 1) the 
basic entities recognised or constructed, 2) assumptions about natural relationships, 3) 
agents and their subject positions, and 4) key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
(Table 6.2). With respect to point 3, the “agents” we focus on in this study are the key 
government water managers and regulators (in England these are the EA and Natural 
England), farmer irrigators, as well as water and the water environment itself.  
Table 6.2 Checklist of elements for the analysis of interpretive repertoires. Adapted 
from Dryzek (2005). 
Elements of interpretive 
repertoires 
Explanation of each element  
Basic entities recognised 
or constructed 
The ontology of the repertoire – the basic features of the 
world as it relates to farming and water resources 
management 
Assumptions about natural 
relationships 
The defining features that characterise relationships 
between people, things, and processes to do with 
farming and water resources management. In this study 
we give special attention to cooperation* 
Agents and their subject 
positions 
The “actors” involved in water management, including 
water and the water environment, and how they are 
positioned within the storylines associated with the 
different interpretive repertoires 
Key metaphors and other 
rhetorical devices 
The central rhetorical devices an interpretive repertoire 
relies upon to convey its understanding of the world, to 
convince or persuade others of its legitimacy, and to 
make it appear self-evident 
* By cooperation, we mean situations where farmers are working together towards some 
end. In a comanagement situation, this end would be a contribution to one or more of 
the seven broad comanagement activities in Table 6.1.   
Our analysis followed the approach outlined by Edley (2001). It entailed reading and re-
reading the transcripts to thoroughly familiarise ourselves with the data, after which we 
moved on to the coding stage. Initially coding was guided by the four broad categories 
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detailed in Table 6.2. We then read and re-read the excerpts in these broad categories, 
and slowly began to develop secondary categories into which all statements of a similar 
type could be placed. For example, all subject position statements that portray the 
government as a “complicated bureaucracy”. From these secondary categories emerged 
what appeared to be relatively distinct interpretive repertoires, although with further 
readings these too were modified until we arrived at the findings in Section 6.3. This 
approach necessarily entails a degree of reflexivity (Silverman, 2004), where researcher 
and research are involved in a reciprocal relationship. The findings and conclusion are 
therefore situated and partial; they are the result of a process guided and influenced by 
our own life experiences, training, interests, and understandings. 
6.3 Results 
Our analysis of the interview and focus group transcripts revealed that the farmers in 
this study employed three interpretive repertoires when talking about their relationship 
with water managers and the water environment. In this section we detail the three 
repertoires, using excerpts from the transcripts by way of illustration, before proceeding 
to situate them in their wider social and historical context. Figure 1 overleaf portrays the 
relevant dominance of each repertoire. The proportions in this figure are not exact 
measurements, but rather are estimates intended for the purpose of illustration. The 
qualitative nature of the study and the theoretical position we take with respect to 
discourse and discourse analysis does not lend itself to a formal quantitative assessment 
of the data. 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
Figure 6.1 The relative dominance of the three interpretive repertoires 
 
6.3.1 The competition repertoire 
The interpretive repertoire that most dominated the interviews and focus groups is what 
we have called the “competition repertoire”. This repertoire takes a utilitarian approach 
to the water environment, where water management should be about supplying and 
removing water in keeping with the needs of commercial farming, although this process 
tends to get interfered with when other interests get in the way (Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3 The elements of the competition repertoire. 
Basic entities 
recognised or 
constructed 
Assumptions about 
natural 
relationships 
Agents and their 
subject positions 
Key metaphors and 
other rhetorical 
devices 
Competitors 
Homo economicus 
The market 
Individual farm 
businesses 
Competition 
Cooperation as 
business 
opportunity 
Water as 
commodity 
Water environment 
as competition, 
business asset 
Food security 
Mechanistic 
Tidy environment 
/countryside 
 
 
Competition
repertoire
Conflict
repertoire
Compromise
repertoire
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Time and money 
Commodities, 
assets, and 
products 
Rules and 
regulations 
Nature as 
secondary/ 
subordinate 
Relationships 
dictated by rules 
and regulations 
Government 
regulators as 
authority figures, 
complicated 
bureaucracies, 
meddlers 
Farmers as 
individualistic, 
self-interested, 
cost-benefit 
businessmen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic entities recognised or constructed   
The competition repertoire is strongly business oriented, adopting an atomistic view of a 
world populated by economic actors – “Homo economicus” - and individual farm 
businesses geared towards profit and material gain through the market-driven 
production and consumption of commodities. Strictly applied rules and regulations 
concerning water management are a fundamental aspect of this repertoire, as are time 
and money which are recognised as inherent constraints on behaviour. The water 
environment itself receives little recognition as an entity in its own right. 
Assumptions about natural relationships 
According to the competition repertoire the natural world is subordinate to the needs of 
man, where the water environment, when it is recognised, is seen as something to be 
competed with: “In this part of the world our competition is the environment”. 
Competition also characterises the relationship between groups and individuals, where 
different farm businesses compete to secure a share of the market: 
But how the hell you get ten people on a river all to talk to each other […] 
you’ve got to remember that when you get down to individual catchments 
you’re never going to get a farmer to give up any of his [water] rights if his 
neighbour has got all his rights because actually they’re in competition to grow 
their crop for the market place.  
…it’s that looking over the hedge and seeing what they’re doing next door 
situation, which I think we’ll struggle to get away from. 
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Cooperation, on the other hand, is viewed only as a business opportunity, a way of 
becoming more competitive in the market, or even as a business imperative - “its 
business driven” and “there’s got to be a benefit” – but beyond this it is of little use or 
value.  
Agents and their subject positions 
Within the competition repertoire, water is positioned as a “commodity” and a business 
input that can be “tapped” or “mined”. Water therefore becomes a “factor of 
production” that needs to be “secured”, where a farmer may store water “on the basis 
that they have a commodity to sell”, and where even rainwater “is a very variable 
commodity”. Alongside being a competitor, the broader water environment is also 
positioned according to its economic function in a system of government subsidies and 
agri-environment schemes, where “like any other business asset” the consideration 
concerning an area of wetland is “how do I make the most amount of money?” Beyond 
this the water environment has no intrinsic value and receives little recognition: 
“something that is actually worthless is artificially being made worth quite a lot of 
money”. 
Given the strong emphasis the competition repertoire attributes to rules and regulations, 
it is not surprising that the government bodies charged with enforcing the rules 
concerning the water environment – the EA and Natural England - are typically 
positioned as “authority figures”. Perhaps most prominently, the EA is positioned as a 
policeman – “deep down we need a policeman, the EA, to run this” - but other similar 
positions of authority are also present, such as the schoolmaster who can “take your 
name down in the book” or give you a “slapped wrist”. 
A second subject position sees these regulatory bodies as “complicated bureaucracies” 
which tend to be “very fragmented”, making dealing with them “a fraught and really 
time consuming process” because there is “no joined up thinking between different 
departments”. A degree of scepticism may accompany this subject position as it is even 
possible that the EA actively seeks to promote high levels of bureaucracy because “the 
more complicated they make it the more stable their job is”. Furthermore, the subject 
position is associated with unnecessarily high costs when it comes to managing the 
environment, which tends to get “gold plated” so that “costs escalate enormously”. 
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A final subject position for government water managers sees them as “meddlers”, 
interfering in the affairs of agriculture and obstructing it from doing what it is supposed 
to be doing: “farmers are getting pretty fed up with being told what to do [...] they just 
want to get on and do what they do, which is grow crops”. You therefore have Natural 
England “sticking their oar in”, and the perspective that “having dealt with people like 
the EA, I would just dig my heels in and say I’m not going to agree to anything, ah 
because in the past you agree to something, in return for it they’ve taken that away as 
well”.  
In the competition repertoire farmers themselves are positioned as individualistic 
businessmen where decision-making relies upon cost-benefit analyses, where action is 
predicated on whether “the economics make sense”, where “it’s all risk-reward”, and 
where “professionalism” and a “professional approach” are highly valued. In keeping 
with the business-oriented nature of this repertoire, the farming sector as a whole is 
positioned as an “industry”.  
Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices 
Several key metaphors and other rhetorical devices are associated with the competition 
repertoire. The first is that of “food security”, which features prominently and 
underlines the imperative to at least maintain, but ideally increase levels of food 
production in England. As a result farming should not be held back by environmental 
regulation or denied access to the water required to achieve this. The below quote 
effectively outlines the way in which the concept of food security has been adopted 
within the competition repertoire: 
I think the UK as an economy has got some big decisions to make, um you 
know, how much do we want from our home production? How much is home 
production giving us security? You know we’ve had a whole generation 
whereby there’s been a surplus of food. You know we could find the next 
generation, or further down the line supply and demand is much tighter, and 
there’s some difficult questions to actually balance. So I think coming back to 
this, we have to do everything possible to make sure there’s enough water that 
the agricultural industry needs. 
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The competition repertoire also associates strongly with a mechanistic metaphor that 
conceives of the social and natural world in terms of component parts that can be 
manipulated and where solutions to problems require engineered or technical fixes. 
According to this metaphor water becomes an input into the mechanical workings of the 
agricultural industry, where the job of rivers is to act as a “conduit” for transporting, 
supplying, or removing excess water: “Getting rid of water; land drainage and abstraction 
are what you want a river for”. The metaphor extends to farmers themselves, who are 
seen as a “vehicle” for achieving food security, and to cooperation which becomes a 
“mechanism” for acquiring additional water or for trading it. 
A final metaphor is that of the “tidy environment” or countryside, where unkempt 
natural growth is seen as waste or “trash”, as a sign of poor management on the part of 
the environmental regulators and non-governmental groups – “but their ponds aren’t 
clean, so there’s no, there’s no…you know they’re overgrown and whatever” - and as 
obstructing agricultural production, for example where natural growth such as reeds 
becomes problematic because “they are choking the supplies or the [water] courses”.  
6.3.2 The conflict repertoire 
The second of the three interpretive repertoires, the “conflict repertoire”, is founded 
upon a logic of opposition and stresses the place of conflict and difference in water 
resources management (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 The elements of the conflict repertoire. 
Basic entities 
recognised and 
constructed 
Assumptions 
about natural 
relationships 
Agents and their 
subject positions 
Key metaphors and other 
rhetorical devices 
Opponents 
Designated 
environment 
Pressure/lobby 
groups 
Rules and 
regulations 
Conflict 
Winners and 
losers 
Cooperation to 
lobby 
Agriculture as 
secondary in 
relation to PWS 
Water environment 
as threat or 
challenge 
Government as 
having a “different 
agenda” 
Government 
regulators as the 
enemy, incompetent 
Warfare or battle 
Survival 
Court case 
Imbalance 
Brick wall 
/environmental wall 
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and water 
environment 
Farmers as 
wrongfully blamed, 
insular, 
uncommunicative 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
Unsurprisingly, “opponents” are recognised as basic entities in the conflict repertoire. 
Other basic entities recognised are “pressure” or “lobby groups”. Thus, although 
farmers might view each other as opponents, when individuals do join forces the 
resulting group or organisation is itself seen as an individual designed to speak with 
“one voice”. These groups are often pitted against one other, with particular emphasis 
given to the conflict between environmental and farming lobbies. Like the competition 
repertoire, the conflict repertoire also strongly recognises “rules and regulations”, but 
unlike the competition repertoire which sees rules and regulations as a hindrance, but 
nonetheless something to work with in a quest to maximise profit, the conflict repertoire 
sees them as a threat and a direct challenge, as something to be overcome. Finally, in 
the conflict repertoire the water environment is recognised, but only as particular areas 
of the countryside that have received an environmental designation: “…and suddenly 
there was this thing that was quite important and what used to be a muddy, wet reed bed 
has now got environmental protection”. 
Assumptions about natural relationships 
In the conflict repertoire relationships between both people and groups are predicated 
upon a logic of opposition, where change is seen as the result of the coming together of 
different or opposing forces, resulting in winners and losers: “Now is the time and the 
opportunity to influence the process, and if we sit back at this point and say well let’s 
see what they produce, then I think we could be the losers again”. In this context 
cooperation is undertaken “because of the threat of losing what we’ve got” and as such 
lobbying is considered the basic relational feature between farmers and government 
bodies: “…we’re in there to lobby, we’re not in there to necessarily do what the EA 
wants us to do”. Finally, agriculture is considered to be secondary, to “play second 
fiddle” to the needs of both the environment and public water supply because of the way 
in which the rules and regulations appear to unfairly favour these other interests. 
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Agents and their positions 
In the conflict repertoire the water environment is positioned as a challenge or “threat” 
that “overruns the interests of agriculture”, throwing up “problems to sort out”. As is 
also typical of the oppositional nature of this repertoire, government regulators are 
positioned as having a “different agenda” to that of farming. According to the conflict 
repertoire, government regulators and managers assume the position of “the enemy” – 
“...you know the Agency is the enemy, and you do not contact the Agency, not even on 
a last resort, you just do not contact the Agency”. 
Moreover, blame is a regular feature of the repertoire, where farmers position 
themselves as being wrongfully “blamed for everything” when it comes to damage 
inflicted upon the water environment. Instead, the EA and Natural England are often 
themselves positioned as being at fault because of their incompetence and general 
inability to manage water resources and the natural environment in the “correct” way: 
“The problems with the SSSI [site of special scientific interest] are not our problems. 
We’ve changed what we’re doing, if you’ve got a problem in there then look at your 
management”. In part the blame attributed to these bodies arises because they may be 
focusing on the “wrong” issues, such as an environmental problem which lies outside of 
a designated area, whilst at the same time failing to properly manage the areas that have 
been designated: “…so they get quite excited by minor things, whereas to me they 
should be managing their sites better”. In the conflict repertoire, alongside being 
wrongfully blamed, farmers are also positioned as insular – “If you don’t want 
additional water, you’ve got enough of what you want, you’re quite happy being in your 
little bubble and staying protected” – and uncommunicative: “I mean farmers don’t talk 
to each other, that’s one of the problems”. 
Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices   
The dominant metaphor around which the conflict repertoire revolves is that of 
“warfare” or “battle” - with the positions of water managers outlined in the previous 
section already attesting to this - and the notion that farmers are “fighting for survival” 
in the current political and economic climate. Indeed, the interviews were peppered with 
allusions to the warfare metaphor. For example, communicating with the EA was 
considered to be putting your “head above the parapet”; helping out a non-group 
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member was “going above and beyond the call of duty”; offering an early voluntary 
agreement to the EA to reduce agricultural water use in a catchment was described as a 
“pre-emptive strike”; intervening in disputes between other farmers was “stepping into 
the firing line”; farmers operating in water-stressed catchments were “on the front line”; 
prospective abstractor group members needed to be “captured” and then “marshalled”; 
farmer cooperation was seen to be the result of having your “backs against the wall”; for 
one farmer, reporting back to other farmers about the outcome of a meeting with the EA 
involved making “a phone call back to base [to tell] the troops about it”; and it was 
suggested that “we shall go to war over water, never mind oil”. 
Another metaphor associated with the conflict repertoire is that of the court case, which 
serves to illustrate dealings with regulators within the current system of governance. 
According to this metaphor communication, primarily between farmers and government 
regulators, is seen as a means of dispute resolution between two opposing parties. The 
metaphor also serves to reinforce the discourse’s notion of blame, and, in the case of 
farmers, wrongful blame, which must be defended against by “getting the evidence 
together” and putting forward your case: “It’s almost like law case history isn’t it, you 
know you’re good when you’re young but when you’ve been in case history for fifteen 
years you’re even better because you’ve got all these cases you can refer to, and it’s that 
sort of build-up of knowledge isn’t it, of experience”. 
A key rhetorical device associated with the conflict repertoire is that of “imbalance” and 
its two associated metaphors, a set of “weighing scales” and a “swinging pendulum”. 
According to these metaphors, the current system of governance is unbalanced, having 
swung “too far” away from the needs of agriculture and in favour of the environment. 
To this extent, “some of its gone so far the wrong way you’re never ever going to get it 
back again”. The result is a system which has become “irrationally” biased in its 
protection of water resources and the water environment. Farmers must therefore lobby 
and “shout as one voice” so as to secure their “fair share of water”, and to “defend” their 
rights in the face of another of the repertoire’s metaphors, the “environmental wall” or 
“brick wall”, where the job of lobbying is to “keep chipping away”. 
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6.3.3 The compromise repertoire 
The final interpretive repertoire, the “compromise repertoire”, was the least prominent 
of the three identified in the interviews and focus groups. Whilst continuing to stress the 
interests of agriculture, this repertoire is more accepting than the other two, 
conceptualising water management as a process of balancing the various needs of the 
different stakeholders who use water; a process which includes accounting for the needs 
of the water environment itself (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 The elements of the compromise repertoire. 
Basic entities 
recognised or 
constructed 
Assumptions 
about natural 
relationships 
Agents and their 
subject positions 
Key metaphors and 
other rhetorical 
devices 
Finite resources 
Wider environment 
Stakeholders 
A changing world 
Complexity and 
uncertainty 
Negotiation, 
dialogue, and 
compromise 
Different needs all 
with a valid claim 
Cooperation as 
compromise 
Flexibly applied 
rules 
Water as precious 
resource 
Water environment 
as something to be 
enjoyed 
Environment 
Agency as flexible 
regulator 
Farmers as more 
outward looking 
The big picture 
Holistic approach 
Jigsaw puzzle 
Negotiating table 
Water resources as 
bank account 
Wise use of water 
Balancing act 
Basic entities recognised or constructed 
The compromise repertoire gives explicit emphasis to the limits of nature and its “finite 
resources”: “…there’s only one lot of water, it’s as simple as that”. Furthermore, unlike 
the other two repertoires which only recognise the water environment in terms of its 
relationship to productive agriculture, the compromise repertoire also recognises the 
“wider environment” and makes reference to the existence of ecosystems. To some 
degree, the repertoire also recognises that change, uncertainty, and complexity are 
fundamental aspects of the world. Finally, the compromise repertoire constructs those 
with an interest in the use or management of the water environment as “stakeholders”. 
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Assumptions about natural relationships  
The compromise repertoire accommodates the needs of a range of actors, including the 
water environment itself, where all are seen as having a valid claim to use water. As 
with the conflict repertoire there is an emphasis on the issue of balance, but although 
tensions exist the relationships between farmers and the other actors involved in water 
management are considered to proceed by way of negotiation and compromise, and not 
direct opposition or blame: “So it is that balance between the two, and there will be 
conflict. You know you’ve got to resolve the conflict by balance. No one’s all right”. It 
is therefore a case of being able to “acknowledge each other’s problems and 
requirements”. In this light, cooperation itself is seen as a means of facilitating dialogue 
and allowing for compromises to be reached both within the farming community and 
between farmers and water managers under a more flexibly applied system of rules and 
regulations:   
I think we’ve never had a better framework to work under, so now I think it’s up 
to the various stakeholder groups to make sure this is worked through in a 
workman-like way, in a way that recognises the needs of the different kinds of 
water users, including the ecology. 
Actors and their positions 
In the compromise repertoire the water environment is positioned as something whose 
significance extends beyond its relationship to agricultural production, as something 
also to be enjoyed, with the result that there is value in trying to conserve and maintain 
it. Due to its finite nature water itself is positioned as a “precious resource” which must 
be used judiciously: “the wise use of a precious resource”. In contrast to the other 
repertoires, the EA was positioned as a “flexible regulator”. Part of the EA’s flexibility 
stems from the fact they are more “genuinely independent than they were” whereas 
before they were “really under the hammer of Natural England”. In this repertoire the 
EA have a “much more balanced approach” where their officers on the ground seem “a 
bit less red-taped” and where “there’s been a huge sea change of sort of cooperation” 
and “a real sense of having to work together”. Finally, according to the compromise 
repertoire farmers themselves are positioned as “more outward looking”, where 
“cooperation is in their vocabulary more than it ever used to be”. 
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Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices  
A few key metaphors are central to the compromise repertoire. The first is “the big 
picture” which is closely related to having a “holistic approach” to water management: 
“the bigger holistic picture”. According to these devices there is a breaking down of 
some of the perceived barriers between farming, the water environment, and its 
management: “Some people say we must divorce environmental issues from irrigation, 
irrigation sits on its own; no it doesn’t, irrigation is using a resource which is a very key 
part of the ecology forever, you know of our wider environment. And water is such an 
important part of the wider environment, and so important to other sectors of the 
community, that I think we have to engage holistically, as they say these days”.  
A recognition of the bigger picture also draws attention to how this picture is 
comprised, and here the use of the “jigsaw puzzle” metaphor becomes relevant, where 
cooperation is envisaged as helping to piece the puzzle together: “…what [water] they 
don’t use and what they’d like to use is a huge jigsaw, which none of us have any ideas 
of the pieces really, and the group is there largely, to begin with anyway, to fit some of 
those jigsaw pieces together. So we have a picture of what...I don’t think even the EA 
have that knowledge. They have certain knowledge, but they certainly don’t have the 
whole picture”. 
A metaphor associated with the compromise repertoire that serves to illustrate the finite 
nature of water as conceived of in the discourse is “water resources as a bank account”. 
According to this metaphor, water is “a bit like money”, where surface water flowing in 
rivers is analogous to a “current account” in which “the water’s flowing past and you 
either use it or you don’t”, and where groundwater is akin to a “savings account” where 
“once the summer starts, as a general rule no more water is going to be added to that, 
that’s it, that’s your stock, and we’re all drawing off it. So if we all draw off it at a lower 
rate then it will last longer for everybody”.  
6.4 Discussion 
Having identified three interpretive repertoires – the competition, conflict, and 
compromise repertoires – here we discuss what they imply about the potential for water 
abstractor groups (and other farmer collaborations) in England to comanage water 
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resources. During the analysis, the consideration of interpretive repertoires and their 
respective subject positions revealed to us how on the one hand “meaning making” and 
the exercise of power is bound up in the local dynamic of the interpersonal exchange, as 
positions were negotiated and arguments were rhetorically constructed by the 
participants. Yet, as discussed in Section 6.2, our intention in this study is to focus not 
on the local dynamics of language in use but to gain an understanding of what the 
interpretive repertoires and subject positions we identify tell us about levels of trust and 
the broader ideological context in which irrigators operate. As we noted, each repertoire 
can be thought of as an historical resource that the farmers drew upon during the course 
of the interview or focus group (Edley, 2001). Thus, in concerning ourselves with what 
the three repertoires imply about a broader ideological power structure, it is useful to 
consider the historical processes they most directly relate to.  
Briefly then, the competition repertoire is perhaps best situated in light of the system of 
rationalised and individualistic large-scale farming the emerged after World War II in 
England, during which time there was a huge drive to increase food production through 
an efficient, competitive, and technologically sophisticated farming sector (Newby, 
1979; Brassley et al., 2012). The “productivist” ideology underpinning these 
developments has continued to hold sway over many farmers as food production has 
become increasingly integrated into a vertical, corporation-dominated supply chain; 
mirroring broader developments on the world stage (Mazoyer and Roudart, 2006; 
Lobley and Winter, 2009). Alternatively, the roots of the conflict repertoire may lie in 
the wide-ranging dispute between farmers and environmentalists during the 1960s and 
70s - many concerning the reclamation of wetlands – engendering deep feelings of 
resentment and mistrust on both sides of the divide (Cox and Lowe, 1983; Lowe et al., 
1986). Then from 1989 the formation of a new body, the National Rivers Authority, 
which in 1996 became the Environment Agency, quickly established itself as a figure of 
contempt for many irrigators as new water resources legislation was implemented 
uncompromisingly and without regard for the affect it would have on farming (Hamett, 
2013). The conflict repertoire has most likely been reinforced by the increasing distance 
and mistrust that has come to characterise the relationship between farmers (and the 
wider public) and the government (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008).  
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Finally, the compromise repertoire reflects developments which stem from international 
discourses championed in particular by the UN through such agreements as the Aarhus 
convention and Agenda 21, which promotes integrated water resources management 
“based on an approach of full public participation” (UNCED, 1992: para 18.9). These 
outputs have been translated into key EU water legislation, most notably the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) which was introduced in England in 2000. The WFD has 
in turn prompted the introduction of the Catchment Based Approach in England during 
2013, espousing the value of collaboration and partnership working (DEFRA, 2013b). 
It was clear from our analysis that especially the competition repertoire, but also the 
conflict repertoire, were dominant in the talk of the farmers we interviewed (Figure 1). 
This dominance is reflected in the way the repertoires have solidified into the 
institutional and organisational practices of these farmers (see Section 2.2), witnessed 
by their involvement in large-scale commercial farming (the competition repertoire) and 
their participation in water abstractor groups with a strong lobby focus (the conflict 
repertoire). One important consequence of this dominance concerns the subject 
positions both repertoires provide for government water managers, which suggests they 
are viewed by these farmers with a distinct lack of trust. Given the importance attributed 
to trust in developing comanagement arrangements (Olsson et al., 2004; Plummer, 
2006), this represents a significant challenge to partnership building. Furthermore, the 
positions that the competition and conflict repertoires hold for water and the water 
environment, as well as many of the basic entities they recognise and their assumptions 
about natural relationships (Tables 3 and 4), points to inherent difficulties when 
considered in light of a comanagement approach.  
In the case of the competition repertoire,  the focus is on rational self-interest and farm 
profit, with an instrumental, rule-governed conception of natural relationships based 
primarily on the notion of competition, and a portfolio of subject positions that depicts 
government water regulators and managers as “authority figures”, “fragmented 
bureaucracies”, and “meddlers”; farmers as “individualistic”; water as a “commodity” 
or input for the mechanical workings of agriculture; and the water environment either as 
“competition” or as an economic resource or “business asset” in a system of 
government subsidies and agri-environment schemes. The competition repertoire 
therefore points to government rules, regulations, and incentives as the only real way of 
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encouraging farmer participation in the management of water, where the pursuit of 
wider environmental objectives must be married with short-term gain. More challenging 
still, the conflict repertoire - characterised as it is by a strong oppositional logic and the 
positioning of government regulators as “the enemy” and the water environment as a 
“threat” - instead serves to obstruct any opportunity for constructive, pluralistic 
dialogue and a more cooperative, local approach to water management.  
It is only in relation to the less dominant and more recent compromise repertoire that 
real opportunity for cooperation between farmers and water managers appears to exist. 
Although the compromise repertoire continues to stress the interests of agriculture, it 
also makes room for an approach to water management which appreciates the needs of 
others and perceives negotiation, dialogue, and compromise as a necessary part of the 
process of piecing together the “jigsaw puzzle”. Within the compromise repertoire the 
EA is positioned as a “flexible regulator”, where at times rules may be applied as 
circumstances dictate. Farmers themselves are positioned as “more outward looking”. 
The repertoire also recognises the “wider environment”, and positions water as a 
“precious resource” which must be used wisely. However, despite our focus on the 
broader ideological aspects of the three interpretive repertoires, here we must also 
consider how repertoires are employed during the local interplay of social interaction. 
To this extent, the compromise repertoire must also be seen as a discursive resource 
which the participants drew upon because of its rhetorical power – a means of 
challenging others or defending one’s position in the course of the conversation - and 
not because it is a true reflection of the “intentions” of the person uttering it.  
Nonetheless, the presence of the compromise repertoire in the talk of the farmers in this 
study suggests that the power of the other more established repertoires has been and is 
being challenged as the “discursive space” (Wetherell, 2001) surrounding water 
management in England is expanded to allow for more pluralistic and cooperative 
approaches to affecting change. A central challenge to developing comanagement 
arrangements between farmer groups and water managers will be to move beyond the 
subject positions associated with the competition and conflict repertoires that currently 
undermine trust and act as obstacles to partnership building. To this extent Berkes 
(2007: 26) suggests that “the key may be the ability of comanagement arrangements to 
facilitate a process of communication to overcome these barriers”. This highlights the 
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need to bring farmers and water managers together in fora which allow opinions to be 
voiced and differences to be discussed. As our findings suggest, both the competition 
and conflict repertoires demand that short to medium term measures geared towards 
garnering the participation of farmers and farmer groups in such spaces will require 
financial incentives. This points to the funding sources underpinning the various agri-
environment schemes and water programmes in England as a means of achieving such 
an outcome.  
At present the structure of agri-environment payments are geared largely to individual 
action at the scale of the farm or field (Emery and Franks, 2012). However, of the agri-
environment schemes currently available to farmers, one Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme (ESS) option known as HR8 (“Supplement to Group Action”) provides some 
incentive for collective action. HR8, and measures for encouraging “boundary 
spanning” approaches in England more generally, has been discussed by Franks and 
Emery (2013). At present HR8 is geared towards landscape-scale action and the 
protection of biodiversity. Yet the authors underline the importance of maintaining the 
flexibility of the scheme because of the diversity of ways it may need to be applied on a 
case-by-case basis. Such flexibility could make it a potential mechanism for 
incentivising the formation and participation of farmer groups in water comanagement 
activities (see Table 6.1 for potential activities). Given the changing structure of the 
system regulating water resources management (Section 6.2.1), a suitable 
comanagement activity to focus on initially could be water allocation. As we have 
mentioned, the likes of water abstractor groups may be well placed to act as a broker or 
middleman in an enhanced system of water licence trading. Franks and Emery (2013) 
also propose a more ambitious agri-environment programme they call “ESS-Plus”, 
designed specifically to broaden the funding incentives available for promoting 
collaborative management approaches. Such a development would represent an 
opportunity to design schemes specifically tailored toward promoting pluralistic 
approaches that encourage constructive communication between irrigators and water 
managers.  
A second consideration involves the nascent Catchment Based Approach. Funding for 
this programme could go some way to encouraging the likes of water abstractor groups 
to attend catchment meetings and involve themselves more in relevant management 
 160 
 
issues, by at least covering the costs involved for attending. It would also be of use to 
consider ways of combing different programmes and schemes and thus minimising the 
plethora of options farmers are confronted with. For example, cooperative ESS 
initiatives like HR8 could merge with the Catchment Based Approach to channel 
funding sources in a way that promotes comanagement goals. Although such 
suggestions are speculative at present, this only underlines the importance of further 
research and the trialling of pilot studies in order to better understand the feasibility and 
design of approaches that may encourage communication and cooperation between 
farmers, and between farmer groups and water managers. Having developed the 
foundations for a more pluralistic management structure, research suggests that in the 
longer term and given certain conditions of success, it is possible for the comanagement 
process to become self-sustaining. This occurs as power asymmetries shift, new 
institutions and system linkages form, trust is nurtured, different interests are 
recognised, and participants learn to cooperate in order to solve problems and make 
decisions, potentially leading to the emergence of adaptive comanagement (see Section 
2.1) (Olsson et al., 2004; Armitage et al., 2007; Armitage et al., 2009).     
6.5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have used critical discursive psychology to explore the ideological 
context in which water resources management in England is currently being conducted 
from the perspective of farmer irrigators. The intention has been to reflect upon the 
potential for developing comanagement arrangements between farmer groups and water 
managers. The data set consisted of 20 interviews and two focus groups with medium to 
large-scale commercial irrigators who are members of water abstractor groups, or who 
are thinking of forming an abstractor group. Our analysis identified three distinct 
discourses, or “interpretive repertoires”, relating to how these farmers talk about the 
relationship between farming and water resources management, namely the 
competition, conflict, and compromise repertoires. 
The relative dominance of the competition and conflict repertoires in the talk of the 
participants suggests that the relationship between irrigators and water managers in 
England is characterised by low levels of trust, and reflects a power dynamic that 
favours individualism and opposition. This situation presents only limited possibilities 
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for the development of comanagement. In effect, despite signs of a structural move in 
England towards more local and participatory forms of water management, a critical 
analysis of the discourse of these farmers reveals that from a social psychological 
perspective the system more closely represents that which emerged during the second 
half of the 20th Century. At this time a productive, mechanised farming sector stood at 
odds with those concerned with the protection and enhancement of the water 
environment in England. In this respect, these findings support the claim of Burton and 
Wilson (2006) that to more critically understand rural change, research must move 
beyond studies that focus only on macro-level analyses of the political economy by also 
drawing upon the insights that fields such as social psychology can provide. 
Yet our analysis also suggests that this power dynamic is being challenged by the 
compromise repertoire, which accounts for the needs of others, shows an appreciation 
for the wider environment, and views change in water resources management as a 
process of negotiation in which cooperation can perform a useful function. Encouraging 
the widespread adoption and institutionalisation of this repertoire, whilst moving 
beyond subject positions in the other repertoires that at present serve to undermine trust, 
must start with better communication between farmers, and between farmers and water 
managers. The competition and conflict repertoires imply that in the short to medium 
term it will be necessary to encourage comanagement through a focus on and 
restructuring of agri-environment schemes and water programmes. It is useful to think 
of the objectives of such an approach in terms of seven broad comanagement activities 
(Table 6.1). Given current proposals to reform England’s water licencing system in a 
way that facilitates the development of water markets, one activity that appears 
particularly well suited to farmer abstractor groups is water allocation. Here abstractor 
groups could function as trading brokers between group members, thus lowering 
transaction costs. 
In finishing, we might note that a broader research programme concerned with 
understanding the dynamic that exists between farmers and water managers would need 
to incorporate the discourse of farmers outside of water abstraction, including smaller-
scale farmers, as well as water managers. In this respect we see this study as a useful 
early contribution to a critical approach for analysing the relationship between farmers 
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and water management in England, one which we hope will encourage others to do the 
same. 
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Chapter 7: Case Study Analysis 
Prologue 
The paper in this chapter (Paper 5) represents the final phase of the research (Phase 
3). By integrating the findings from the contextual analyses that comprise Phase 2, this 
chapter provides a practical demonstration of how the politicised IAD Framework can 
be applied to (adaptive) comanagement. It therefore complements the theoretical 
discussion in Chapter 2, and in so doing completes Objective 1 of the research agenda. 
At the same time, it also address Objective 4, which is concerned with the mechanisms 
that generate comanagement under the conditions specified in Phase 2, and the 
implications for farming and water governance in the future. This paper is under 
review by the journal Ecology and Society. 
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Paper 5 - Using the politicised IAD Framework to 
analyse (adaptive) comanagement: Farming and water 
resources in England 
Luke Whaley and Edward K. Weatherhead 
 
Abstract 
The challenge of managing water resources in England is becoming increasingly 
complex and uncertain, a situation reflected in many countries around the world. 
Cooperative and participatory forms of governance are now seen as one way of 
addressing this challenge. We investigate this assertion by focusing on five farmer 
irrigator groups in the low-lying east of England. The groups’ relationship with water 
resources management is interpreted through the lens of comanagement, which over the 
last decade has increasingly merged with the field of adaptive management and related 
concepts that derive from resilience thinking and complex adaptive systems theory. 
Working within a critical realist paradigm, our analysis is guided by the politicised IAD 
Framework. Two previous studies concerned with the broader context surrounding 
farming and water governance in lowland England reveal low levels of trust between 
farmers, and between farmers and water managers, as well as a power dynamic that 
stands in the way of farmer cooperation and participation. Within this context, the 
findings of this study point to a number of mechanisms that appear to generate 
comanagement. Of these mechanisms, institution building through the specific group 
strategy of adopting a company structure, and the stationarity of the resource group 
members extract from, were seen to be the most crucial. These and other key findings 
are used to inform a discussion of farming and water resources management in England 
going forwards. In doing so, we also reflect upon the relationship between 
comanagement and market-based approaches to managing water resources. Beyond this, 
the research serves as a practical demonstration of how the politicised IAD Framework 
can be used to analyse potential (adaptive) comanagement situations, and the related 
benefits. The analysis complements a previous submission this journal, where we 
 166 
 
discuss the relationship between the Framework and (adaptive) comanagement from a 
theoretical and methodological perspective.    
Key words: politicised IAD Framework; comanagement; farming; water resources; 
England 
7.1 Introduction 
As a concept, comanagement provides a useful lens through which to interpret 
cooperation and participation in natural resource governance. Not least, it draws 
attention to key features of the process of developing joint management procedures, 
including trust, power sharing, and institution building (Berkes, 2009; Pinkerton, 1989a; 
Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2006; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). The adaptive turn in 
comanagement has provided further advances and has deepened our understanding of 
human-environment relations through its focus on concepts such as social learning, and 
its appreciation of the inherent complexity and uncertainty of coupled social-ecological 
systems (Armitage et al., 2009; Folke et al., 2005; Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2007). 
These developments have shone the spotlight on comanagement as a way of enhancing 
system resilience and adaptive capacity if it evolves to become adaptive comanagement 
(Armitage et al., 2007a; Folke, 2003; Moberg and Galaz, 2005; Olsson et al., 2004a)20; 
traits that will only become more important as the effects of climate change, a shifting 
demography, and changing lifestyle preferences continue to challenge the sustainability 
of natural resource governance (UNEP, 2012). 
However, despite the contributions the field of comanagement has made to 
environmental and natural resource governance, some aspects of the concept remain less 
well explored. In particular, comanagement research has tended to focus on developing-
country contexts, or else on indigenous communities attempting to secure more 
substantive property rights claims to natural resources in developed countries. Far fewer 
studies have explored comanagement in situations where the actors involved are 
economically driven and strongly embedded in capitalist systems of production. 
                                                          
20 Our use of the term “comanagement” in this paper encompasses the concept as originally 
conceived as well as its adaptive counterpart (i.e. “adaptive comanagement”), where the latter 
is seen to be an evolutionary development of the former (Berkes 2009). 
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Furthermore, despite theoretical discussions in the literature, very few studies have 
concerned themselves with the relationship between comanagement and market-based 
forms of natural resource management.  
Beyond these considerations, two methodological issues tend to challenge analyses of 
comanagement (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014). The first concerns the cross-
disciplinary nature of the subject, where comanagement’s traditional social base in 
commons theory and related fields has in more recent times been complemented by 
resilience thinking, which has its roots in the natural sciences. The second, and perhaps 
more significant issue relates to the fact that the vast majority of comanagement 
research focuses on and works towards the development of the normative concepts 
associated with the subject. In contrast to this, far fewer studies adopt critical forms of 
analysis to investigate these concepts. With respect to work on social resilience and 
natural resource management, Wilson (2010) observes that those studies that do tend 
not to exhibit the same rigour as studies that proceed upon more normative lines. 
In this paper we offer a contribution to these relatively underdeveloped aspects of 
comanagement theory and method. We address the theoretical considerations through 
an analysis of farmer irrigator groups - known as “water abstractor groups” – in 
England. Here we explore the potential for these collaborations to comanage water 
resources in conjunction with statutory water managers, by identifying key factors of 
success as well as deeper causal “mechanisms” that appear to generate comanagement. 
The research comes at a time when the UK Government is looking to instigate a more 
fluid system of water rights trading in England. This provides an opportunity to 
consider the contribution of abstractor groups to the comanagement of water resources 
within a market-based context. To guide our analysis we have adopted a version of the 
Institutional analysis and Development (IAD) Framework, originally developed by 
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 2005, 2011), but 
which has been modified by Clement (2010) to incorporate a critical consideration of 
the role of power in natural resource governance. In an earlier paper published in this 
journal (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014) we discussed the suitability of applying this 
framework to studies of (adaptive) comanagement because of the way in which it is able 
to address the methodological issues outlined above. In particular, the politicised IAD 
Framework facilitates a structured and consistent approach to analysing the “many faces 
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of comanagement” (Berkes, 2009), whilst advocating for a range of analytical methods 
designed to provide an integrated and critical understanding of the normative concepts 
associated with comanagement theory.  
This study therefore provides an opportunity to move beyond our initial theoretical 
discussion of the relationship between (adaptive) comanagement and the politicised 
IAD Framework, and to demonstrate its applicability from a practical perspective. Our 
analysis represents the culmination of a research programme investigating farmer 
cooperation and participation in English water governance, which centres on the 
adoption of the politicised IAD Framework. Therefore, the analysis also provides 
insights to issues currently affecting water management in England. Moreover, it is 
likely that our findings are of relevance to those attempting to establish comanagement 
processes in other developed-country contexts with similar conditions.         
7.2 Water abstractor groups in England 
Unlike many other countries, where agriculture is often the dominant water use, in 
England irrigation only accounts for around 1.5% of the total volume of water 
abstracted annually. It is used to supply high value crops on a land area of roughly 150 
000 hectares (Weatherhead, 2006; Woods, 2000). Nonetheless, in agriculturally 
intensive regions like the low-lying eastern counties of East Anglia and Lincolnshire, 
irrigation can account for up to 70% of water abstracted in some catchments during the 
summer months (Holman and Trawick, 2011). As a response to developments in water 
and environmental regulation which placed new boundaries on water use in agriculture, 
since the 1990s a number of farmer “water abstractor groups” have formed, with the 
general aim of defending their rights to access a “fair share of water”.  
Over time, however, it has become clear that acting collectively brings additional 
benefits both to the members of the group and to the government. Leathes et al. (2008) 
discussed the institutional capacity of four of these groups to defend their rights to 
abstract water for irrigation. Beyond this reactive function the authors also ask if there 
isn't a role for abstractor groups in water management more generally. The role of 
abstractor groups in water management is also a question that has not escaped the 
attention of the Environment Agency (EA) - the regulating body in charge of managing 
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England's water environment - who for example find it easier to deal with a coherent 
group than numerous individuals (EA, n.d. a). Although currently only a small number 
of abstractor groups exist, the likelihood that access to water will become more variable 
and less secure in the future suggests that further groups will form in response to a 
growing number of challenges to irrigated agriculture, particularly in those catchments 
where water is scarce.  
7.3 Methodology 
We adopted an embedded multiple case study approach (Yin, 2009) to analyse the 
structure and function of five farmer water abstractor groups in England. The research 
employed the politicised IAD Framework to guide the various strands of the analysis, 
where in total data was sourced from 25 semi-structured interviews with farmers and 
governmental and non-governmental water managers; two focus groups with farmers in 
catchments to the east and west of the country; an analysis of primary and secondary 
documents relating to water policy and the development of farming and water 
management dating from World War II until the present day; and a literature review. 
This study incorporates and builds upon the findings from two separate analyses 
(Whaley and Weatherhead, 2015a, 2015b, in press), as described below.  
7.3.1 Five case studies 
The five water abstractor groups we analysed are located in the low-lying, and generally 
drier, east of England (Figure 7.1). Our intention was to include in the study the same 
four groups previously analysed by Leathes et al. (2008). After making contact with 
representatives from each of these groups we found one of them (the North 
Northumbrian Water Abstractor Group) was no longer fully functional. The remaining 
three are the Broadlands Agricultural Water Abstractor Group (BAWAG), which 
formed in 1997 and comprises roughly 180 farmer members and 20-30 corporate 
members; East Suffolk Water Abstractor Group (ESWAG), that consists of 
approximately 80 members and which also formed in 1997; and Lincoln Water Transfer 
limited (LWT), which officially formed sometime during the late 1990s. LWT initially 
consisted of 19 members, but over time has been reduced to 14 as several members have 
left and new members have joined. As will become apparent, LWT is somewhat 
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different to the other groups with respect to its involvement in water comanagement. To 
this extent, LWT served as an “extreme case study”, allowing us to explore certain 
factors that give rise to comanagement in their “purer” form (Danermark et al., 2002). 
Alongside these three groups, we included two more. These are the Lark group, which 
is the oldest group in England, having formed in 1991, and consisting of roughly 80 
members (of which approximately 50 hold significant water licences); and the Nar 
group, a nascent organisation comprising roughly 30 farmers that formed on the river 
Nar during 2011. These five groups account for the vast majority, if not all of the active 
water abstractor groups in England (EA n.d. a).  
Figure 7.1 Map of England and Wales showing location of the five water abstractor 
groups included in the study. Blue shading represents areas under the management of 
internal drainage boards (see Section 7.5). Adapted from Venables et al. (n.d.). 
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7.3.2 Applying the politicised IAD Framework 
We analysed the structure and function of the five water abstractor groups and their 
contribution to seven broad comanagement activities (Table 7.1) using the politicised 
IAD Framework (Figure 7.2). The comanagement activities are adopted from Pinkerton 
(1989b). Our approach to employing the Framework follows the process detailed in 
Whaley and Weatherhead (2014). This allowed us to critically analyse normative 
comanagement concepts within the context of the specific case histories of the five 
water abstractor groups. Two of the “exogenous variables” of the politicised IAD 
Framework, the “political economic” and “discourse” variables (see Figure 7.2), were 
analysed in separate studies. In the first study (Whaley and Weatherhead 2015a, in 
press), we employed a political economy analysis of farming and water governance in 
England from World War II until the present day. In the second study (Whaley and 
Weatherhead 2015b, in press), we used a form of discourse analysis called critical 
discursive psychology to analyse the ways in which farmers talk about water resources 
management, water managers, and the water environment in England. Both analyses 
served to highlight how context, power, and levels of trust fundamentally influences the 
ability of farmers to comanage water resources in England. A discussion of the findings 
of each study is provided in the results section.  
Table 7.1 Seven comanagement activities. Adapted from (Pinkerton 1989b). 
Comanagement activities 
1         
Data 
gathering 
and 
analysis 
2  
Logistical 
decisions 
such as who 
can abstract 
water and 
when 
3  
Water 
allocation 
decisions 
4  
Protection of 
resource from 
environmental 
damage 
5 
Enforcement 
of 
regulations 
6 
Enhancement 
and long-term 
planning 
7  
Broad 
policy 
decision 
making 
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Figure 7.2 The politicised IAD Framework, with the two variables that have been 
analysed in separate studies shaded in grey. Adapted from Clement (2010). 
 
Working within a critical realist paradigm (Bhaskar, 1979; Danermark et al., 2002; 
Sayer, 1992), a core concern of the research was to identify the generative mechanisms 
that allow farmer abstractor groups to comanage water resources, within the broader 
contextual conditions we identify in the previous two studies. This entailed using the 
politicised IAD Framework to firstly identify more concrete “factors of success” that 
appear to link the water abstractor groups to comanagement, and then to make 
inferences about what these factors suggest about relatively abstract generative 
mechanisms operating at a deeper, more conceptual level (see Bhaskar 1975). Examples 
of these generative mechanisms in the comanagement literature include “trust building”, 
“problem solving”, and “social learning” (Berkes, 2009). The relevance of each 
mechanism to a comanagement outcome was decided by employing three strategies put 
forward by Danermark et al. (2002), namely counterfactual thinking, a comparative case 
study approach, and, as mentioned in Section 7.3.1 above when discussing the LWT 
group, the use of an extreme case study. The interactions and outcomes of each case 
study were evaluated using three related transaction costs, namely information, 
organisational, and strategic costs (Imperial, 1999). We also evaluated the ways in 
which the cases did or did not contribute to the overall adaptability, efficiency, and 
equity of water management, as outlined in Ostrom (2005).  
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Following the analysis, we considered the implications of our findings for water 
resources management in England going forwards. This involved making assumptions 
about likely changes to the exogenous variables of the politicised IAD Framework – and 
thus the context of water management – in the future. Given the complexity of natural 
resource management, it is not possible to make strong predictions as to future 
interactions and outcomes. Yet, as Polski and Ostrom (1999: 24-25) note: “When 
examining these more open, less constrained situations, a policy analyst is forced to 
make weaker inferences about patterns of interaction. However, well-informed weak 
inferences can still provide important policy information”. The IAD Framework is a 
powerful tool of making well-informed inferences about the behaviour of a system 
because of the integrated, comprehensive, and context-specific approach it encourages 
the analyst to adopt (Whaley and Weatherhead, 2014). 
7.4 Results 
First we provide an overview of the findings of our investigation into the five 
exogenous variables of the politicised IAD Framework as they apply generally to all 
five case studies. We summarise the main findings from the analyses of the political-
economic and discourse variables, explored in the two previous studies (Whaley and 
Weatherhead, 2015a, 2015b), before considering the remaining three exogenous 
variables, namely the biophysical-material, rules, and community variables. 
7.4.1 Political-economic and discourse variables 
The political-economic variable was investigated by employing an approach known as 
the “Power Cube” (Gaventa, 2006a, 2006b). This was used to analyse the development 
of the system governing farming and water management in England from World War II 
until the present day. Doing this revealed how different forms of power, operating in 
different types of spaces, and at different levels of governance, has come to shape the 
current dynamic among farmers, as well as between farmers and water managers. The 
analysis revealed that the system of industrial agriculture that developed after World 
War II in England resulted in an occupational identity for farmers that revolves around 
individualism, competition, and a desire to maximise production, often at the expense of 
the environment. In part this sense of identity, or power “within” (Veneklasen and 
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Miller, 2002), has been maintained by the corporate agricultural supply chain and the 
structure of the global food system, which exert considerable downward pressure on 
farmers. These findings suggest that notions of participation, cooperation, and wider 
environmental concern are marginal considerations for many farmers in England today, 
especially in the low-lying east of the country where large-scale, mechanised farming 
dominates (Holderness 1985, Marsden et al. 1993).  
The analysis also charted the rise of water abstractor groups, who, as mentioned above, 
started to form in the 1990s in order to defend their rights to abstract water. At the same 
time, legislation emanating from Europe, influenced by international conferences and 
conventions, has resulted in greater opportunity for farmers to participate in water 
management at the local catchment and sub-catchment levels. This suggests that there is 
the potential for water abstractor groups to undertake a more proactive management 
role, despite their reactionary beginnings. Given the barriers to farmer cooperation and 
participation that the paper identified, it was suggested that this opportunity to develop 
comanagement “could be enhanced through greater integration of government 
programmes and a channelling of funding sources”.  
We investigated the discourse variable of the Framework by employing critical 
discursive psychology (Edley, 2001) to analyse the ways in which irrigators in England 
talk about water management, water managers, and the water environment. Three 
different discourses, or “interpretive repertoires” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), were 
identified, namely the “competition”, “conflict”, and “compromise” repertoires. The 
competition repertoire was the most dominant of the three, whilst the compromise 
repertoire was by far the least dominant. The competition repertoire embraces strong 
business values and takes a utilitarian approach to the water environment. According to 
this repertoire, farmer cooperation and participation in water governance is only 
considered of any use if it makes sense from an individual business perspective. The 
conflict repertoire, which is “founded on a logic of opposition and stresses the place of 
conflict and difference in water resources management,” serves to largely obstruct the 
comanagement process.  
On the other hand, the less prominent compromise repertoire provided more scope for 
farmer cooperation and participation in water governance as it recognises the value of 
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the wider water environment and views water resources management as “a process of 
balancing the various needs of the stakeholders who use water”. The analysis 
highlighted the importance of improving communication between farmers, and between 
farmers and water managers in order to move beyond the productivist and conflict 
repertoires, and to instead nurture a more widespread adoption of the compromise 
repertoire. 
Each interpretive repertoire has a number of “subject positions” (Davies and Harre, 
1990; Harre et al., 2009) associated with it, which relate to the various actors involved 
in water governance. One outcome concerning the dominance of the productivist and 
conflict repertoires is “attributed to the subject positions both repertoires provide for 
governmental and non-governmental water managers, which suggest that relationships 
between farmers and water managers are characterised in large part by a distinct lack of 
trust”. The paper concluded that, given the importance comanagement places on the 
development of trust (Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2004; Plummer, 2006), “this 
represents a significant challenge to partnership building”. 
Both the political-economic and discourse variables most affect the “position” element 
of the action situation. They also influence the norms and values of participants in these 
situations (see Whaley and Weatherhead 2014). Given the findings of the two studies, 
we concluded that the dominant norms of the farmers in this research programme are 
likely to be those of competition, business operating procedures, conflict, and non-
participation, whilst the values they place on water management outcomes will tend to 
revolve mostly around profit and business independence, success, and professionalism.  
7.4.2 Biophysical-material, rules, and community variables 
Considering first the biophysical-material variable, a common feature of many 
catchments with a high proportion of irrigation licences is the presence of on-farm 
reservoirs. The biophysical-material variable affects what actions are physically 
possible in an action situation, what outcomes can be produced, how actions are linked 
to outcomes, and what is contained in participants’ information sets (Ostrom, 2005). 
Therefore, having a degree of storage in the system in the form of reservoirs has the 
potential to significantly affect the internal dynamic of the action situation and the 
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incentives participants face. In the discussion we will consider the role of on-farm 
reservoirs in water management going forwards. 
Given that England is a country with strongly enforced formal institutions, we have 
taken the government regulations relating to water management as de facto conditions 
that participants operate under within the action situations we looked at. Many of the 
rules which are of particular relevance relate to the government’s water abstraction 
regime, which is enforced by the EA (see Ostrom 2005: 188-215 for a discussion of the 
types of rules that structure an action situation). In particular, there is a boundary rule 
stating that anybody intending to abstract more than 20m3 of water a day must first 
obtain a licence. The licence itself contains scope rules detailing how much water a 
person or business can take, what they can use the water for, where and when they can 
abstract water, and any minimum flow or level limitations. Breaches of the licence 
conditions may result in financial losses to farmers if they are claimants of the various 
subsidies available through the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, where a proportion 
of the amount normally received can be withheld as a penalty. Continued licence 
transgressions can result in the EA taking legal action through the courts. 
Other rules relating to water resources management include section 57 of the Water 
Resources Act 1991, which states that during periods of water scarcity the EA has the 
power to halt water abstraction for the purpose of spray irrigation. Furthermore, there 
are rules allowing abstractors to trade their licences with one another on a waterbody, 
although to date few trades have taken place. In part this is because of a lack of 
understanding of how to trade, and the time consuming nature of the process (EA/Ofwat 
2009). 
Finally, with respect to the community variable of the Framework, the vast majority of 
farmers we interviewed were white males between the age of 40 and 65.  This is 
unsurprising given that farmers in the UK are predominantly male, with an average age 
of 59 (DEFRA, 2012a).      
Having considered the exogenous variables of the politicised IAD Framework, now we 
discuss the findings from the analysis of the five water abstractor groups detailed in 
Section 7.3.1. As noted above, of these groups, LWT differs substantively from the 
others in terms of its involvement in the comanagement of water resources. Due to this, 
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we have combined the discussion of the remaining four groups, that is, BAWAG, 
ESWAG, the Lark group, and Nar group, and then follow with a more detailed 
consideration of LWT.  
7.4.3 Analysis of four farmer irrigator groups 
Our analysis revealed that the Lark, BAWAG, ESWAG, and Nar abstractor groups 
contributed relatively little to Pinkerton’s seven comanagement activities (Figure 7.3). 
Instead, to differing degrees, the central function of these groups is to lobby for farmers’ 
rights to access water. Yet despite their lobby focus, it has been noticeable that over 
time the groups have developed more proactive tendencies. Perhaps the most notable 
contribution is a shared strategy adopted by several of them to volunteer a reduction in 
their water use during periods of water scarcity. This strategy appears to have been 
adopted in order to avoid a section 57 order (see discussion on “rules” variable above), 
rather than out of any altruistic impulse on behalf of farmers to improve the water 
resources situation in the catchment as a whole. 
Figure 7.3 The combined contribution of the Lark, BAWAG, ESWAG, 
and Nar water abstractor groups to Pinkerton’s seven comanagement 
activities. 
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We also observed evidence of groups encouraging water efficiency measures among 
their membership, conducting resource monitoring, representing farmers in conferences 
and meetings dealing with broader water policy issues, and commissioning studies to 
assess resource conditions in some catchments as well as the value of irrigable 
agriculture to the local economy. Again, these measures have been adopted largely to 
improve the groups’ ability to effectively lobby for farmers’ rights, as well as to 
increase the benefits they gain from irrigation. There is also evidence that at least two of 
the groups were facilitating water trading between members, either through advertising 
of spare water in their periodic newsletters, or through face-to-face communication 
between members at meetings. 
An analysis of the information component of the action situation revealed that group 
members held varying degrees of local time-and-place knowledge, which may 
contribute to water management decision-making. This related to an understanding of 
the distribution of interests and resources within the catchment, local knowledge of the 
resource and its history, current and future water requirements, as well as future 
business practices which may have an impact upon the resource. In contrast, the 
knowledge held by the regulatory agencies stemmed from a scientific approach to 
managing the resource, and focused on a better appreciation of the bigger picture of 
water governance in England. Whilst staff in these agencies also held a degree of local 
knowledge, over time this knowledge-base has been eroded away as staff members have 
retired or have moved on in the many waves of government re-organisation.  
EA and NE officers also held detailed knowledge about water and environmental 
regulation, as well as recent or upcoming changes to these regulations. Interestingly, in 
each case the leader of the abstractor group also held this information to a large degree. 
In two of the groups there was a choice rule (again, see Ostrom, 2005, for a discussion 
on the types of rules and their relationship to the action situation of the IAD 
Framework) instructing the leader of the group to remain up to date with water 
legislation and to attend meetings and conferences where necessary. In both these cases 
this individual received a salary from the group, primarily in order to perform this 
function. 
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Considering the costs and benefits of abstractor groups from a transaction costs 
perspective, it is clear that the biggest benefit to water governance has been a reduction 
in information costs. This is a direct result of enhanced communication channels 
between farmers, and between farmers and water managers. On the other hand, 
coordination costs have tended to increase for the farmers involved, particularly in the 
early stages of group formation. This increase in coordination costs is significant in 
light of the findings from the political-economic variable of the Framework, whereby 
the prevailing power dynamic serves as a barrier to farmer cooperation and participation 
in water governance because of demands on time, as well as a central concern with costs 
and profit. Although we discovered little hard evidence to suggest it occurs, the 
development of abstractor groups opens the door for a number of strategic costs. These 
costs relate to the ability of non-members in the catchment to “free ride” on the group’s 
achievements, and the potential for groups, or even specific individuals within the 
groups, to exert power over other participants in order to achieve purely selfish ends.  
Given that these four groups offer only a minimal contribution to the comanagement 
activities in Table 7.1, we do not discuss their relationship to the more general 
evaluative criteria of adaptability, efficiency, and equity.  
7.4.4 The case of Lincoln Water Transfer limited 
In contrast to the other four water abstractor groups, the Lincoln Water Transfer group 
is a clear example of a case in which farmers have self-organised in order to comanage 
water resources. Given the generally low levels of trust between participants and the 
way in which the current power dynamic in England stands in the way of farmer 
cooperation and participation in water governance (see above), this case represents a 
notable exception. As a result, it is of much interest to identify the key factors that link 
the farmers in this study to a comanage outcome, and causal mechanisms that can be 
inferred from these “factors of success”. Before discussing our findings, below we first 
provide a brief overview of the comanagement scheme that LWT participates in. 
The LWT scheme  
The area where the LWT group operates is characterised by a network of drainage 
ditches from which the members are able to abstract water for irrigation during the 
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growing season. These ditches represent a “ponded” system inasmuch as the water in 
them tends to stand relatively still, making it significantly easier to manage water levels. 
The interconnection of the ditches also means that water can be withdrawn at any point 
in the system. The ditches drain into the oldest canal in England, the Fossdyke canal, 
which connects the river Trent with the river Witham. The drainage ditches are 
managed by an internal drainage board (IDB), which is a body with the jurisdiction to 
manage water levels in certain low-lying areas of England that are most at risk from 
flooding. The LWT group, which is currently comprised of 14 farm businesses 
(originally 19), formally came together in the late 1990s after years of attempting to 
secure additional water for irrigation. A window of opportunity arose when 
improvements were made to the capacity of a water transfer scheme – the “TWA 
scheme” - that carried water from the river Trent via the Fossdyke canal to supply a 
town further downstream. With the upgrade to the TWA scheme it was now possible for 
the group of farmers to request some of this additional capacity supplied from the 
Fossdyke canal to service their own irrigation needs.  
The LWT group shares a single abstraction licence, which they initially divided up 
among themselves according to predicted water demand. Some or all of each member’s 
licence share can then be reallocated within the group either before or during the 
growing season, as circumstances dictate. Although submissions of unwanted water by 
members into a central pool, and requests by members to take water from this pool, are 
managed by the IDB, the group’s board of directors have final say on how the water is 
allocated. This is important in situations where demand for water from the central pool 
outstrips supply. In these situations, it appears the board would employ a pro rata 
approach, where water is allocated to members requesting additional water in 
accordance with their overall licence share. The group also holds a second shared 
licence. This licence allows them to apply for additional water under the TWA scheme 
when water levels in the network of drainage ditches fall too low to allow for irrigation. 
The LWT scheme entails a close working relationship between the abstractor group and 
the IDB, who have taken on the responsibility of administering the system on behalf of 
the group, as well as the EA, who are in charge of transferring additional water under 
the TWA scheme. In order that the IDB can manage water levels accurately, LWT 
members are required to provide weekly returns detailing their water use in the previous 
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week, and an estimation of their water use for the coming week. In time the function of 
the group has evolved. Of particular note, LWT has funded its own programme to 
eliminate the potato brown rot virus, Ralstonia solanacearum, from the watercourses 
where it abstracts. The status of the group has also meant that its leader is invited to 
attend meetings, conferences, and workshops relating to water resources management 
and policy direction in England. Our assessment of the overall contribution the LWT 
scheme makes to water resources management is shown in Figure 7.4. 
Figure 7.4 The relative contribution of the LWT scheme to  
Pinkerton’s seven comanagement activities. 
 
Factors of success and generative mechanisms 
Using the politicised IAD Framework (Figure 7.2), we were able to identify a range of 
factors that appear important to the success of the LWT scheme. Here we consider these 
factors of success in relation to the scheme’s formation, operation, and evolution. The 
factors are categorised according to their relationship to the exogenous variables of the 
politicised IAD Framework (Table 7.2). We also discuss how these factors relate to 
deeper, more abstract mechanisms that can be thought of as generating comanagement, 
as discussed in Section 7.3.2. 
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Table 7.2 Nine factors contributing to the success of the LWT comanagement scheme 
and the generative mechanisms derived from them; displayed in relation to the five 
exogenous variables of the politicised IAD Framework. 
Exogenous variable Factors of success Generative mechanisms 
Rules Formation of limited company 
with members’ agreement and 
protocol 
Shared licence 
“Institution building”, 
“problem solving, and 
“social learning” 
“Institution building” 
Biophysical-material Ponded system of drainage 
channels 
“Stationarity” 
 Access to additional water “Plus-sum game” 
Community  Similar race, age, gender, and 
profession of group members 
“Homogeneity” 
 Small group size “Group size” 
 Presence of a leader “Energy centre” 
Political-economic Relationship between farmers 
and IDB 
“Trust” and          
“bridging organisation” 
Discourse  Greater use of “compromise 
repertoire” 
“Trust building” 
During the formation of the scheme, perhaps the most significant factor stems from the 
rules variable, where the group decided to form a limited company to conduct their 
affairs. This entailed drawing up a members’ agreement and protocol that detail 
members’ rights, conduct, commitments, payments and costs, as well as punitive 
measures for rule infringements. The protocol also details an operating procedure for 
internally allocating water among group members. The agreement and protocol are 
upheld by English law, where serious rule infringements on the part of members, or a 
failure on the part of government officials and other actors to respect the terms of the 
agreement, can result in action being taken in the courts.  
It is clear that adopting a corporate strategy helped the group to overcome the prevailing 
power dynamic and low levels of trust we identified in the previous studies (Whaley 
and Weatherhead 2015a, 2015b, in press) by providing a structure and operating 
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environment which is in keeping with the business orientation of modern farming. It 
also gave the group independent legal status, which greatly assisted with their 
successful application for the two shared water licences. Doing this embedded LWT 
within a macro-institutional structure that supports the group from both a legalistic and 
regulatory perspective, while still providing it with a degree of local autonomy. We can 
therefore conclude that adopting a company structure with related members’ agreement 
and protocol represents a case of “institution building” (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). A 
second factor relating to the rules variable is the joint licence the group holds, which 
facilitates water sharing between members. However, this is perhaps a less significant 
factor because the group’s corporate structure would allow for a similar water-sharing 
dynamic regardless of whether the members’ allocated volume pertained to an 
individual’s own licence or a proportion of a single group licence. 
From a biophysical perspective, the key factor to note is the ponded system of drainage 
ditches the group abstracts from, which relates to the “stationarity” of the resource. 
Stationarity here refers to the mobility of a natural resource such as water, where the 
less mobile the resource is the more stationarity it has (Ostrom et al., 1994). As Ostrom 
et al (1994: 314) discuss, stationarity is important mechanism for developing collective 
action as it “significantly affect[s] appropriators’ incentives and capabilities to devise 
rules because of [its] impact on the type of information available…[stationarity affects] 
the level of reliable information and the costs of obtaining information”. The ability of 
the group to secure water over and above their existing allocation was also an important 
factor as it represents a “plus-sum game”, which is known to promote collaboration 
among water users (Dinar et al., 1997).  
From the perspective of the community variable, commons theory suggests that the 
“homogeneity” of the farmers’ identities in terms of age, race, gender, and profession 
would most likely have assisted group formation (Baland and Jean-Philippe Platteau, 
1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1987). Another key community factor was the presence of 
leadership within the group, which took the form of a new farm business in the area 
with a strong desire to secure additional water for irrigation. The manager of this farm, 
incentivised by the success of his business, functioned as an “energy centre” (Olsson et 
al., 2006; Pinkerton, 1989b) by leading discussions between the parties, in turn driving 
the scheme forward. A final mechanism relating to the community variable is “group 
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size”, where the LWT group is small (14 members) in comparison to many of the other 
groups (where the largest, BAWAG, is comprised of roughly 180 members). 
The political-economic variable draws attention to the IDB’s relationship with the 
farmers and the EA. IDBs have a long history dating back to the medieval period, where 
for much of this history they have shared a strong political and economic alliance with 
farmers and landowners (Purseglove, 1988; Reeves and Williamson, 2000). As a result, 
relatively high levels of trust exist between the IDB and farmers, a factor which was 
clearly of importance in the IDBs decision to take responsibility for administering the 
scheme. Furthermore, we found evidence that the IDB was also well respected by the 
EA for its professionalism and technical knowhow. In this light, the IDB can be 
considered a “bridging organisation”, a role which is often crucial to comanagement 
arrangements because of its importance in building trust and social capital more 
generally, accessing and sharing knowledge, and resolving conflicts (Berkes, 2009). It 
may also be argued that the LWT group itself performs some of the functions of a 
bridging organisation within the scheme when seen in light of the relationship between 
its members and local water managers. Finally, with respect to the discourse variable, it 
was clear during our interviews that particularly local EA staff, but also the farmers we 
spoke to relied more on the “compromise repertoire” (see above for discussion on 
discourse variable) than we found when analysing all but one of the other abstractor 
groups.  The emergence of this repertoire reflects the development of a “trust-building” 
dialogue among the farmers in the group (Folke, 2003; Olsson et al., 2004b). 
As our analysis makes clear, much of LWT’s involvement in collective-choice 
situations has occurred during the scheme’s formation, when the system of rules that 
guides the operational activity of the group, the IDB, and the EA was put in place. This 
process of institution building at the local level helped to overcome low levels of trust 
whilst facilitating the emergence of power-sharing arrangements. Over time, the 
company structure of LWT also appears to have facilitated “problem solving” and 
“social learning” among group members in the face of change and uncertainty. This was 
best illustrated when the group devised additional rules in order to fund the eradication 
of the potato brown rot virus from the drainage ditches they irrigate from. The 
procedure was institutionalised in the members' protocol, and demonstrates that the 
company structure was able to cope with an issue which was potentially divisive, given 
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that some members did not grow potatoes and so faced much less of an incentive to 
expend resources treating the disease. 
Considering the outcomes of the LWT scheme, from a transaction cost perspective it 
appears information costs increase in some respects and decrease in others. In general 
terms, information costs go down as channels of communication open up between 
farmers, and between farmers and water managers, where local time-and-place 
knowledge is able to better complement the scientific knowledge held by the regulator. 
However, information costs also increase for farmers and the IDB with respect to the 
weekly submission and processing of water usage data. Yet this level of communication 
is important not only in that it allows the IDB to correctly manage water levels, but 
because it endows the management system with greater sensitivity to both resource 
conditions and farmer decision-making, meaning it is better prepared to deal with 
change when it occurs. Coordination costs also increased, especially in the early 
development phase as the group self-organised, legal costs for setting up the company 
were incurred, and rules and operating procedures were devised. It appears that these 
coordination costs are a significant factor in the group members’ decision not to take the 
functionality of the scheme any further, given the pressurised economic environment 
that farmers are operating within, as well as their ideological leaning towards 
individualism and competition. We also found anecdotal evidence that an incentive for 
one or more group members to drop out was because they knew they could benefit from 
the additional water and better water level management the scheme brought whilst 
avoiding the costs of being a member. This would represent a case of free riding, 
resulting in greater strategic costs. 
Considering the overall evaluative criteria, we can conclude that the LWT scheme has 
enhanced the adaptability of local water governance in at least two ways. Firstly, the 
establishment of new networks and improved channels of communication between 
farmers and water managers enhances the ability of the system to respond to social-
ecological feedback in a more timely and flexible manner. Secondly, as demonstrated 
by the group’s ability to deal with the case of potato brown rot, the organisational and 
institutional structure of the scheme has helped to develop greater social capital among 
participants and has facilitated their ability to solve problems when they arise. It is very 
unlikely that such an outcome to the potato brown rot threat could have been achieved 
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without the presence of the group. Therefore, despite a lack of interest in developing the 
scheme any further at present, it does appear that the institutional structure of the group 
and its relationship with the IDB and EA provides a latent capacity for further action 
and adaptation. 
The scheme has also enhanced economic efficiency, as it allows specialist contract 
growers – an increasingly common feature of farming in England - more flexibility to 
rent land with water to grow and irrigate their crops anywhere across the whole land 
area of the group, a useful benefit considering the long crop rotations required for 
disease control for some of these crops. However, the scheme is unlikely to maximise 
economic efficiency due to the non-competitive nature of the group’s water allocation 
system. This sharing system prohibits members from bidding for water in such a way 
that, according to economic theory, it would go to its highest value use (Keohane and 
Olmstead, 2007). It is however possible to conceive of a similar scheme that instead 
adopted a competitive bidding system in order to allocate water. From a water use 
perspective, the scheme also appears to be more efficient than if each farmer held an 
individual abstraction licence proportional to their current share of the group’s joint 
licence. This was demonstrated when the group’s licence came up for renewal in 2010. 
At this time, several of the members handed back some of their licence share to the EA, 
resulting in a reduction to the overall licence volume. The reasons given for this were 
that these members felt confident that if they needed additional water they could apply 
for it within the group, because of the added security the scheme provides. This mindset 
differs from the standard situation in England, where irrigators typically only use 
around half of their licenced volume but hold on to a large amount of “headroom” for 
security. Finally, the scheme demonstrated high levels of equity – in terms of fiscal 
equivalence - with financial costs to members being equivalent to the benefits they 
enjoyed in terms of licence share. Again, this dynamic was institutionalised in the 
members’ agreement and protocol.   
7.5 The findings in their wider context 
Of the factors and more abstract generative mechanisms identified in Table 7.2, the 
following will be taken further by considering their relevance in the context of water 
resources management in England more generally: 1a) the stationarity of the resource, 
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1b) the formation of a limited company with a clearly defined and legally binding 
members’ agreement and protocol 1c) the role of the IDB as a bridging organisation and 
scheme administrator, 1d) a plus-sum game, where the farmers involved have the 
opportunity to acquire additional water over and above their existing allocation.  
Looking to the future, we can also make several informed inferences about changes to 
the exogenous variables of the Framework. These are: 2a) the biophysical-material 
variable: water supply will become more variable and less secure, with water scarcity 
becoming more common (EA, 2010a), 2b) the rules variable: the regulatory system 
governing water resources will continue along a direction of increasing liberalisation 
(EA 2010b; DEFRA 2011b, 2013c), and 2c) the political-economic and discourse 
variables: a continued drive towards both the use of economic instruments for managing 
the environment and natural resources, as well as the promotion of greater stakeholder 
participation and cooperation (DEFRA, 2011b, 2012b, 2013b).   
How the factors 1a-1d combine with inferences 2a-2c will be the subject of this 
discussion. We will also reflect on what our conclusions infer for comanagement in 
other countries with similar characteristics to those outlined here.  
Considering point 1a, the stationarity of the resource, draws attention to the benefits of 
developing water storage in catchments where farmers currently abstract from non-
stationary, free-flowing rivers. This would make decisions about resource allocation 
more predictable, in turn making it easier to devise cooperative arrangements (Ostrom 
et al 1994) akin to the LWT model. Furthermore, there is scope for enhancing the 
cooperative aspect of such an arrangement through the development of joint reservoir 
schemes nested within larger catchment-based abstractor groups. A small number of 
joint reservoir schemes already exist in the east of England, and have allowed the 
farmers involved to devise their own operating procedures and allocation rules. 
Interestingly, in one case the three farm businesses have adopted the same shared 
strategy as LWT by forming a limited company. This company separately owns the 
reservoirs and related infrastructure and the water is then sold back to the individual 
members, who have a holding right equivalent to their share of the business.  
There are large parts of eastern England which, like the LWT scheme, are characterised 
by ponded networks of IDB-managed drainage ditches with a high degree of stationarity 
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(Figure 7.1). Furthermore, these regions tend to be prime agricultural land. This 
suggests that there is much scope for encouraging the emergence of water abstractor 
groups in these low-lying areas, and provides an opportunity for IDBs to take on a new 
function as a bridging organisation and administrator in a system of comanagement 
(1c). In recent years the place of the IDBs as they currently exist has come under 
pressure from some angles (Bankoff, 2013; Purseglove, 1988), and a move such as this 
one might ensure their position within water management going forwards.  
It is also important to note that, particularly in the east of England, roughly fifty percent 
of abstraction is from groundwater sources (DEFRA, 2014b). Although water flow 
within aquifers is typically less predictable and controllable than the flow in ponded 
surface systems, here too there is potential for farmers to work together to allocate the 
resource among themselves. In all these cases, successful implementation of the scheme 
would be advanced by the formation of a limited company or similar legal structure, and 
the adoption of a members’ agreement and protocol (1b). As we have discussed above, 
doing so provides a familiar and structured operating environment for farmers to work 
within, which in turn helps to overcome the relatively low levels of trust and a power 
dynamic which currently impedes the participation of farmers in cooperative forms of 
water governance.   
As climatic conditions change and irrigation needs and water availability becomes more 
uncertain (2a), it is likely that these options for enhancing cooperation between farmer 
groups and water managers will become increasingly relevant if, as this paper suggests, 
they are able to enhance the adaptability and efficiency of the system. At the same time, 
the possible emergence of a more liberalised licencing system also has the potential to 
change the relevance of these options (2b). If we are to assume that the government 
continues with its current proposals to further develop a system of water rights trading 
in England, then in contrast to the present system where water users hold a licence that 
details a set quantity of water which may be abstracted, licences might instead become 
linked to the available flow in a given waterbody. The volume of water linked to the 
licence would therefore go up and down as conditions in the river or aquifer change, and 
some or all of the licence could be traded with potential buyers. Agriculture holds by far 
that greatest number of abstraction licences but only uses a small amount of water 
compared to public water supply (approx. 1.5% to 50%) (DEFRA, 2008). This dynamic 
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points towards a future scenario in which many small trades occur between farmers, 
whilst less frequent but much larger trades occur between water companies, or between 
water companies and other sectors. Among other things, this has raised the issue of 
market power, where it is feared that large abstractors, such as the water companies, 
will “outmuscle” the smaller abstractors in a water market.  
This situation suggests there is an opportunity to utilise the strategy of pooling water 
licences and forming a company among a group of agricultural abstractors, where doing 
so has the potential to increase their standing in the market. Our analysis of the other 
four groups has already provided some evidence that abstractor groups have a tendency 
to facilitate trading by acting as a broker between buyers and sellers. By acting 
collectively, each member’s licence quantity would in effect act as a share in the 
company. Here, as with the LWT scheme, fiscal equivalence could be achieved as 
member costs are incurred in proportion to their company share. Furthermore, 
participating in the market to secure additional water is a plus-sum game, which, as 
noted, provides a greater incentive for farmers to act collectively (1d). Having formed a 
company, farmers would have the option to trade their individual licences internally, 
submitting any additional or unwanted water to a central pool, much like the procedure 
used by the LWT group. Alternatively, this internal allocation system could employ a 
competitive bidding/trading process to maximise economic efficiency. However, we 
caution that doing so has the potential to undermine other aspects of the arrangement 
such as the development of social capital, in turn diminishing the adaptability of the 
system. Any of the central pool which is not taken up by members of the group may 
then be aggregated and traded with other players in the market. A collective approach 
such as this would have the advantage of providing flexibility of water use within the 
agricultural sector, whilst giving farmers greater security and a firmer standing in 
trading situations with bigger players in the market.  
The UK government is currently only intending to develop water markets in those 
catchments where trading would bring tangible benefits (Defra, 2013c). In part this is 
because instituting a new regulatory system is a resource-intense process. This would 
suggest that, where possible, it would be better not to implement such changes if it can 
be avoided. Again, especially in the IDB-controlled ponded systems to the east of the 
country (Figure 7.1), adopting schemes akin to the LWT model would save on the need 
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to undertake wholesale changes, whilst bringing the range of potential benefits we 
identified. Developments of the sort outlined in this discussion fit well with the 
changing political and discursive landscape of environmental management in England, 
where there is an increasing move towards both greater participation and cooperation by 
all stakeholders in management decision-making and action, as well as management 
liberalisation through the adoption of economic measures such as water markets or 
payment for ecosystem services (2c). 
It is probable that many of the factors and mechanisms that have made the LWT model 
successful would work well in other countries with a similar context. Generally 
speaking, these would be situations characterised by a history of centralised natural 
resource management, stakeholders embedded in capitalist systems of production who 
are driven by strong economic incentives to act individualistically and compete, and 
relationships lacking in trust. Whilst mechanisms such as “stationarity”, “storage”, or a 
“plus-sum game” are already established criteria in the literature on the collective 
management of natural resources (Dinar et al., 1997; Ostrom et al., 1994), far less 
attention has been given “institution building” through the development of company 
structures. Yet the subject has not been wholly neglected. For example, in a study of 
grazing systems in the Australian Outback, Brunckhorst and Marshall (2007) consider 
the benefits of developing a corporate approach among stakeholders as one option for 
collectively managing the resource. Here the authors note that “appropriate business 
structures might offer a supportive framework for collective decisions that facilitate 
adaptive management, [thus] enhancing sustainability and endurance” (Brunckhorst and 
Marshall 2007: 182). Our analysis of the LWT scheme would support this assertion.    
7.6 Conclusion 
In this paper we have demonstrated the practical value of applying the politicised IAD 
Framework to studies of comanagement through an analysis of farmer water abstractor 
groups in England. This follows a previous submission to this journal in which we 
explored the relationship between the politicised IAD Framework and (adaptive) 
comanagement from a theoretical perspective. By adopting an integrated and critical 
approach, the analysis was able to identify a range of factors that appear to link water 
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abstractor groups in lowland England with comanagement. These “factors of success” 
were also used to infer more abstract mechanisms that can be said to generate 
comanagement, such as “trust” and the presence of an “energy centre”. We then 
discussed the relevance of several of these factors and generative mechanisms for 
English water governance in the future, where the Framework guided a set of 
predictions about likely changes to the context in which water governance takes place. 
The discussion considered the relationship between comanagement and market theory 
by contemplating the place of water abstractor groups within a more liberalised system 
of water trading; a topic which has received scant attention in the literature to date. 
In general, the findings of this paper have relevance for the emergence of 
comanagement in situations characterised by a power dynamic that favours 
individualism and competition, and where there has been a history of centralised and 
bureaucratic natural resource management. In particular, we have found evidence that 
institution building through the adoption of a company structure with a well-defined, 
legally enforceable members’ agreement and protocol can overcome low levels of trust 
among resource users and managers. Doing so has the potential to facilitate power-
sharing arrangements in a way that enhances the adaptability of the system, whilst also 
maintaining or even improving its efficiency and equity. The political economy and 
discourse analysis component of this investigation highlighted the need to encourage 
collective action among farmers through better integration of government programmes 
and the channelling of funding sources. To this extent, we propose the current system of 
grants and subsidies in England should be used to promote the formation of new 
catchment-based farmer groups whose purpose is to comanage water resources, whilst 
bringing existing groups into the management fold. Funding for shared farm reservoirs 
could also be used to create a “plus-sum game”, with the intention of facilitating 
collective action. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that further investigations into the 
role of various types of company structures, as a means of facilitating stakeholder 
cooperation and participation in natural resource governance, is of much interest to 
scholars and practitioners of comanagement.  
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Epilogue 
In this Chapter I have not been able to demonstrate the way in which the action 
situations of the politicised IAD Framework were analysed. In particular, the approach I 
employed in order to identify different institutional statements relating to the rule-in-
use variable of the Framework (rules, norms, and shared strategies), how I 
differentiated between the different types of statement, and how these statements 
structure an action situation. As a result, in Appendix 3 I provide a short discussion 
with working examples. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions  
8.1 Review 
The aim of this thesis has been to explore farmer cooperation and participation in 
English water governance, through the conceptual lens of (adaptive) comanagement. 
To do this I have developed an interdisciplinary approach that draws in particular upon 
sociology, political science, economics, and psychology. The various analytical strands 
of the research are held together by the politicised IAD Framework, which has guided 
the research at each turn. The thesis has moved through three broad phases. Phase 1 
was theoretical and methodological, and comprises Chapters 2 and 3. Initially, in 
Chapter 2, I demonstrated how, from a theoretical perspective, the Framework is well 
suited to analyses of (adaptive) comanagement. Key to my argument was that by 
choosing to adopt the Framework, the researcher’s attention is drawn to a range of 
methods which together are able to address the “many faces” commonly associated 
with the concept. Then, in Chapter 3, I outlined the research design. In doing so I 
discussed the critical realist paradigm I am working within, the Retroductive Strategy 
underpinning the research, and the various methods that have then been employed to 
address the four research objectives. In Chapter 3 I also discussed how the politicised 
IAD Framework is well suited to a critical realist approach. 
Phase 2 was exploratory, and set out to investigate the wider context surrounding 
farming and water governance in lowland England, and what this implies for farmer 
cooperation and participation as viewed through the lens of (adaptive) 
comanagement. This phase focused on issues of policy, power, and trust, which in turn 
relate to three of the politicised IAD Framework’s exogenous variables, namely the 
“rules-in-use”, “political-economic”, and “discourse” variables. This phase of the 
research therefore provided the context in the model of the Retroductive research 
strategy I have employed (Figure 3.3). In Chapter 4 I undertook a literature review, 
from which five policy categories were distilled that appear to act as an enabling 
environment for adaptive comanagement. I then compared these categories to water 
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policy in England using a directed content analysis. In Chapter 5, I employed a broad 
political economy analysis of farming and water governance in lowland England, by 
examining historical developments from World War II until the present day. This 
analysis, which was structured by an approach known as the Power Cube, shed light on 
the current power dynamic influencing the relationship between lowland farmers, and 
between these farmers and water managers. Then, in Chapter 6, I undertook an 
analysis of farmer discourse using two concepts from the field of critical discursive 
psychology, namely interpretive repertoires and subject positioning. This study also 
examined the power dynamic between lowland farmers, and between these farmers 
and water managers, but from a different perspective to the previous study. Both 
studies, and in particular the latter, provided insights about the levels of trust that 
characterise these relationships. 
Finally, Phase 3 was more focused, where here I adopted a multiple case study 
approach in order to analyse five farmer water abstractor groups in the low lying east 
of England. Consistent with a critical realist approach, the intention of this analysis was 
to identify those mechanisms that generate comanagement between abstractor 
groups and statutory water managers. Again the politicised IAD Framework was 
employed in order to guide the analysis, where the broader findings of Phase 2 were 
incorporated into a more fine-grained analysis of each abstractor group at different 
levels of organisation and governance. Doing this allowed me to discover various 
“factors of success” that appeared to link farmer cooperation with comanagement 
outcomes. These more concrete factors were then used as a foundation upon which to 
make inferences about the deeper, more conceptual causal mechanisms. The 
relevance of the findings were discussed in relation to the future of water governance 
in England, where the Framework guided a set of inferences about likely changes to 
the context in which water management takes place. I gave particular attention to the 
relationship between comanagement and market theory by considering the place of 
water abstractor groups within a more liberalised system of water trading; a topic 
which has received very little attention in the literature to date. 
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8.2 Conclusions 
Having reviewed the research process, here I will detail the various conclusions that 
follow from the findings of this thesis. The conclusions are displayed in relation to each 
of the four research objectives stated in Chapter 1.  
Objective 1: Demonstrate whether and how the politicised IAD Framework can be 
applied to studies of (adaptive) comanagement, and discuss the benefits of doing 
this. 
Objective 1 has been addressed throughout all three phases of the research. In 
Chapter 2 I offer theoretical justification for how the Framework applies to analyses of 
(adaptive) comanagement, and then in the remaining chapters - culminating in the 
case study analysis of abstractor groups in Chapter 7 - a practical demonstration of the 
Framework is undertaken. I can conclude that the politicised IAD Framework is well 
suited to studies of (adaptive) comanagement. Generally speaking, this is because it 
provides breadth, clarity, and structure, drawing the analyst’s attention to: 1) the 
range of variables and questions to be considered when undertaking a study of 
(adaptive) comanagement, 2) the various components of the situation and the ways in 
which they interact, 3) the way in which these components are structured by the five 
exogenous variables, and 4) the criteria the analyst may wish to adopt in evaluating 
the outcomes of the process.  
More specifically, from an (adaptive) comanagement perspective, the advantages of 
employing the politicised IAD Framework are: 1) the five exogenous variables of the 
Framework encompass the range of approaches needed to analyse the “many faces” 
of comanagement that exist in the literature  (Berkes 2009), where these include trust 
building, institution building, power sharing, problem solving, social learning, and 
governance,  2) the Framework can be used to perform embedded analyses concerned 
with both different levels of organisation and governance, and the relationship 
between these levels. This “holons-within-holons” approach (Ostrom, 2005) is 
consistent with adaptive comanagement’s focus on multiple levels of activity and 
cross-scale interplay. It is also a means of tacking the complexity associated with 
 196 
 
social-ecological systems by dissecting them into composite holons, which can then be 
dissected further (ibid), 3) the Framework allows the analyst to ground the normative 
concepts associated with (adaptive) comanagement in a critical awareness of 
“situation” and how context and power fundamentally influence the behaviour of the 
system in question, 4) the Framework helps to identify the key mechanisms that 
generate (adaptive) comanagement and the contextual conditions that facilitate or 
obstruct this process, 5) analyses that employ the Framework provide a solid 
foundation upon which to make sound policy recommendations. Of importance is the 
fact that the research remains relevant to policy makers through its focus on the 
socioeconomic and institutional components of an action situation. This issue of 
informing the policy process has been recognised as a challenge to adaptive 
comanagement scholars (Berkes et al., 2007). 
Objective 2: Analyse the extent to which English water policy provides an enabling 
environment for adaptive comanagement. 
In a number of ways decision makers have put in place policy objectives that are 
amenable to the emergence of adaptive comanagement. In particular, the key features 
of water policy in England that were identified as facilitating adaptive comanagement 
are: 1) a recognition of the many economic and non-economic functions that water 
and the water environment perform, using the framework of the ecosystem services 
approach, 2) an acceptance that change is an inherent feature of water management 
that is only likely to become more prominent in the future, 3) a stated desire to 
enhance the resilience of the system, 4) the promotion of participatory and locally-
based governance approaches that are linked across scales of organisation, 5) a 
growing awareness of water management as a long-term social process.  
Yet at the same time, I also noted a level of discrepancy between key aspects of the 
five policy categories that facilitate adaptive comanagement and water policy in 
England. In particular, I identified: 1) a failure on the part of policy makers to 
adequately prioritise the place of social learning as a central mechanism by which 
water governance in England can progress and adapt to changing circumstances, 2) 
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only a weak focus on uncertainty and the need to live with it, instead of simply 
attempting to reduce or eliminate it, 3) a failure to link resilience and adaptive capacity 
to the social dimension of water management. 
Objective 3: Analyse the ways in which power and levels of trust influence the ability 
of lowland farmers to comanage water. 
Broadly speaking, the political economy analysis in Chapter 5 revealed how since 
World War II the system governing farming and water governance in lowland England 
has witnessed a dispersal of power across different levels of organisation from the 
local to the international, and in different types of spaces. One outcome is the 
establishment of “invited spaces” in which non-state actors, including farmers, have an 
opportunity to influence planning and decision-making. Yet despite this opportunity, 
the power dynamic revealed by the analysis indicates that three distinct barriers stand 
in the way of developing comanagement arrangements between lowland farmers and 
water managers. These are: 1) the power “within” lowland farmers, which continues to 
be defined in large part by a productivist ideology that favours individualism, 
competition, and profit, often at the expense of the environment, 2) the ongoing 
power that government water managers exercise “over” farmers instead of sharing 
power “with” them, and 3) the relationship between modern farming and 
environmental interests, where the two sides power “to” act has tended to be 
diametrically opposed. 
The discourse analysis in Chapter 6 identified three distinct discourses, or “interpretive 
repertoires”, relating to how the farmers in the study talked about the relationship 
between farming and water resources management. These are the competition, 
conflict, and compromise repertoires. The relative dominance of the competition and 
conflict repertoires in the talk of the participants suggests that the relationship 
between irrigators and water managers in England is characterised by low levels of 
trust, and reflects a power dynamic that favours individualism and opposition. This 
situation presents only limited possibilities for the development of comanagement. Yet 
the analysis also suggests that this power dynamic is being challenged by the 
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compromise repertoire, which accounts for the needs of others, shows an appreciation 
for the wider environment, and views change in water resources management as a 
process of negotiation in which cooperation can perform a useful function. 
Encouraging the widespread adoption and institutionalisation of this repertoire, whilst 
moving beyond subject positions in the other repertoires that at present serve to 
undermine trust, must start with better communication between farmers, and 
between farmers and water managers. 
Objective 4: Analyse the relationship between water abstractor groups and water 
resources management and identify the mechanisms that generate comanagement. 
Discuss the relevance of the findings for water governance in England going 
forwards. 
By employing the politicised IAD Framework, the analysis in Chapter 7 identified nine 
key factors that appear to link the abstractor groups in the study - and particularly the 
LWT group - to comanagement. These “factors of success” are: 1) the adoption of a 
company structure with a clearly defined and legally enforceable members’ agreement 
and protocol, 2) a shared water licence, 3)the ponded system of drainage channels 
which LWT abstracts from, 4) access to additional water, 5) the close relationship 
between farmers and the IDB, 6) the presence of the “compromise repertoire”, 7) 
Similar race, age, gender, and profession of group members, 8) small group size, and 9) 
the presence of a leader. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, an important part of a critical realist approach demands that 
I do not take the co-variance of events in the domain of the empirical as implying a 
causal relation. Instead the goal is to discover deeper, more abstract mechanisms that 
can be said to generate the observed outcome pattern within a given context. In the 
case of this research the “outcome pattern” refers to the participation of abstractor 
groups in one or more of seven broad comanagement activities (Table 7.1). Therefore, 
it can’t be said that the factors of success listed above cause comanagement, but only 
that they appear to correlate with this outcome. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
these factors are useful for making inferences about more abstract generative 
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mechanisms. From the factors of success identified above, I have concluded that the 
following generative mechanisms were operating to bring about (adaptive) 
comanagement: 1) stationarity (of the resource), 2) a plus-sum game, 3) institution 
building, 4) trust and trust building, 5) the presence of a bridging organisation, 6) group 
homogeneity, 7) group size, 8) the presence of an energy centre, 9) problem solving, 
and 10) social learning. All of these mechanisms are recognised in the commons, 
resilience, and comanagement literature, and this provides support for the internal 
validity of the research, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Of these mechanisms, several appear to be more crucial for generating (adaptive) 
comanagement within the context identified in Phase 2 of the thesis; that is, within a 
situation characterised by relatively low levels of trust both between farmers, and 
between farmers and water managers, where individualism and competition are 
dominant behavioural traits. By employing three strategies for deciding among 
contending mechanisms – namely counterfactual thinking, an extreme case study, and 
a comparative case study approach (see Chapter 3) - two mechanisms in particular 
appear most crucial for generating comanagement between abstractor groups and 
water managers in lowland England. The first is “institution building” through the 
specific shared strategy of adopting a company structure with a related members’ 
agreement and protocol. Furthermore, the strategy to form a company as a way of 
facilitating comanagement is perhaps the most novel finding of the thesis, given that it 
has received relatively little attention in the literature to date. It is also of particular 
relevance given the contextual conditions described above, where it has helped to 
overcome low levels of trust, in turn facilitating power-sharing arrangements. The 
second key mechanism is the “stationarity” of the resource, which was unique to LWT 
and appears a crucial element of the scheme’s success.  
The mechanisms identified in this thesis have potentially significant implications for 
farming and water governance in England, where I have proposed that in the future: 1) 
water supply is set to become more variable and less secure, 2) the water regulatory 
regime will become more liberalised through the development of water markets, and 
3) a dual focus on market instruments and participatory approaches is likely to remain 
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a central characteristic of water and environmental policy. Within this changing 
picture, a company structure and a clearly defined and legally enforceable operating 
procedure has the potential to increase the flexibility of agricultural water 
management, and the overall adaptability of water governance at the local level, 
whilst maintaining or improving measures of efficiency and equity. Furthermore, 
within a water market, adopting a company structure is likely to facilitate cross-sector 
trading with farmers whilst improving their standing in relation to the “bigger players” 
in a trading situation.  
Finally, the water resource systems of many agriculturally important, low-lying parts of 
the country already exhibit stationarity, whether in the IDB-managed ponded systems 
of the Fens (see Figure 7.1), or the aquifers which many farmers abstract from. These 
areas represent opportunities to encourage collective action among farmers because 
of the way stationarity makes it easier to self-organise and participate in management 
decision-making. Even on free-flowing rivers a degree of stationarity can be achieved, 
by storing water in on-farm reservoirs. In the future, introducing measures to trigger 
these mechanisms may become increasingly relevant as the requirement to manage 
water through change and uncertainty becomes commonplace. It is probable that 
these conclusions are applicable to other countries with similar contexts. 
8.3 Recommendations 
In this final section I provide recommendations that stem from the research findings 
and conclusions. They are divided into two sections, where these are 
recommendations for policy makers, and recommendations for researchers and 
further research.  
8.3.1 Recommendations for policy makers 
Here I propose recommendations for policy makers that would facilitate the 
development of (adaptive) comanagement arrangements between farmer groups and 
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water managers in lowland England. A number of useful suggestions can be derived 
from the findings of the analyses in Chapters 4-7.  
With respect to the policy analysis in Chapter 4, which set out to address Objective 2 of 
the research agenda, two recommendations can be made that would facilitate the 
development of an enabling policy environment for adaptive comanagement. Firstly, 
water policy should give special attention to the place of social learning within existing 
management processes such as river basin management planning and the Catchment 
Based Approach. It should also promote new objectives especially designed to 
facilitate joint learning as a way of developing a more adaptive system of water 
governance in England, and to recognise that this is necessary because of the inherent 
levels of uncertainty decision-makers face from a range of sources. Secondly, attempts 
to enhance the resilience and adaptive capacity of water governance in England must 
explicitly link this objective to the social dimension. In the policy documents, although 
resilience and adaptive capacity were stated aims of the government, this typically 
related to the design of infrastructure and regulatory systems, or the healthy 
functioning of natural ecosystems. Whilst these are important considerations, from an 
adaptive comanagement perspective the participatory, multi-level, learning, and 
process aspects of water governance are seen as key social attributes of a more 
resilient system. 
Considering Objective 3, which was addressed in Chapters 5 and 6, it is clear that both 
of these analyses provide justification for the use of regulations and financial 
incentives designed to instigate behaviour change. This points to the importance of the 
current system of agri-environment and water-related schemes and programmes. 
Encouraging farmer cooperation and participation in water governance will depend on 
the structure of such schemes. To this end, I suggest a greater integration of 
government programmes and a channelling of funding sources. Here CAP payments 
under Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) options such as HR8 (see “The CAP” in 
Section 5.3.5) could combine with initiatives like the Catchment Based Approach to 
incentivise the formation of farmer groups and their participation in water 
comanagement activities. Given the changing structure of the system regulating water 
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resources management (see Section 6.2.1), a suitable comanagement activity to focus 
on initially could be water allocation.  
This consideration of water allocation leads on to recommendations that arise from 
the final analysis in Chapter 7, which set out to address Objective 4. Considering the 
success of the comanagement scheme that the LWT group participated in, it was clear 
that a power-sharing arrangement that revolves around water allocation is a feasible 
option for farmer groups operating in conjunction with local water managers. Again 
looking to the current system of grants and subsidies in England, a recommendation to 
encourage similar arrangements in other areas of lowland England is to tailor ESS 
options and Catchment Based Management funding in order to cover the costs of self-
organising (start-up and running costs). Specific focus should be given to options that 
facilitate the formation of a company structure among a group of farmers, where the 
function of the company is oriented towards comanagement through the adoption of 
an appropriately designed, and legally enforceable members’ agreement and protocol.  
Options of this sort would appear to be most suitable for regions where water levels 
are managed by IDBs. This is because the resource in these areas tends to exhibit a 
high degree of “stationarity”, whilst the land itself often provides excellent growing 
conditions for farming. Furthermore, the higher levels of “trust” between IDBs and 
farmers could help to facilitate the development of comanagement schemes, as was 
the case in the LWT study. It would also provide IDBs, whose position in England’s 
system of water governance is sometimes called into question, a new function as a 
“bridging organisation” in arrangements of this sort. However, even outside of these 
areas, on free-flowing rivers, a degree of stationarity can be achieved by storing water 
in on-farm reservoirs. Here I recommend the provision of funding designed to promote 
the development of shared reservoir schemes. This would represent a “plus-sum 
game” that again could encourage collective action among farmers in a way that is 
geared towards making water allocation more adaptable and efficient. 
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8.3.2 Recommendations for researchers and further research 
Several recommendations for researchers and further research emerge from the 
findings of the thesis. With respect to researchers, the clearest recommendation is for 
the use of the politicised IAD Framework as a means of analysing natural resource 
governance, and (adaptive) comanagement in particular. Whilst I do not need to go 
into all the reasons for suggesting this again here, it suffices to say that the clarity, 
breadth, and structure the Framework provides, the way it is able to ground normative 
concepts in a critical appreciation of situation, and its ability to produce results that 
are relevant for policy makers, all act as strong arguments for its adoption. 
Furthermore, I recommend using the politicised IAD Framework as a way of structuring 
multi-disciplinary team studies, whereby the analytical clarity it provides can be used 
to guide and organise the work threads of the various members in the team. 
A number of specific recommendations for further research also emerge from this 
study. Of particular importance, I recommend that the causal relationships I have 
proposed exist between the generative mechanisms identified and (adaptive) 
comanagement be further investigated. Indeed, this is regarded as an important step 
in a critical realist approach, whereby causal mechanisms are not just postulated, but 
are then subjected to further empirical testing in order to ascertain both their 
presence, and their relative explanatory power with respect to the phenomena of 
interest (Bhaskar, 1975, 1979; Danermark et al., 2002). For example, although I have 
proposed that all the mechanisms identified generate comanagement, following 
further investigation it is likely that some of these mechanisms, whilst perhaps 
generating collective action among farmers more generally, are not as relevant to a 
specific comanagement outcome pattern. Within the limited scope of this study I have 
already attempted to make this distinction by proposing that “institution building” 
(with respect to the specific measure of adopting a company structure) and resource 
“stationarity” are most vital for generating comanagement arrangements geared 
towards water allocation between farmer groups in lowland England. Yet further 
enquiries are needed in order to refute or add weight to such claims, and to discover 
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new structures and causal mechanisms that facilitate or obstruct the development of 
(adaptive) comanagement. 
Finally, there is real value in undertaking further research aimed at exploring options 
for promoting farmer cooperation and participation in water governance that revolve 
around the key findings. In particular, I recommend attention is given to the role of 
IDBs, where their function as a potential bridging organisation, especially in the 
ponded surface-water systems of lowland England, should be explored further. 
Secondly, and most interestingly, I recommend that further research concerns itself 
with the role of various types of company structures, as a means of facilitating farmer 
cooperation and participation. These proposals will need to be investigated in relation 
to the current system of grants and subsidies, which, as the findings from Chapters 5 
and 6 suggest, are the most efficacious means of instigating behaviour change among 
lowland farmers in the short to medium-term. This will require that new agri-
environment schemes and options are explored, with the aim of providing the relevant 
support to incentivise the formation of farmer groups designed to participate in water 
comanagement. 
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Appendix 1: Extended Interview Schedule 
1. General  
 Information about me, the research, and the interview.  
 What level of confidentiality would you like? I will ask you again at the end of the 
interview. 
a. Name   b. Name of group   c. Position in group 
 First of all can you please tell me a little bit about you and your farm business 
before moving on to questions about the abstractor group? 
 What would you say are the major challenges to farming in the future? 
 
2. Internal group dynamics 
 What is your role in the abstractor group? 
 When did the group form and what were the reasons for doing so? 
 How many members do you have now? How many did you have to begin with? 
 How does someone become a member of the group? 
 What type of agreement do you have between members of the group (e.g. 
contractual or implicit)? 
 How has the group changed when you compare it now to how it was in the 
beginning? (Function, size, etc.) 
 What would you say have been the achievements of the group to date and were 
there any particular challenges you faced in attaining them? 
 What would you say are the benefits of being a group member? 
 What would you say are the drawbacks of being a group member? 
 How often do you meet up? Who meets up? What do you discuss? 
 What level of communication would you say exists between members, and 
between members and the committee, etc.? 
 Would all group members know who the other members are? 
 What sorts of decisions do you have to make as a group, and how do you decide 
upon them? 
 What sorts of costs are involved in running the group and how are they paid for? 
 To what degree would you say there is trust between the group members, or to 
what degree do the group members trust the organisation to act on their behalf? 
 How do you feel about cooperating with other farmers? And in an ideal situation 
would you rather be operating independently? Why? 
 Do conflicts ever arise between the group members, and does the group itself play 
any part in resolving them if they do arise? If so, how? 
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 Does the group have any say in how its members use water in order to manage it 
better? If so, how is this done? 
 Has the group facilitated any water trades between its members? How well placed 
do you think the group is for doing this? 
 What do you feel about water trading? Have you had any experience with it or 
know anyone who has? Would you like to see farming ring-fenced in a market? 
 
3. External group dynamics 
 What is the group’s relationship with the Environment Agency and other 
government bodies like Natural England? 
 How have these relationships changed over time? 
 In what way does the group function to resolve issues between its members and 
other stakeholders or the government? 
 Do you think the Environment Agency is effective in monitoring abstraction 
volumes and timings? 
 What are the consequences to farmers who break their licence conditions? 
 Does the group have much to do with other non-government organisations or 
stakeholders? 
 What is the group’s relationship with environmental NGOs like the rivers trusts? 
 To what degree did the recent drought affect your members? 
 How did the group responded to the challenge of the drought? 
 What would be your advice to any farmers thinking about forming an abstractor 
group? 
 
4. Farming and water management 
 I read in a report that the NFU wants the Government to support farmer-led 
catchment abstraction groups who play a part in managing water. Would you say 
this is feasible? And if so, is it desirable? How could you see such an arrangement 
working? 
 Do you feel a responsibility towards the condition of the river in you catchment? 
And do you have any control over management decisions even if you did?  
 What do you think about the way water is managed in England, and what are the 
ways you would change it if you could? 
 In what ways do farmers contribute to water management in this catchment? Is 
there a role for them to become more involved in water management issues going 
forwards?  
 What could farmers contribute towards water management? 
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 Do you think there is a greater role for cooperation, both between farmers and 
between farmers and the other stakeholders involved in water management? And 
could groups like yours be used in this way?  
 Are you part of any Catchment Sensitive Farming, catchment-based management, 
or stewardship schemes at the moment? If yes, what does this entail? If no, why 
not? 
 There is a higher level stewardship grant for collective environmental action; do 
you think there would be any interest from your group to apply for this sort of 
funding in order to play more of a role in water management issues in the 
catchment? 
 
What level of confidentiality would you like? I will ask you again at the end of the 
interview. 
a. Name   b. Name of group   c. Position in group 
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APPENDIX 2: Research Information Sheet and 
Interview Consent Form 
  
 
 
 
 
Understanding the role of farmer cooperation in the 
management of water resources 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or 
not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
This study is part of an EPSRC funded research project looking at the potential for 
abstraction licence trading to overcome issues of water scarcity in the UK. The 
research team is made up of nine academics from four universities, including three 
PhD students. As one of those PhD students, my specific area of interest is looking at 
the ways in which farmers are working together as members of water abstractor 
groups.  
 
The aim of my research is to understand how abstractor groups and shared reservoir 
groups that exist at the moment might function in the future, where weather conditions 
are predicted to be more variable and water supply less secure. To do this I will be 
interviewing farmers who are part of these groups, as well as individuals from outside 
organisations who deal with the groups, in order to explore how they function at 
present and how these functions may change over time. 
  
As someone involved with one or more of these groups, you are invited to participate in 
the study. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take 
part you will be given this information sheet to keep and asked to sign a consent form. 
Please note that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time and without giving 
a reason. 
 
Participating in the study will involve being interviewed for approximated 45 minutes on 
issues related to the abstractor group you are involved with, as well as water issues 
more generally. If you are happy to, the researcher may then contact you at a later date 
to ask for additional information or to clarify any information given during the interview.  
Your participation will assist in an understanding of how farmers use and manage 
water in partnership, and how this might improve water security for both farming and 
the environment.  
 
All data you provide will be stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act, and 
should you wish to remain anonymous your name and any other relevant details will be 
removed upon request. The results of the study will go towards a final PhD thesis, and 
may also be published in a relevant academic journal. 
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If you wish to take part in this study, please initial where appropriate and sign the form 
provided. Please note that this research has been reviewed and approved by Cranfield 
University’s Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee. 
 
If you would like to know any further information, please contact: 
 
Luke Whaley 
Cranfield Water Science Institute 
Cranfield University 
E: l.whaley@cranfield.ac.uk 
T: 01234 750111 ex. 5583 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Full title of Project: Understanding the role of farmer collaboration in the future 
management of water resources. 
 
Name, position and contact address of Researcher: 
 
Luke Whaley 
PhD Student 
Water Science Institute 
Cranfield University 
 
 
 Please tick box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read/listened to the information about the above study 
and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
  
 
       Please tick box 
 
      Yes                 No 
4. I agree to the interview being audio recorded    
   
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
Name of participant                                                  Date                                                         Signature 
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Appendix 3: Analysing Action Situations 
Here I provide a brief working example to illustrate how I analysed action situations 
during the research. Much has been written in the main body of the text on the 
process of using the politicised IAD Framework to do this. In this appendix I therefore 
limit the theoretical discussion and instead refer the reader back to the relevant 
sections of the thesis (see Chapters 2 and 3).  
The stages of the analysis were shown in Figure 3.1. The first step was to define the 
action situations for each case study in Chapter 7 (each of the five abstractor groups), 
where these related both to levels of organisation (inter-organisational and intra-
organisational) and levels of governance (operational, collective-choice, and 
constitutional levels). Each action situation is broken down into seven working 
components (see Figure 2.2) consisting of participants who take up various positions, 
where any given position allows the participant to undertake certain actions that are 
dependent on how much information they possess about each available action, how 
actions are linked to potential outcomes, the degree of control individuals exercise 
over these outcomes, and the costs and benefits they assign to them (Ostrom 1990). 
An example of an intra-organisational action situation at the operational level is 
provided in Table A3-1. This situation relates only to the task of allocating water 
between members of the LWT abstractor group. 
Table A3-1. Water allocation between LWT members at the operational level. 
Participant Position Actions Information Control Costs and 
benefits 
Outcomes 
Farmer Chairman Ensure the 
board of 
directors 
make 
decisions 
in 
accordanc
e with the 
rules of 
Members’ 
agreement 
and protocol 
Strong 
control, but 
accountable 
to 
membership. 
Coordinatio
n costs, 
benefit of 
ensuring 
operating 
procedure is 
followed 
Board of 
directors 
operate in 
accordanc
e with 
rules 
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the 
members’ 
agreement 
and 
protocol 
Farmer Board 
director 
Decide 
how water 
is to be 
allocated 
Members’ 
agreement 
and protocol 
Joint 
control/decisi
on-making 
Coordinatio
n costs, 
benefit in 
that water 
allocated 
fairly when 
demand 
outstrips 
supply 
Equitable 
allocation 
when 
demand 
outstrips 
supply 
Farmer General 
member 
Submit 
proportion 
or all of 
licence to 
central 
pool 
before 
season 
begins for 
permanent 
or annual 
use 
Estimate of 
water 
requirement 
for season 
Individual 
decision 
Coordinatio
n costs, 
benefit by 
receiving 
additional 
income for 
unwanted 
water 
1)  
Greater 
flexibility 
of water 
use, 
especially 
for 
specialist 
growers 
operating 
across the 
catchment, 
2)  
Increase 
income for 
members, 
3) 
Enhanced 
water 
security 
 
 
  Take water 
out of 
central 
pool 
before 
season 
begins for 
permanent 
or annual 
use 
Estimate of 
water 
requirement 
for season 
Individual 
decision 
Coordinatio
n cost, 
benefit by 
having water 
to irrigate 
current crop 
or to expand 
the crop for 
whole 
season 
  Submit 
proportion 
or all of 
licence to 
central 
pool 
during 
season  
Estimate of 
water 
requirement 
for 
remainder 
of season 
Individual 
decision 
Coordinatio
n cost, 
benefit by 
receiving 
additional 
income 
during 
season for 
unwanted 
water 
  Take water 
out of 
central 
Estimate of 
water 
requirement 
Individual 
decision 
Coordinatio
n cost, 
benefit by 
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pool 
during 
season 
for 
remainder 
of season 
being able 
to irrigate 
crop during 
season 
 
The action situation is structured by the five exogenous variables of the politicised IAD 
Framework. The variables themselves where analysed in Chapters 5-7. In Chapters 5 
and 6, the political-economic and discourse variables were explored, where these 
variables are seen to influence in particular the “position” element of action situations. 
For example, the analysis of the political-economic variable revealed that within the 
action situation in Table A3-1 above, farmers are positioned as individualists with low 
levels of trust in one another. This finding was supported by the discourse analysis in 
Chapter 6, where the positions attributed to farmers in the competition and conflict 
repertoires were self-interested, insular, and uncommunicative businessmen. As 
Chapter 7 revealed, the LWT scheme nonetheless constitutes a case of genuine 
comanagement, where both farmers and water managers cooperate in order to 
contribute to a range of water comanagement activities. It was clear that the decision 
to form a limited company and devise a legally enforceable members’ agreement and 
protocol was one a key factor of success, pointing to the process of institution building 
at the local level. Here I take this factor further; in Table A3-2 the allocation rules the 
group devised in order to structure the action situation above (Table A3-1) is shown. 
Table A3-2. The rules devised by the LWT group to allocate water. This table only 
details the choice rules concerning allocation of water among group members. 
Type of Rule Basic verb Rule-in-use 
CHOICE Do Before the season starts any 
member with surplus water 
may submit some or all of their 
licence share to a central pool 
on a one-year basis, where this 
will include proportionate daily 
allocation, or else this water 
cannot be shared with anyone 
else in the group. Any annual 
allocation offered but not taken 
up will be transferred to a “first 
reserve”. 
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Before the season starts any 
member with surplus water 
may submit some or all of their 
licence share to a central pool 
on a permanent basis, where 
this will include proportionate 
daily allocation, or else this 
water cannot be shared with 
anyone else in the group. Any 
annual allocation offered but 
not taken up will be transferred 
to a “first reserve”.  
Before the season starts any 
member requiring additional 
water on an annual or 
permanent basis may apply for 
it from the central pool on the 
condition that they contribute 
towards the annual 
administrative costs of the 
scheme in proportion to their 
total share of the group’s 
abstraction licence or else the 
board of directors will take 
disciplinary action against the 
member in question. 
During the season any member 
requiring additional water may 
apply for it from the first 
reserve on the condition they 
have used their total allocation, 
where this will not include any 
daily allocation, or else they 
cannot access additional water 
from the group. 
During the season any member 
with surplus water may submit 
this licence share to a “second 
reserve”, where this will not 
include proportionate daily 
allocation, or else this water 
cannot be shared with anyone 
else in the group. 
During the season any member 
requiring additional water may 
apply for it from the second 
reserve on the condition that 
the first reserve has been used, 
where this will not include any 
daily allocation, or else they 
cannot access additional water 
from the group licence. 
All members must not trade 
any part of their share of the 
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licence directly with any other 
member or else the board of 
directors must apply 
disciplinary action. 
  All members must not to trade 
any part of their share of the 
licence with a third party 
outside of the group or else the 
board of directors must apply 
disciplinary measures. 
  All members must not allow a 
third party to use any part of 
their share of the licence on 
land that is not designated 
within the scheme as laid out in 
the licence conditions or else 
the board of directors must 
apply disciplinary measures. 
All of these rules are “choice” rules. That is, they most directly impact upon the 
“actions” element of the action situation (see Figure 2.2). The syntactic structure of the 
rules-in-use21 is defined according to Ostrom and Crawford’s (1995) grammar of 
institutions. According to this structure, rules are comprised of five components: 
[Attribute], [Deontic], [Aim], [Conditions], and [Or else]. For example, the rule in 
England relating to driving on the left hand side of the road can be structured as: “All 
drivers [attribute] must [deontic] drive on the left hand side of the road [aim] unless 
overtaking another vehicle in designated areas [condition] or else they will be 
prosecuted [or else]”. The same syntax can be seen in the ways in which the rules 
detailed in Table A3-2 above have been structured.  
Using the grammar of institutions also allowed me to distinguish rules-in-use (ADICO) 
from other institutional statements, namely norms (ADIC) and shared strategies (AIC). 
For example, one norm relating to the LWT case study concerns the close relationship 
between the IDB and the farmers in the abstractor group, where, according to the 
grammar of institutions, the norm in question can be written as: “Farmers who irrigate 
[attribute] must [deontic] be assisted by managing water levels [aim] when they 
request help [condition]. Here there is no “or else” component of the statement – i.e. 
                                                          
21 Where these rule were discovered after analysing the interview data and other supporting 
documents. 
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no formal penalty is incurred for not following this course of action – thus 
distinguishing it from a rule.22 Finally, to illustrate a shared strategy I can refer to the 
decision by several abstractor groups to reduce their water use during drought 
periods. This can be written as: “All group members [attribute] reduce water use by 
the agreed amount [aim] when there is a drought [condition]. Alternatively, LWT’s 
decision to form a limited company is also a shared strategy that was adopted within 
the structure of the inter-organisational action situation during the formation of the 
scheme. This strategy can be written as: “All group members [attribute] form a limited 
company [aim] before applying for a shared licence [condition]. 
The various action situations, as well as the rules-in-use and other exogenous variables 
that structure them, interact with one another. Thus, in the simple example of choice 
rules in Table A3-2, reference is made to the disciplinary measures the board of 
directors can use to penalise members who break the rules. These sanctions are also 
encoded in the members’ agreement and protocol, and constitute “pay-off” rules, 
which most directly affect the “cost and benefit” component of an action situation. 
There are of course many other rule-in-use relating to the other five components of 
the action situation, where alongside choice rules and pay-off rules, these are position, 
boundary, aggregation, information, and scope rules (Ostrom, 2005). By way of 
illustration, an example of each type of rule from the analysis of the LWT scheme is 
provided in Table A3-3 below.23 
 Table A3-3. Examples of each of the seven types of rules-in-use. 
Type of rule Basic verb Rule-in-use 
POSITION Be There will be no fewer than 
four directors 
BOUNDARY Enter or leave A third party may enter the 
scheme as a member if the 
majority of members vote him 
or her in, and where the joining 
                                                          
22 Nonetheless, not following norms will typically result in an “informal sanction”, be it external, 
for example through peer pressure, or internal, for example by feeling guilt or shame (Ostrom, 
2005). 
23 Note that “position” rules do not conform to the ADECO syntax (Ostrom, 2005). 
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party is not taking a transfer of 
any existing member's rights 
and where he or she 
contributes towards the capital 
payments as decided by the 
board, or else the person in 
question must not join. 
AGGREGATION Jointly affect When demand for water in the 
central pool outstrips supply 
the board of directors must 
decide how the water will be 
allocated between those 
members requesting it or else 
the chairman can take 
disciplinary action. 
INFORMATION Send or receive All members of Lincoln Water 
Transfer must send their 
abstraction returns to the 
UWIDB at the end of each week 
or else the board can take 
disciplinary action. 
SCOPE Occur Lincoln Water Transfer's 
abstraction activity must occur 
along the reaches of the 
drainage channels designated in 
the group’s licence and must be 
used on the area of land 
designated in the group’s 
licence or else the regulator has 
the right to sanction the 
offender/s in question. 
Finally, it is necessary to note that a fine-grained analysis of rules-in-use (and other 
exogenous variables) was not employed to analyse all the ways in which the five 
exogenous variables structure all of the action situations comprising the case studies in 
Chapter 7. This would have been a massive task, without sufficient benefits to justify 
such an undertaking. This is especially so because such an approach is typically only 
necessary when attempting a formal game-theory analysis (Ostrom 2005). In this 
thesis, the approach I have adopted has been less formal. As such, at times it sufficed 
to pick out what appeared to be the most significant elements of the exogenous 
variables as they related to the action situations, or to define those action situations 
that were of most interest in detail, whilst spending less time on others. 
